From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Fri Nov 30 2001 - 09:41:51 MST
My thoughts on Identity
I am relatively new to this particular list so I had not seen this
discussion come up before. I have thought some about this and think it is
a very important issue to resolve. From the perspective of the subject, say
me, in the event of a catastrophic damage, I would never be aware of
awakening. Assuming a real time constant backup is continually being made,
as was pointed out by kurzweill, the sentient being that awoke would have
all my thoughts and experiences and would have a continuity of
consciousness. However, this sentient being is, by definition, a copy. Is
an exact copy me? I dont think so, I think its just an exact copy *of* me.
This means that the original me does not ever perceive a waking up
sensation. From the perspective of an external observer this copy does
indeed appear to be me, since there is no objective test that can be used to
show that it is not. Or is there? In reality, unless the copy of me is
identical at the quantum level, theoretically a test could be made to show
that this is not indeed the original me and is a copy. There is no doubt in
my mind that this copy is a sentient being, but there is a doubt in my mind
that it is *me* Sure, my thoughts hopes dreams and fears and any
contribution I may bring to the world may live on in this copy, but I do not
wake up and live on.
But then again, space-time does not exist at an interval any smaller than
the Planck length and all matter and energy transversing space time travels
in small quantum leaps from one interval of space-time to the next, in
essence quantum teleporting across these minuscule gaps in the fabric of
the universe. If one were to imagine an atom that makes up a neuron in the
human brain transversing space time, its small sub atomic components all
separately teleport randomly over short distances in the general
macroscopic direction of motion, all of this teleporting averaging out at
the larger macroscopic level to lead to a net motion of the atom, and,
subsequently the neuron that is made of groups of said atoms. In effect,
all the components that make up my brain, and me, are continually and
randomly teleporting all over the place, albeit very short distances. It
could be said then that traveling through time actually continually makes
'me' a copy of the me from the previous instant. And if this is the case,
the 'subjective' me always dies at every instant in time, which means I
guess I wouldn't have any issues with a 'copy' of me (as long as it is a
real time up to date one) coming should anything happen to this
physiological housing of this incarnation of me. But then again, all these
sub-microscopic quantum teleportation effects are not detectable outside of
the atom, and consciousness is likely a phenomena routed in the pattern of
these microscope structures (patterns of atoms) and not routed in some
quantum level effect (though some, such as Penrose, have argued that it is)
If consciousness does depend on a quantum level effect, then these quantum
teleportations would definitely relate to consciousness. If that were the
case, then I would be satisfied that an up to date backup of me was
actually me, except that this quantum level teleportation effect does not
apply to each particle simultaneously, instead different particles teleport
at different times. When talking about catastrophic damage to the
physiological host of me, that damage occurs to the whole system at once.
Since it is that system that is me, then if it is damaged or destroyed,
then so I am... But the random teleportation of particles only affects a
small number of particles at any one Planck instant in time. So I do not
think those two effects could be considered similar.
The macroscopic analogy of this would be replacing all neurons at the same
time with a copy of that neural pattern or replacing one neuron at a time
over a great length of time. These two effects would, I feel, be quite
different. Is it still me if one neuron is replaced with a synthetic
hardware neuron? I think so, but what if I replace 10, 100, or 10^4 or 10^5
neurons? At what point do we have to start considering the possibility
that it is not me but a copy of me. Surely if only one neuron were *not*
replaced and the rest were with a copy, then that should be considered a
copy of me, as 1 neuron is not enough to house my consciousness.
Should my neural net be slowly replaced one neuron at a time, I would not
consider this any loss to the continuity of consciousness, and, at least
with my knowledge of the subject, I would consider this to indeed be *me*
Once my neural net is replaced by hardware though, an entirely different
scenario comes into play. I think, in the short time I have spent thinking
about this, that a sort of 'distributed processing' would be utilized, once
your neurons have been replaced by a hardware version on neuron at a time,
a copy could be made of your neural net, also one neuron at a time, and your
neural net could slowly start to communicate, one neuron at a time, with
this copy. Thus distributing your consciousness over two hardware copies,
without (in my opinion) having to worry about the loss of continuity of
consciousness. This could be expanded to multiple copies with your
consciousness randomly distributed across multiple copies of your original
neural net. If this is the case, and no one copy of your neural net houses
more than say... 5% of your total conscious processes then damage to any
one particular net will not result in your death while still maintaining
continuity of consciousness.
In conclusion, I do not find any solace in a copy of me living on, even if
it is objectively identical to me, subjectively it is not. So, I think,
until the above scenario is achieved, I would opt for dearly protecting the
physiological mechanism currently housing my consciousness.
Just my 2c
Michael
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