From: J. R. Molloy (jr@shasta.com)
Date: Tue Dec 12 2000 - 15:01:37 MST
Michael S. Lorrey wrote,
> I admit I'm a bid superstitious on this topic. John and I have
gone back
> and forth on this for years. John's concept of the destructive
scan
> producing a copy that is indistinguishable from the original
avoids what
> happens when the original is not, in fact, destroyed during a
scan, so
> while the copy may be as good as the 'real thing', there is
something
> basically counter-intuitive to the idea that my uploaded copy is
> indistinguishable from ME, or is me for all practical purposes.
A living copy of you instantly becomes distinguishable from you as
the copy begins to register its own individual environment.
> The way I get around the squeamishness of blithely zapping the
original,
> or having to deal with leftovers is to embrace the 'soft upload'
as the
> only true 'transfer of conciousness', where the individual
augments
> their mind with artificial components to such a degree that
eventually
> the biological component dies but is not missed by the concious
entity.
You've identified an important difference between the upload and the
original: The upload is potentially immortal. That obviously changes
things, and no doubt previous discussions have mentioned this
difference. As for augmenting and enhancing the original so that it
morphs into a newly "conscious" being, that happens with ordinary
100% biological humans as well. Except that the "consciousness" of a
20-year-old human surpasses by a long shot the "consciousness" of a
20-month-old human. With the advent of super-intelligence, I foresee
the assimilation of ordinary human awareness into a more accurate
and comprehensive version of The Big Picture.
> It is tantamount to taking a '57 Chevy and slowly replacing parts:
the
> alternator, the points, the carb, the muffler, the head, etc. At
some
> point in the future, there will be no original parts on it, but
its
> history, its provenance, makes it a superior vehicle to one that
has
> been reproduced by some CAD/CAM system from scans of original
parts.
> With a body infested with nanites whose job is the slow
replacement of
> dying neurons with artificial substitutes is analogous to this.
You describe a worthy analogy. I'd extend this to include a more
radical transition from automobiles to jet aircraft or rockets. The
atoms of a '57 Chevy could be rearranged to build a rotary
spacecraft. With sufficient intelligence and self-organization, an
uploaded entity would look upon phlogiston/consciousness/identity
with an augmented sense of humor. After all, it is not we, but
rather uploaded SI, that will have to deal with the Singularity.
> I can much easier accept that the resulting entity eventually
living
> totally on an artificial substrate is a 'human' that is aware than
a
> mere scanned upload.
I see what you mean, and I agree that the path to posthumanity seems
more likely to involve super-augmentation rather than digitized
replication.
> Do I think they are inferior to soft uploads? Not necessarily. How
would
> they be any different from an AI grown from scratch on artificial
> substrates? Likely little except the AI would likely have far less
junk
> code involved. I am just not sure if following that route would
retain
> the ME-ness of ME.
Another advantage to your soft uploads is that they could retain
enough of the human perspective that they would be able to relate to
un-augmented humans, so that the evolutionary line would not be
broken (thus providing a buffer for Singularity). Considering what
the me-ness of me has accomplished, I don't fear relinquishing it in
favor of a super-me. But that's probably the voice of an
underachiever speaking.
> This is likely a significant solipsistic conceptual stumbling
block, one
> that is entirely 'in my head'. I don't deny it. This is likely
true.
Selective Uploading could get around this. I mean, just upload the
non-conflicted patterns contained in the brain.
> However, anything that would make me comfortable going through
such a
> transition ought to be attempted, if only to make such a procedure
more
> acceptable to the population at large, and to make the resulting
> entities more likely to be treated as 'human' by the rest of
humanity.
Yeah, well <snickering out load> if I actually got the chance to go
through a transition from human to posthuman, it would not matter to
me how the rest of humanity treated this It couldn't matter. If it
mattered, then uploading probably would get squelched by the rest of
humanity. But since the rest of humanity (by the time uploading
becomes feasible), would have already queued up for it, transitional
humans would likely be treated as the In Crowd.
> This would likely help reduce greatly the amount of support for
luddites
> who would oppose granting civil rights to such entities, which can
only
> be to the good.
As I envision uploading, uploaded entities would be in position to
transcend civil rights and the constellation of concepts that has
brought about civil rights. Uploaded entities won't have civil
rights, they'll have stellar rights; for they have the stars to
reach.
Stay hungry,
--J. R.
3M TA3
The crux is whether you find value in intelligence.
If not, then the physical forces that we are familiar
with today have the ultimate say, and humankind is
ephemeral and of no significance -- even to itself.
In which case, one then runs against Molloyism and
embraces nihilism -- a different kettle of fish indeed.
--J. R.
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