From: Emlyn (emlyn@one.net.au)
Date: Thu May 31 2001 - 00:40:23 MDT
> >Instead, two physical processes (?) are the same if they are
> >identical... is that right?
>
> Well (I hope that this isn't too weasily) for some purposes, yes.
> If the marketing people ask you "hey, is that EXACTLY the same
> process running on the new hardware" you'll say yes. But if
> someone in the operating systems group asks you the same
> question (which would be very silly of them, of course)
> then you'd say no.
>
> >So, if I get two computers which are structurally identical, and
> >run identical programs on them, is some part of each of these a
> >physical process, and thus there is only one instead of two
> >instances?
>
> Well, my opinion is that we would always say that there are two
> instances. Items that differ, even if only in location or time,
> surely are regarded as different instances.
>
> Regarding personal identity, I speak of there being two or
> more instances of me in the case that close duplicates exist.
>
> Lee
Riiight!!! Yes, I would agree with this. Two instances of an abstract form -
in this case a type of person called Lee. Both the original and copy are
Lees, undoubtedly, as they are instances of the type of person called Lee.
However, for any given one of those Lees, I still maintain that the instance
is far more important than the type, to that instance.
Actually though, it's mostly about belief in these cases. A materialist
would be happy to use destructive teleport, and never know any problem, no
matter who is right about this. A non-materialist (does that make me a
dualist? Or something else?) on the other hand would not use it, and would
never know any problem again, no matter who is right.
Think of it like this, in your pit story... a materialist copy, standing on
the lip of the pit, will be happy enough that he is one with the original,
and so would the original, because they are materialists. They would make
their decisions based around this.
On the other hand, a non-materialist would have a non-materialist copy on
the pit lip. Neither of them would believe they were the same person as each
other, and both would behave accordingly. Likely they'd have a bit of
empathy for each other, actually (not that the materialists wouldn't, of
course).
Just out of interest, if that were me in the copy pit, I'd press the button
enough times that there were enough duplicates at the top of the pit that
they could get me out, by a chain of humans dangling over the edge, if
nothing else. Then we'd all wander back to civilisation together and start
the Great Society of Emlyns.
Emlyn
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