From: Samantha Atkins (samantha@objectent.com)
Date: Wed May 01 2002 - 14:33:50 MDT
Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Tue, 30 Apr 2002, Adrian Tymes wrote:
>
>
>>This almost exactly duplicates Descartes' infamous musing. If you
>>were uploaded into a VR that *perfectly* replicated your current
>>reality, in a way that you did not remember the upload, then no, it
>>would not matter: by definition, there would be no difference to you.
>>
>
> Of course there would a world of a difference: you wouldn't be in control.
> You'd be in teletubbyland, at mercy of whatever entity that is running the
> place. Perfect prison, can't even kill yourself.
>
Actually you have no way of know whether you are in such a world
already so insisting on a great deal of difference isn't very
convincing. You can certainly apparently kill the apparent body
but whether or not this is the absolute death you might
otherwise think it is would be uncertain in such a context.
Precisely what is different that you can absolutely prove right now?
- samantha
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