From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Fri Jun 14 2002 - 06:41:04 MDT
Louis writes
> As to the "(otherwise ... making you fork)", I have always contended that
> "making you fork" is the proof that these "synched" thought experiments are
> faulty. If you can't allow anything that would cause a difference between to
> objects, that would take a lot of effort.
Yes, but the principle (what's at stake here philosophically) isn't
too much affected by the effort. That's one reason that if one
agrees that programs can be just as conscious as we are (or that
we *are* programs), then this effort can be infinitely reduced.
Moreover, as we progress technologically, we may soon be in the
position of wondering how moral it is to re-run certain programs.
> I think this is getting back into the "if two objects are identical in every
> way are there one or two of them" argument. I have always maintained "two",
> but this thought experiment hinges on a person's opinion of that argument.
I tend to agree with you. The key point, to me, is that for some
reason someone has referred to "two objects". Why did they do
that? How did they do that? Evidently there is some distinction
between them; all we need to do is ascertain what. Then, in some
cases, we will judge the "two" to be equivalent to one, or equivalent
in some ways.
> I think there is only a small change in "the same" and "almost
> the same".
Yes, exactly! I don't think that anyone has answered this
point satisfactorily. I had asked earlier (when people
suggested that perhaps nothing was wrong with having a
little girl experience an incredibly evil torture session,
merely so long as it had happened before) what would be
the view if it weren't *exactly* identical. As you imply,
our values must be continuous.
> I think it has almost no effect on whether there are one or two
> consciousnesses. This is perfectly consistent, because I believe
> that two identical copies would still have two consciousnesses.
I tend to agree; but it's always problematical when one is
asking whether there are one or two
persons
consciousnesses
experiences
and I've noticed people moving back and forth between these
without a lot of care. (It's also true that we shouldn't
try to obtain completely hard and fast answers to any of
these, but try to keep in mind their slippery natures.)
I suppose that we should consider there to be one person,
but two consciousnesses and two experiences in duplication
experiments. It seems odd, for example, to be unable to
categorize completely whether or not a collection of atoms
is having an experience by examination of local conditions
---in other words, it seems odd if one has to be informed
of conditions through out the universe, past and present
included, in order to be able to say whether an experience
is being had, and whether it is good or bad.
Lee
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