From: Steve Nichols (steve@multisell.com)
Date: Tue Dec 12 2000 - 15:52:59 MST
>
> Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2000 15:21:32 -0500
> From: "John Clark" <jonkc@worldnet.att.net>
> Subject: Re: Immortality
>
> Steve Nichols <steve@multisell.com> Wrote:
>Some thermostats alter the absolute temp they switch on at depending on
>ambient temperature (i.e. depending on humidity). Some even do this
>variably based on time of day, and depending on whether the room is
>occupied, and occupied by particular people.
If they are making these decisions, however complex, from programming,
then they are finite-state. If they are altering their circuitry in response
to
feedback loop from the environment, then they might be infinite-state
(analog).
>Human brains are not infinite state either, and you still have not
>provided any evidence that they are in fact conscious.
Human brains are 'plastic' and rewire their circuitry. This is
not disputed by anybody, except by you it seems.
The physical "brain" is not conscious in the sense that you
could stick it with a pin and it wouldn't feel pain (no nerve
endings). But we, organisms including our brains have
"experience", mental life or "self-referential consciousness." Only
radical behaviourists deny this, are you a Skinnerian? If so
I can trot out the standard refutation of this position .......
The brain generates the virtual sensor(gan) in so that part
of our biosphere is non-material ... like can only interact
with like ... thoughts, dreams &c. are hallucinations or illusions
and can take place in/ interact with an organ that is purely matter.
This is Spinoza & Leibnitz case against Descartes' pineal gland
theory. MVT overcomes such objections.
>
> Turing machines are hard-wired and cannot evince PHASIC
> TRANSIENT behaviour ... correct me if I am wrong? R.E.M.
> as I would claim is a random-like phenomena because E-1
> brains are still (in long evolution terms) changing from finite to
> infinite-state.
random-like is not the same as random.
You are avoiding the point ... besides, perhaps pure randomness
is just a concept and does not exist in nature? Rapid eye movements
*seem* random in the same way that phasic transients *seem* random.
> >Consciousness requires a degree of self-organisation.
>
Ah, first they must self organise, then they must be
self-disorganised... You seem confused.
In order to make an *independent* response to the environment some
degree of "self" (organisation/ choice/ reaction) seems necessary.
A robot that blindly follows a set of instructions and cannot make
independent
volitions has no "self" or central executive, but is just a slave machine.
Yes, the ability of the brain to self-organise (or internally organise, if
you dislike
the term "self") is basic .. and indeed, human embryos spend up to 24 hrs a
day
in REM before birth at certain stages, and well after birth the neuronal
circuits
form and reform. There is a massive volume of data on ontogeny ... if you
insist I
will bore this list with reams of references?
>
> The debate seems to centre on the problems resolving Leibnitz Law ...
> that to be truly "identical" the two things in question must be fully
> interchangeable. Sense-data (experience) and the conscious sensor/ self
> seem to be different types ... this is the problem for brain-mind identity
> theorists. However, MVT explains the virtual sensor(gan), the phantom
median
> eye, which gives the persistent experience of self in terms of generation
(action
> potential signals &c) of the *same* generic neuronal information as the
sense-data
> (contents of consciousness).
>I don't think so. Identity is not an issue of consciousness, it is an
>issue of discretion.
The loci of experience, and the mechanisms that give rise to it are
very pertinent to the parallel discussion about uploading &c. Cogito ergo
sum.
>
> This is a major reason why MVT is important, most theories of mind
> (including
> Descartes' dualist account) fail on this point. Brains are necessary, but
> not
> sufficient for consciousness (they could be in mu-state ... don't you
> agree?)
>You have to be kidding. Brainless awareness? Excuse me? Cites please,
>cites.
What I am saying is that brain-dead (mu-state) means NO awareness.
The brain is not only a circuit, but needs to be in infinite state. I tend
to
think insect neuronal clusters, and even hagfish & lampreys (E-2 brains)
are not conscious. If the word conscious is a problem, use sentience or
even qualify as "self-referential consciousness."
>
> As to whether I can *prove* that you are conscious (whoever "me/ you" are)
> ... I don't want to get bogged down in individual cases because of the
> problem
> of solipsism. Do you accept that dreams happen? If you do, then you are
> allowing me that the dreamers (in general, whether birds, mammal, or
*you*)
> have consciousness.
Do you claim that dreams are anything more than automated backup/sorting
of buffer data stored in short term memory?
Yes, I agree with Globus (Real Time Hypothesis) that REM occurs during the
day
but is harder to detect, and with Aristotle that we are nearer to our true
"self"
when dreaming and mentation is not interrupted by external 'noise.' I also
agree
partly with Freud, and think that dreams are a way of rehearsing behaviour
(such
as sex) without taking risk of actually engaging in the world. We build and
destroy
models of reality when dreaming ... I also think that consolidation and
reinforcement of
memory (and discard activity) happens during dream, both REM and non-REM.
Your view is too narrow, and ignores loads of evidence. But at least you
accept
dreams (a form of conscious event) occur!
Level Up
www.steve-nichols.com
Editor Extropia.net
------------------------------
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Nov 01 2002 - 15:32:23 MST