From: Rob Harris (rob@hbinternet.co.uk)
Date: Fri Mar 03 2000 - 08:48:37 MST
>Seriously, though, that claim is definitely a misreading of Dennett's own
>argument, which is eliminitivist, not reductivist. That is, he thinks
>that there ARE no qualia, not that qualia are "really" physical phenomena.
As I say....classifcation is irrelevant. If I can no longer use the word
"exists" I can use "is", and qualia "is", and can never be destroyed by any
number of words or logical processing applied to "it". The very fact that
there is an undebated "it" to discuss validates my point. The effect itself
demonstrates a dimension to this reality that is understandably peturbing to
the "only if I can apply this arbitrary function to it" crowd.
>However, the reductivist and the eliminitivist arguments are really just
>two different rhetorical approaches to materialism. If you agree that
>materialism is right and that therefore qualia can't be NON-physical, it's
>only a matter of definition/semantics whether you decide to call some
>physical phenomena qualia or whether you decide not to call anything
>qualia.
Nobody is calling qualia a coherent physical phenomenon - unless they're
deeply ostentatious. It is a phenomenon that demands attention in it's own
context. Empirical science cannot even attempt to grasp this - but
redefining "existence" to purely "empirically" coherent material will not
make this effect disappear.
>Perhaps the stronger point to be made here is that nobody's making a
>conceptual error. The reductivist/eliminitivist/materialist argument
>usually begins by establishing that qualia can't be non-physical.
Who cares? It's a distinct effect of this universe. The universe including
us and everything that we are. Nothing is exempt, much as it may make
sophistry more easy.
>Certainly, then, the eliminitivist isn't making a mistake: he takes it
>that qualia are, by definition, non-physical, and therefore, since nothing
>non-physical exists, no qualia exist.
Again, if I can't use "exist" by definition, then the prescribed definition
is a mere subset of those effects/material/whatever things that "are".
>But the reductivist isn't making a
>mistake either: she can argue that certain physical phenomena have enough
>properties in common with qualia that almost all of the sort of things
>that we say about qualia are also true of the chosen physical phenomena.
>If you believe that enough of these properties are shared, you might be
>convinced to say that the physical properties could inherit the name
>"qualia," since its original definition is empty.
"Qualia" is just a pointer. Read extra into it as you wish. If you're
unhappy with the definition of "qualia", then another pointer must be made
to the same effect that "is", if we're ever to understand the function,
constituents and implications of such effects. As I said before, I label the
effect "formerly known as qualia" as "itdoesexistyoustupidbastards".
>It all resolves around the inherent problem that there's no way (even in
>principle) to tell which of the following two claims are correct:
>1) Almost everything you say about X is wrong, but is true of Y; you must
>REALLY be talking about Y.
>2) You're talking about X alright, but everything you say about it is
>wrong.
I agree with this, but I will say to you now that I and everyone else knows
DICK about qualia, and the more central "consciousness", I AM it, so it is
here. I'm no dogma-fool or mystic - quite the opposite in fact. From my
perception, an attempt to rid your worldview of bizarre effects such as
consciousness and the associated qualia constitutes a typical an oft-noted
threat to a "know-all" view of eternity. You probably have no idea how
ridiculous this seems to me. Basically, all there is is X, we have no other
data - so "everything we say about it" is pointless speculation.
>Example: "Of course I know what a horse is. A horse is a rounded edible
>fruit, coming usually in either red or green. Fresh ones make a crunch
>noise when you eat them." Am I talking about horses or not?
Definitions, definitions, definitions. We can't even hope to define qualia
or consciousness until we have enough data to make the word any more than a
pointer to the observed effect - and we have none except that perception of
the effect. The effect will ALWAYS be here and there's NOTHING you can do
about that - except destroy all entities that produce "it".
>Reductivism, then, just assumes 1 is right with regards to your claims
>about qualia. You're not REALLY talking about the non-physical, she
>argues: you're REALLY talking about these physical phenomena.
Nonsense in the context of my argument...
> Is this blatantly obvious to anyone else?
Obviously not on this list. But then, philosophy is just a sideline here. If
any of you extropians have knowledge of any decent philosophy lists - and
more importantly, you know the difference between philosophy and sophistry,
let me know - I'd be eternally grateful.
Yours, (honestly - I'm just a bit disillusioned and therefore angry)
Rob.
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