From: Robin Hanson (rhanson@gmu.edu)
Date: Fri Mar 24 2000 - 15:12:00 MST
[I don't really want to revive this topic much, but I did promise
a reply. RH]
On 3/5/2000, Dan Fabulich wrote:
> > You keep restating claims like this as if they were obvious;
> > they aren't. This is the issue we are arguing about.
>
>I'll fall back on my Omega Point argument, because I think I can force
>this one through more easily than my computability argument (though I
>actually like that one a bit better).
>
>Allow me to restate the claim in a more general manner. ...
>Now you want to ask which number I'll "end up believing," or at least tell
>me some number theoretic properties about that number. ...
>Now notice that if I live forever and have an infinite number of thoughts
>... there's no way for you to tell whether my "last" number will be
>even or odd, in exactly the same respect as it would be impossible for you
>to determine whether the last natural number will be even or odd.
Ethics is only normatively useful if it helps you make a decision, and
decisions have deadlines. So imagine some very important decision you
will make in a thousand years. There is some fact of the matter about
what your ethical opinions will be at the time you have to make that
decision. Anything that helps you learn about that fact helps you in
making your decision. And knowing enough about those facts tells you
everything useful that you could know. So the only question is how to
best arrive at estimates of those facts.
Studying the nature of human ethical reasoning should help, and should
trying out various ethical ideas in your head and seeing how you "feel"
about them. These are admittedly very different styles of investigation,
but they are both investigations about *facts*. And ex post observable
facts at that. In this sense, all useful ethics is about empirically-
observable facts.
Greg Burch wrote:
>above a certain level of complexity, mental systems cannot be
>accurately enough modeled in practical terms to completely predict their
>behavior, requiring such systems to employ generalizing heuristics that
>map satisfactorily onto a traditional notion of the realm of "ethics".
I don't think I disagree with that.
Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
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