From: Emlyn (emlyn@one.net.au)
Date: Thu May 31 2001 - 04:13:51 MDT
Robert Bradbury threw this spanner in the works:
> So here is the challenge -- can anyone come up with an argument
> that justifies the preservation and continued "operation" of
> oneself in the face of clear evidence that more efficient
> means (i.e. means that consume less matter & energy) are
> available to "execute" ones consciousness? Furthermore,
> can anyone present an argument that the occupation and execution
> of said means is justifyable if more efficient means to generate
> information content (extropization) are available?
Nothing if not extreme. I kinda like it.
Just to clarify something, we need to talk about super goals here I think.
My super goal in most of these discussion is "I don't want to die".
Apparently Roberts supergoal is "Be as EXTROPIAN as possible". Robert
apparently is basing this goal on the following definitions, from
extropy.org:
EXTROPY - the extent of a system's intelligence, information, order,
vitality, and capacity for improvement.
EXTROPIANS - those who seek to increase extropy.
This is a damned interesting tack to me. It seems there's another way to
define an Extropian, which is an intelligent entity who follows the
Extropian principles (http://www.extropy.com/extprn3.htm).
Ok, so we've got EXTROPIANS, who follow the first definition, and
Extropians, who follow the second.
It seems clear to me that an EXTROPIAN would agree with Robert, that an
inferior form of the self should not be tolerated, and should be shut
down... with the caveat that this is only true if the matter and energy
consumed by the inferior EXTROPIAN is actually in demand. If it is a choice
between existing, or ceasing to exist knowing that the useful elements of
the EXTROPIAN's body will not be used instead by a more "worthy" being, the
EXTROPIAN would choose the former, irrespective of the existence or not of
more "worthy" beings.
Whereas, I think an Extropian would be a far more independently minded
critter. The idea of shutting him/herself down so that some atoms might be
claimed by a better would be kind of ludicrous. Certainly, the decision that
oneself is so hopeless as to not be worth the air one breathes, in relation
to other organisms, would be inconsistent with Practical Optimism, at a
minimum.
By Robert's reasoning, the EXTROPIAN point of view would be that the human
race right now should have a big standardised IQ test, and the winner should
be given the world's resources, whilst the rest of humanity basically works
toward a foolproof method for molecular duplication of the winner, then
commits mass-suicide. Silly.
Interestingly, what would that society of the mass copied "winner" be like?
Would it be functionally better or worse than the current human
civilisation, from the perspective of EXTROPY?
Likely, it would be worse, because of it's homogenous nature.
Extropy in it's various definitions supports and encourages diversity,
individualised approaches. Natural selection favours this too. Even the
relative losers (species-wise) in natural selection are valuable, because
they embody alternative approaches that might be useful when the next
environmental shift comes along. So to drop in and erase all the hopeless
species ahead of their "time" is an entropic act. Similarly, to kill of an
old version of an individual simply because a superior version could use its
resources, could in many cases (more so as we move toward extreme
homogeneity, extreme dominance of the superior) be said to be an
anti-EXTROPIC act, let alone anti-Extropic, because the reduction in
diversity is a potential cost which outweighs the gain from giving those
extra (minimal) resources to the superior copy.
Another good reason? Because I don't want to - surely that's covered by
Extropianism.
>
> You have "inalienable" rights by virtue of being born a human.
> Are those rights "inalienable" if you choose to be an extropian?
>
> Robert
Inalienable rights? There's a funny notion... you are American, aren't you?
Emlyn
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