From: Smigrodzki, Rafal (SmigrodzkiR@msx.upmc.edu)
Date: Wed Jun 12 2002 - 09:33:59 MDT
A claim was made that:
>But the pain the little girl experiences is *exactly* the same
>as it was the first time.
### What if the copying of a mathematical object (a perfect quantum level
description of a human, including the time dimension) does not multiply the
qualia (e.g. pain) associated with the object?
I understand this is a rather counterintuitive proposal. Still, our
intuitions about the meaning of time might off here. If you think about a
mathematical object (triangle?), it is the same triangle observed by
Pythagoras, not a copy in the time-and-space bound sense we usually use. If
the triangle could feel its squareness, it would be a timeless instant, a
qualium not affected by the number of people imagining a triangle. By
analogy, copying a human at this level, as a mathematical object, would be
like imagining a person, without having a duplication of the internal mental
states. If you read Julian Barbour such ideas appear much less outlandish.
Maybe it means you cannot perfectly copy a physical object (including the
time dimension), unless you can copy the whole universe, or at least all the
branches of the multiverse containing the object.
Rafal
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