From: Robert J. Bradbury (bradbury@aeiveos.com)
Date: Wed Dec 13 2000 - 12:37:13 MST
Chris wrote:
> Your position is irrational in thinking that there's an original
> "consciousness" that is permanently destroyed in the process. Mine
> is irrational in thinking that the continuity of my original or my
> copy matters at all.
In reviewing this discussion, it seems to me there may be
a misunderstanding of consciousness. If we can accept
that William Calvin's model of the brain is correct, then
consciousness is a set of neurons that have agreed that
they have an image (or a model) of reality in which we view
ourselves as the primary actor. In other words we "perceive"
ourselves as ourselves. However, the key aspect of consciousness
must be the firing of the neurons, which in turn depends upon
the neuronal interconnections and synaptic strengths
(i.e. acquired memories).
So whatever process gets used to copy "you" has to
copy or emulate both the functioning of the neurons
and their "memory").
Now, ignoring for the moment the "quasi" conscious state
of sleep, clearly individuals who have undergone surgery
where they have had their body temperatures lowered
sufficiently that their neurons stop firing, have "lost"
consciousness. You are completely unable to perceive
yourself at all. Yet we warm them such people up and for
the most part they recover with no difficulty. I.e. consciousness
is rebootable (just like our computers most of the time).
So consciousness must be generated by the fact that
you can "remember" that you are you. You are you because
you have your memory "state" information. This is like
the fact that your browser can take you back to a place
you have visited on the net because it has a history
file remembering all of the pages you have visited.
So, in fact a copy of you *is* you, at least upon intial
activation, simply because it perceives itself through its
memory that it is in fact you.
So, I would tend to agree with the perspective that
while I too desire an evolved copy procedure so
I can preserve my sentimental feelings that I am
really me (and not my copy), I don't doubt that
a destructive readout copy is in fact really me.
Since I'm partial to the perspective that sleep is a
very altered state of consciousness, it seems that
waking up is really a warm reboot. If so, I'd suggest
that every day we are living as copies of ourselves.
Robert
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