From: Joe Dees (joedees@addall.com)
Date: Thu Oct 04 2001 - 20:04:11 MDT
Best to everyone
Bill
Richard Kidd, F-4, 86
_____________
Dear Classmates:
Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American
citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first
there in 1993 providing relief and assistance to refugees along the
Tajik
border and in this capacity have traveled all along the border region
between
the two countries. In 1998 and 1999 I was the Deputy Program Manager for
the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is the largest
civilian employer in the country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines
and
UXO. In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a
"Holy
War" as decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines, and by a
special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in
this
effort were considered to "martyrs" even an "infidel" like myself. The
mine
action program is the most respected relief effort in the country and
because of this I had the opportunity to travel extensively, without too
much
interference or restriction. I still have extensive contacts in the area
and
among the Afghan community and read a great deal on the subject.
I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but
quite
frankly I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have not
had
time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would like to use
them
as a basis for sharing some observations.
First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and
character. I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some
comments about our "enemy."
Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated
beyond
what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people live
day-to-day, hand to mouth in abject conditions of poverty, misery and
deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even less.
The
country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like peace. They
know very little of the world at large, and have no access to
information or
knowledge that would counter what they are being told by the Taliban.
They
have nothing left, nothing that is except for their pride.
Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often
referred
to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious leaders
and
their military cohort, the Taliban. The non-Afghan contingent came from
all
over the Islamic world to fight in the war against the Russians. Many
came using a covert network created with assistance by our own
government.
OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to by us in the country at the
time)
restored this network to bring in more fighters, this time to support
the
Taliban in their civil war against the former Mujehdeen. Over time this
military support along with financial support has allowed OBL and his
"Arabs"
to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is the
"inspector general" of Taliban armed forces, his bodyguards protect
senior
Talib leaders and he has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban,
which were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did
he
learn to do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of
Kandahar.
This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2
years
or
so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the
local
Afghans. At the same time the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has
started
to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local humanitarian
conditions
have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have become even harsher.
It
is my assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed
the
Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for
their
forces and have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from
Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any
US
action were probably on their way to sharing the same fate that all
other
outsiders and outside doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan-defeat
and
dismemberment.
During the Afghan war with the Soviets much attention was paid to the
martial
prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time and most
of
us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go
help
the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the Soviets.
Those
concepts were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never conquered
as a
nation, are not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan battle is one that
makes a lot of noise and light. Basic military skills are rudimentary
and
clouded by cultural constraints that no matter what, a warrior should
never
lose his honor. Indeed, firing from the prone is considered distasteful
(but
still done). Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal
in nature, with fighters owing allegiance to a "commander" and this
person
owing allegiance upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is
secured by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed this
somewhat,
many of the units in the Taliban army are there because they are
being paid to be there. All such groups have very strong loyalties along
ethnic and tribal lines. Again, the concept of having a place of "honor"
and
"respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between families
and
tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual slight. That
is
one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the Russians.
It
is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of
Afghans
into a military formation. The "real" stories that have come out of the
war
against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot different from our
fantastic visions as cadets. When the first batch of Stingers came in
and
were given to one Mujehdeen group, another group-supposedly on the same
side,
attached the first group and stole the Stingers, not so much because
they
wanted to use them, but because having them was a matter of prestige.
Many
larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when
all
the
various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such
as
blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in order
to
seek glory. In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the
rate
of fatalities were lower for all involved.
As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not
THAT
good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less so
than
the Afghans. So why is it that they have never been conquered? It goes
back
to Dr. Kern's point about will. During their history the only events
that have managed to form any semblance of unity among the Afghans, is
the
desire to fight foreign invaders. And in doing this the Afghans have
been
fanatical. The Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to
endure
hardships that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and
enervate
the resolve of all but the most elite military units. The physical
difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather and
the
harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their advantage
and
use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair
generals--around November 1st most road movement is impossible, in part
because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed and air
movement will be problematic at best).
Also, those fighting us are not afraid to fight. OBL and others do not
think
the US has the will or the stomach for a fight. Indeed after the
absolutely
inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was that we
were
cowards, who would not risk one life in face to face combat. Rather than
demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that action and
others of
the not so recent past, have reinforced the perception that the US does
not
have any "will" and that were are morally and spiritually corrupt.
Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their
propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the
extremists/Arabs
and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to fight coordinated
battles and their lack of external support. More importantly through is
that
we have to take steps not to play to their strengths, which would be to
unite the entire population against us by increasing their suffering or
killing innocents, to get bogged down trying to hold terrain, or to get
into
a battle of attrition chasing up and down mountain valleys.
I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and
well
beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second
guess
current plans or start an academic debate I would share the following
from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans. First, I would give
the
Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy off a chunk of
the
Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this cash I would pay some
guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership making it look like an
inside
job
to spread distrust and build on existing discord. Third I would support
the
Northern alliance with military assets, but not take it over or adopt so
high
a profile as to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans.
Fourth
would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance
to
the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give
these guys a reason to live rather than the choice between dying of
starvation or dying fighting the "infidel." Fifth, start a series of
public
works projects in areas of the country not under Taliban control (these
are
much more than the press reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that
improvements come with peace. Sixth, I would consider vary carefully
putting
any female service members into Afghanistan proper-sorry to the females
of
our class but within that culture a man who allows a women to fight for
him
has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the cooperation of
Afghan
allies. No Afghan will work with a man who fights with women. I would
hold
off from doing anything to dramatic in the new term, keeping a low level
of
covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this pressure to
force open the fissions around the Taliban that were already developing.
I
expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL. We can pick
up
the pieces next summer, or the summer after. When we do "pick-up" the
pieces
I would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man to man." While
I would never want to advocate American causalities, it is essential
that we
communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can and will "engage
and
destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned above, we should not
try
to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry operations against the enemy are
essential. There can be no excuses after the defeat or lingering doubts
in
the minds of our enemies regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing
will communicate this except for ground combat. And once this is all
over,
unlike in 1989 the US must provide continued long-term economic
assistance
to rebuild the country.
While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to
share
a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not abide
by
the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there is a
chance
that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner exchange.
During
the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist prisoners
having
their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in prisoners so
that
souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take home with them. This
practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya were similar
videos are being made today and can be found on the web for those so
inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same way.
Sometime
during this war I expect that we will see videos of US prisoners having
their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate
their
"strength" to their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to
seek
wholesale revenge against civilian populations and to turn
this into the world wide religious war that they desperately want. This
will
be a test of our will and of our character. (For further collaboration
of this type of activity please read Kipling).
This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and
somewhat conversely of compassion and of a character. Towards our
enemies,
we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of our
military
character for a long time. But to those who are not our enemies we must
show
a level of compassion probably unheard of during war. We should do this
not
for humanitarian reasons, even though there are many, but for shrewd
military
logic.
For anyone who is still reading this way to long note, thanks for your
patience. I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more
concise manner.
Thanks, Richard Kidd
------------------------------------------------------------
Looking for a book? Want a deal? No problem AddALL!
http://www.addall.com compares book price at 41 online stores.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Nov 02 2002 - 08:11:11 MST