From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Wed Jun 12 2002 - 13:20:19 MDT
Eugen writes
> I'm one of the [two] runs.
I think that this is wrong. You are both of the runs. Duplicates
are selves. I would say that you have no physical basis for saying
that you are one of the runs and not the other.
> As soon as I realize this, I can lobby the entity I'm
> conversing with to remove the constraints (whether
> trajectory forcing if it's nondeterministic or identical
> input if it's deterministic) keeping my trajectory identical
> (whether I'm the first or the second run doesn't matter).
> The entity may or may not listen.
By hypothesis, the entity does not listen. We are talking
about runs (program executions) that from the Operating
System's point of view are entirely deterministic. Your
calculation (i.e. your experience) determines only one
bit of output that the OS uses: namely whether or not
to terminate the second execution mid-way through.
> Variations on this involve the number of copies, and how much money you
> offer (assuming, there are no other enticements available -- if my runs
> are identical, either I'm in solitary confinement, surrounded by zombies,
> or other people are in there with me).
Quite true. If billions are offered, I'll consider
aborting my second run. As you say, the total number of
copies of me executing (currently or in the past or future)
can also logically affect my preferences. Also, as you say,
(A) you could be surrounded by mere portrayals of people that
the OS puts on for your benefit, but who are not real and do
not have experiences, or (B) there could be other people
present (though it's much more complicated and takes some
work to make sure inconsistencies don't arise).
> > > My scenario is exactly equivalent to a specific Turing Machine
> > > (one that is clearly Eugen Leitl, assuming that he has a finite
> > > lifespan) being run through twice by the Operating System, or
> > > God, or whatever.
> > >
> > > So I think that they are already "separate people" in your
> > > terminology, but I'm not certain.
>
> No, they're not separate people. Yet. They have the potential to become
> separate, and diverge rather far apart, if given the chance.
Okay, as you will: they're not "separate people". But part of
my hypothesis is that there is exactly zero chance that they
can diverge; they're quadruples in a (formal) Turing Machine,
and this TM either runs one-and-a-half times, or two full times.
Your choice.
Lee
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