From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Wed May 30 2001 - 20:12:32 MDT
I hate the copy question. But....
There seem to be two camps: one that believes that a copy is the same
person and one that believes that a copy is a different person. Neither
side can explain this belief to the other. Both sides seem to use circular
reasoning, in that if the copy is the same person then killing the original
isn't suicide, but if the copy isn't the same person than you can't kill the
original. The belief system seems to dictate the logical argument, and each
side has a consistent argument within their own belief system which does
nothing to inform the other belief system.
Yet, we keep trying....
Another way to state this difference seems to be this: One camp is happy as
long as any copy survives. The other camp is unhappy as long as any copy
dies. The question may actually be: Are we trying to achieve immortality
or are we trying to avoid death? These may turn out to be different
questions. My personal belief seems to be more interested in avoiding death
rather than achieving immortality.
My new explanation of my personal position is this....
I do not care about a copy, but want my original to live on. My definition
of self is based on what I think and feel. I can think thoughts in my own
brain, and this seems to be internal to me. When other people think or when
computers think, they are external. I read them as incoming data, but that
data exists whether I create it or not. I cannot change the data by
changing my own mind. Even if the external person has the same memories as
me or has been genetically engineered to look like me, I perceive my
thoughts internally and their thoughts externally.
An identical copy may be another "me" by all definitions. It is an exact
duplicate. However, I cannot read the copy's mind. I do not know if it
thinks a different thought from me. I can only perceive my own thoughts,
and cannot perceive the thoughts of the copy. We may be identical at first,
but I don't *know* this. People may tell me that its thoughts are exact
copies of mine, but I can't confirm this myself by observing its internal
thoughts. I can't experience its emotions to decide if they are the same as
mine. If it has a hidden thought or motive that it does not reveal, I
cannot know this because this attribute is hidden from me and kept to its
self. Its self is not the same as myself, and what it keeps to itself it
keeps from me. I still perceive the original thoughts in the original body
as internal to me. I still perceive the copy's thoughts in the copy's body
as external to me. Until I can experience my self in the copy, I cannot
conceive how it could be the same me. I obviously experience it as
disconnected from me, even if it is "another" me or "separate" me.
This perception of reality, the center of thought and conscious cognition is
what I define as "me". I experience reality through this view port known as
"me". This is the definition of "me" that I seek to preserve. I don't care
if a copy looks like me. I don't care if a copy has been programmed with my
memories. I don't care if no one else can tell us apart. I still perceive
reality through a single body portal. This body is "me", while the other is
not. If I could wake up in a new body and perceive it, then I would agree
that it was me. The problem with some copy procedures is that while the
copy wakes up as "me", the original also wakes up and says "nothing
happened, I'm still me." Killing the original me before it has a chance to
wake up and object does not solve my problem. I want the original to agree
that it has been transferred. Killing it or taking some intervention to
prevent it from objecting does not remove the objection, it just prevents it
from being expressed.
Since my definition of "me" is experiential, I don't care if this "me"
evolves and is different now than it was before, it still is my reality
portal in a way that a copy is not. I don't care if my body is morphed to
become totally different or if every atom is replaced with a different one,
my experience is still that I am still internal to this "me" and not another
copy of "me". I don't even care if my mind is totally wiped so that I have
no memories of my previous life. It would be tragic, but as a total
amnesiac, I would still perceive life from within my original body and not
from another copy. Many of the copy procedure discussions focus on trying
to make the copy as close to the original as possible. This is irrelevant
to me. Other arguments try to argue that the original me is changing or is
not continuous. These arguments are also irrelevant to me. My problem is
that the original will still wake up and perceive itself in the old body
without having been moved. (Unless you kill it first.) It will wake up and
say "I am me." The copy will also wake up and say "I am me." I expect both
to believe that they are distinct individuals and will not want their own
instance to die. Neither will be inclined to commit suicide after meeting
the other. (What if the other is a dream or a fraud? It claims to be "me",
but I don't feel that it is. What if it wore a disguise and claimed to not
be me. How could I be fooled into not being able to find or identify
myself? It seems clear that there is a difference between the inescapable
me and the other unprovable me.)
That's my story, and I'm sticking to it. This is my definition of "me" and
what I am trying to preserve. Copy scenarios do not alter my attachment to
my original body. Slow upgrades maintain my attachment as my body is
changed. This may not be the definition used by other people, and may not
match the goals for preservation that other people have.
I will even go so far as to give this extreme example: If my neurons are
replaced one by one with artificial ones, I would eventually perceive myself
inside the artificial body. If my meat neurons are reassembled into a meat
brain, I would not feel that the meat brain was me, although the meat brain
would claim that it was. If my artificial brain was wiped so that it had no
memory, I would still perceive it as me, and not the meat brain with my body
and all my memories. In such a scenario, we built an artificial body "me"
and reassembled a meat body "me". The process was done such that my
experience of "me" continued into the artificial body. A new being was
created out of my old parts that would be a new me, with my old body and my
old memories. I would consider it new and the artificial one to be the
original. Both would have the same personality and memories. Both would be
"me" by most definitions. However, there was one "me" from meat-birth
through the artificial body. The second "me" was created out of my old
parts afterwards and constitutes another me. Both are valid, real, and
"me", but I would like the result of this scenario where I live forever in
an artificial body and will not experience death when the newly created "me"
in my meat body died. I know this example is extreme, but I think it makes
my point for what I want to preserve. I doubt this will convince anybody
who argues that the two beings should both self-identify and self-experience
both bodies simultaneously and equally valid.
-- Harvey Newstrom <http://HarveyNewstrom.com> <http://Newstaff.com>
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