From: Darin Sunley (rsunley@escape.ca)
Date: Fri Feb 25 2000 - 19:03:20 MST
Skye wrote:
>What I would like *someone* on this list to do is come
>up with a better definition of what we are arguing
>about. It seems this arguement has downgraded from
>scientific to semantic and philosophical in nature.
That would be very difficult. What we are arguing about
is whether a particular alleged phenomena is
"semantic and philosophical in nature", or whether it is a
concrete, physical, non-mystical, rationally examinable
pattern in ordainary, simulatable, computable matter.
The instant both sides agree on a rationalist, symbolic,
computable definition, the non-computationalists have
just abandoned the field.
In general, computers can simulate any process that can be
described completely and accurately using symbols. (Yes,
I _know_ there are pathological cases :). Any rebuttal on
those grounds will necessarily include a proof of relevance.)
This is the equivalent of defining them. Once qualia are definied
in a non-philosophical sense, they are(in all likelyhood) computable,
and thus, by some people's definition, cease to be qualia.
Not that I understand why, entirely. I see no reason why qualia
are necessarily non-computable. Granted that my perception
(note the small "p", Dan :)) of "red" is WAY more complicated
then a 64 bit number describing that particular wavelength of
light. To use that as an argument against my perception being
computable is a strawman. I am not a paint matcher. My brain
has millions, possibly billions of interacting subsytems. That's
room for a lot of complexity in my mental structures, including the
mental structures that shuttle perceptions from one end of my
brain to the other. My perception of "red" is more complicated
then the aforementioned 64 bit number. This is obvious. But is it
_so_ obvious that my perception is more complex then a multi
gigabyte strongly interlinked symbolic structure of the colour,
pointers to the semantic primitives and actual hardware of the
visual cortex, links to memories, links to knowledge of associated
phenomenon (the siren of a fire engine), etc...?? The answer is a
very firm "not really". This isn't obvious at all. And so neither is the
non-compuatbility of qualia.
Darin Sunley
rsunley@escape.ca
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