From: Smigrodzki, Rafal (SmigrodzkiR@MSX.UPMC.EDU)
Date: Sun Jun 03 2001 - 19:33:04 MDT
I wrote :
> > I would feel that a full state clone sitting near me would
> still be me, in another
> > place. This is a statement of a subjective preference, not
> a hard (objective) fact.
Eugene wrote:
> Well, now there are two of you. May I kill one of them, then?
> This instance
> of you, for instance? Why not? The original you would still
> be there, right?
As much as it might surprise you, I sincerely believe that it might be
perfectly OK to do it. I would object to any method involving pain,
suffering, or anticipation of such but an instantaneous decomposition would
be OK. If both of us were in the same room and only one of us would be
allowed to live, we could flip a coin and neither would cheat (I wouldn't
cheat on myself), although we would prefer to live, even if we had to split
the car. If the copy was made after my "original"'s deanimation, the problem
would not exist at all. Of course, I would have to be quite sure that a
sufficiently exact copy of me exists. I wouldn't mind it.
> May I at least prick you with a pin? Strange, the other guy over there
> didn't jump.
Now this is not nice. My copy would not jump but would have a lot of empathy
for me, just as I would empathize with him. We would do our best to pay it
back, too. Surely there are people who would say "Who cares" about any pain
they can't feel by direct neural input, and those should't be copied too
much.
I just told the other guy over there a story,
> would you please
> repeat it? Of course I didn't tell it to you, well, I guess I
> did, it's
> just strange that you can't remember it. Them clones...
If I had taken Versed, I would't remember anything either. If we (copies)
link up and exchange data (should be a trifle if you have the tech to copy
people in the first place), we would be one again. And if we don't link up,
over time we will diverge enough that at some point I would say my copy is
just my brother (probably when he starts listening to Britney Spears or
something). There is no instantaneous fork for me but a gradual divergence.
I agree that attitudes my differ on this point.
> Yes, but if I intereprete you right, you're about to run in
> some real-world
> problems if you adhere to that position. (See above scenarios).
I don't perceive these as problems. I know I could live quite well with my
copies, because they would be just like me. Did you see "The 6th day"? There
are persons who couldn't accept copies, except when shifted in time (like
the CEO of the firm in the movie, got copied after death, but treated his
original like a piece of meat when he was resurrected too early), some
people could deal quite well with their copies (like Arnold's character),
and some wouldn't even try it (the religious guys).
If you miscount the number of legs in your chair, your real world future
will be contrary to your expectations - you might trip. I know of only one
form of reasoning applicable to such problems - arithmetics. If your math
ideas are different, every sane person knows you will run into trouble. But
with differing self identity models you can have various real life
solutions, successfully serving different tastes. I'd be happy with spawning
(producing huge numbers of my copies to form a social group, preferably with
memory synching), it should serve my goals just fine, you probably wouldn't.
Some people like chocolate, so they eat it, others don't like it, so they
abstain.
>
> > This said, I would think that my more liberal attitude
> towards self is probably more
> > practical - I wouldn't have any problems accepting the
> microtome method of uploading,
> > which to me seems to be the most practical one (I am a bit
> skeptical about
> > nanotechnology). Would you?
>
> Of course. (I'm also very sceptical about medical
> nanotechnology, at least
> its advent in the time frame of relevance). If there's no
> fork, there's only
> one instance of me-pattern, which is of course me. Make two
> instances of me,
> and you've got two brand new but different people.
So if you are resurrected by this method in one instance you are "old" made
anew but if by clerical oversight two copies are made at the same time -
none of them is you?
In graphical arts a painting is defined as one-of-a-kind, all, even very
exact copies are just forgeries. The monetary value of such a copy is, by
convention, nil. A print, however, may exist in many copies, as long as all
are made from the original block. The monetary value of such copies (all of
them "original") is, by convention, same. So, depending on circumstances,
the esthetic or ethical dimension of a material object may vary.
Rafal Smigrodzki MD-PhD
Dept Neurology University of Pittsburgh
smigrodzkir@msx.upmc.edu
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