From: Emlyn (emlyn@one.net.au)
Date: Thu May 31 2001 - 01:20:39 MDT
Lee writes:
> Emlyn writes
>
> >> Doesn't this mean that if we ever could teleport (a la Star
> >> Trek, where you are disintegrated here and reassembled there)
> >> that you would refuse to travel by this means? If so, then
> >> you are quite wrong. As soon as it became sufficiently cheap
> >> and convenient, and as soon as all your friends started doing
> >> it, your reservations would crumble away at once.
> >
> >I'm not sure what the latin is for proof-by-peer-pressure, but I'd be
> >surprised if it's regarded as a strong methodology.
>
> :-) That's great! Who needs the Latin (although I concede that
> it might add some dignity). "Proof-by-peer-pressure". I love it.
>
you know it was a joke? ie: that what I meant was that I think this holds no
water, given that saying something is ok because "all your mates are doing
it" is not really a useful moral argument?
But it is funny. I'd highly recommend finding the Latin if you seriously
intend to use this form of "argument"... easier to slip it by the unwary :-)
> The point, of course, is that when you consult your intuition
> about all this after you've finally gone on a lot of vacations
> with your friends teleporting everywhere, "you" will dismiss your
> previous doubts as philosophically old-fashioned. Instinctively
> "you" will realize that you and your buddies are really the
> same people that they've always been.
>
Well, a materialist would.
I, on the other hand, would realise that I was Emlyn(n) from a series of
Emlyn's from 0 to n, where each previous Emlyn had "teleported" exactly
once, ie been dissassembled for scrap. I would be well aware that I was, at
some point thereafter, reassembled from the description of Emlyn(n-1) made
just before dissassembly.
Thus, I would be likely to avoid "teleport" machines like the plague, as I
would know that it would be instant death for me (plus life for someone just
like me at some point in the future. The caveat is that if I am Emlyn(i)
where i > 0, obviously I will do it under some circumstances. I'd assume
from my present vantage point as Emlyn(0) that these circumstances must be
coersive.
Now if dissassembly is a slow, painful process, I'd say it's fairly clear
that you'd not choose to do it, if you were informed. You'd wander up to a
machine, be scanned, then be slowly ripped to bits in agony.
However, if it's quick and painless, so that you are oblivious to it, then
the question of whether it matters or not is very interesting. If you don't
believe there's afterlife/god/etc (which I don't), and you are never aware
of your demise, but someone indistinguishable from you at the other end is
completely unaware of any problem (scanned before dissassembly), then what
does it matter?
It depends on how you define it, I guess. If your goal is to continue
survival of your class of person (Emlyn in my case), then there is no
problem at all... that's Lee's position I guess. Even if your goal is to
avoid death of the self, still where is the problem? There have been
absolutely no measurable consequences to your actions... each individual has
no issue with the process as a subjective experience, and any external
observer would just see a dissassembly and reassembly of an indivual...
functionally it's fine, if the passenger is happy with it.
So oddly enough, for me it comes down to consequences. What happens when the
individual dies, who is dissassembled? If the answer is "absolutely nothing
at all", then it's hard to see why there would be a problem. If some awful
torture was imposed on the being at the "for" end, on the other hand, then
there is a clear problem.
> >I need to ask a question at this point. There is a concept that
> >identical processes are the same process. I am not sure if this
> >applies to objects...If I make two structurally identical diamonds,
> >are they the same diamond? I am assuming a materialist would say
> >they are not.
>
> Right. The nearest thing, as you probably know, is in quantum
> mechanics where objects can be absolutely identical, to the point
> that when you fail to take this into consideration, paradoxes
> (such as Gibbs') arise. But we don't want to go there. No---
> two objects shouldn't be spoken of as the same object.
>
> >Instead, two physical processes (?) are the same if they are
> >identical... is that right?
>
> Well (I hope that this isn't too weasily) for some purposes, yes.
> If the marketing people ask you "hey, is that EXACTLY the same
> process running on the new hardware" you'll say yes. But if
> someone in the operating systems group asks you the same
> question (which would be very silly of them, of course)
> then you'd say no.
>
> >So, if I get two computers which are structurally identical, and
> >run identical programs on them, is some part of each of these a
> >physical process, and thus there is only one instead of two
> >instances?
>
> Well, my opinion is that we would always say that there are two
> instances. Items that differ, even if only in location or time,
> surely are regarded as different instances.
>
> Regarding personal identity, I speak of there being two or
> more instances of me in the case that close duplicates exist.
>
> Lee
>
>
>
Isn't this my argument? I'm getting confused now...
Emlyn
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