From Yves.Roudier at eurecom.fr Fri Sep 3 17:30:04 2004 From: Yves.Roudier at eurecom.fr (Yves.Roudier@eurecom.fr) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:42 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] ESORICS 2004 - Last Call for Participation Message-ID: <200409031730.i83HU4dY018048@zinnia.eurecom.fr> [Apologies for multiple copies of this announcement] CALL FOR PARTICIPATION ESORICS 2004 9th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security Sponsored by SAP, @sec, and Région PACA Institut Eurecom, Sophia Antipolis, French Riviera, France September 13-15, 2004 http://esorics04.eurecom.fr ESORICS 2004 will be collocated with RAID 2004 Since 1990, ESORICS has been confirmed as the European research event in computer security, attracting audience from both the academic and industrial communities. The symposium has established itself as one of the premiere, international gatherings on Information Assurance. This year's three days program will feature a single technical track with 27 full papers selected from almost 170 submissions. TECHNICAL PROGRAM ----------------- Monday, September 13th ====================== 09:15 - 09:30 opening remarks 09:30 - 10:30 invited talk: Enterprise Privacy Management Michael Waidner - IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Switzerland 10:30 - 11:00 coffee break 11:00 - 12:30 Access control -------------- Incorporating Dynamic Constraints in the Flexible Authorization Framework Shiping Chen, Duminda Wijesekera, Sushil Jajodia Access-Condition-Table-driven Access Control for XML Database Naizhen Qi, Michiharu Kudo An Algebra for Composing Enterprise Privacy Policies Michael Backes, Markus Duermuth, Rainer Steinwandt 12:30 - 14:00 lunch 14:00 - 15:30 Cryptographic protocols ----------------------- Deriving, attacking and defending the GDOI protocol Catherine Meadows, Dusko Pavlovic Better Privacy for Trusted Computing Platforms Jan Camenisch A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of the Otway-Rees Protocol Michael Backes 15:30 - 16:00 coffee break 16:00 - 17:30 Anonymity and information hiding -------------------------------- A Formalization of Anonymity and Onion Routing Sjouke Mauw, Jan Verschuren, Erik de Vink Breaking Cauchy Model-based JPEG Steganography with First Order Statistics Rainer Böhme, Andreas Westfeld Comparison between two practical mix designs Claudia Diaz, Len Sassaman, Evelyne Dewitte Tuesday, September 14th ======================= 09:00 - 10:30 Distributed data protection --------------------------- Signature Bouquets: Immutability for Aggregated/Condensed Signatures Einar Mykletun, Maithili Narasimha, Gene Tsudik Towards a theory of data entanglement James Aspnes, Joan Feigenbaum, Aleksandr Yampolskiy, Sheng Zhong Portable and Flexible Document Access Control Mechanisms Mikhail Atallah, Marina Bykova 10:30 - 11:00 coffee break 11:00 - 12:30 Information flow and security properties ---------------------------------------- Possibilistic Information Flow Control in the Presence of Encrypted Communication Dieter Hutter, Axel Schairer Information flow control revisited: Noninfluence = Noninterference + Nonleakage David von Oheimb Security Property Based Administrative Controls Jon A. Solworth, Robert H. Sloan 12:30 - 14:00 lunch 14:00 - 15:30 Authentication and trust management ----------------------------------- A Vector Model of Trust for Developing Trustworthy Systems Indrajit Ray, Sudip Chakraborty Parameterized Authentication Michael J. Covington, Mustaque Ahamad, Irfan Essa, H. Venkateswaran Combinatorial Design of Key Distribution Mechanisms for Wireless Sensor Networks Bulent Yener, Seyit A. Camtepe 15:30 - 16:00 coffee break 16:00 - 17:30 Cryptography ------------ IPv6 Opportunistic Encryption Claude Castelluccia, Gabriel Montenegro, Julien Laganier, Christoph Neumann On the role of key schedules in attacks on iterated ciphers Lars R. Knudsen, John E. Mathiassen A Public-Key Encryption Scheme with Pseudo-Random Ciphertexts Bodo Möller Wednesday, September 15th ========================= 09:00 - 10:30 Operating systems and architecture ---------------------------------- A Host Intrusion Prevention System for Windows Operating Systems Roberto Battistoni, Emanuele Gabrielli, Luigi Vincenzo Mancini Re-establishing Trust in Compromised Systems: Recovering from Rootkits that Trojan the System Call Table Julian Grizzard, John Levine, Henry Owen ARCHERR: Runtime Environment Driven Program Safety Ramkumar Chinchani, Anusha Iyer, Bharat Jayaraman, Shambhu Upadhyaya 10:30 - 11:00 coffee break 11:00 - 12:30 Intrusion detection ------------------- Sets, Bags, and Rock and Roll Analyzing Large Data Sets of Network Data John McHugh Redundancy and diversity in security Bev Littlewood, Lorenzo Strigini Discover Novel Attack Strategies from INFOSEC Alerts Xinzhou Qin, Wenke Lee ORGANIZING COMMITTEE -------------------- General Chair Refik Molva Institut Eurecom email: Refik.Molva@eurecom.fr Program Chairs Peter Ryan Pierangela Samarati University of Newcastle upon Tyne University of Milan email: Peter.Ryan@newcastle.ac.uk email: samarati@dti.unimi.it Publication Chair Publicity Chair Dieter Gollmann Yves Roudier TU Hamburg-Harburg Institut Eurecom email: diego@tuhh.de email: roudier@eurecom.fr Sponsoring Chair Marc Dacier Institut Eurecom email: dacier@eurecom.fr PROGRAM COMMITTEE ----------------- Vijay Atluri, Rutgers University, USA Giampaolo Bella, Università di Catania, Italy Joachim Biskup, Universitaet Dortmund, Germany Jan Camenisch, IBM Research, Switzerland Germano Caronni, Sun Microsystems Laboratories, USA David Chadwick, University of Salford, UK Ernesto Damiani, University of Milan, Italy Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, University of Milan, Italy Yves Deswarte, LAAS-CNRS, France Alberto Escudero-Pascual, Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden Csilla Farkas, University of South Carolina, USA Simon Foley, University College Cork, Ireland Dieter Gollmann, TU Hamburg-Harburg, Germany Joshua D. Guttman, MITRE, USA Sushil Jajodia, George Mason University, USA Sokratis K. Katsikas, University of the Aegean, Greece Maciej Koutny, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK Peng Liu, Pennsylvania State University, USA Javier Lopez, University of Malaga, Spain Roy Maxion, Carnegie Mellon University, USA Patrick McDaniel, AT&T Labs-Research, USA John McHugh, CERT/CC, USA Catherine A. Meadows, Naval Research Lab, USA Refik Molva, Institut Eurécom, France Peng Ning, NC State University, USA LouAnna Notargiacomo, The MITRE Corporation, USA Eiji Okamoto, University of Tsukuba, Japan Stefano Paraboschi, University of Bergamo, Italy Andreas Pfitzmann, TU Dresden, Germany Bart Preneel, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Microelectronic laboratory, Belgium Steve Schneider, University of London, UK Christoph Schuba, Sun Microsystems, Inc., USA Michael Steiner, IBM T.J. Watson Research Laboratory, USA Paul Syverson, Naval Research Laboratory, USA Kymie M.C. Tan, Carnegie Mellon University, USA Dan Thomsen, Tresys Technology, USA Moti Yung, Columbia University, USA VENUE / TRAVEL -------------- ESORICS 2004 will be held on the French Riviera coast, about 20 km West of Nice and 15 km Northeast of Cannes. The conference will take place at Institut Eurecom / CICA, in the Sophia Antipolis science park, which can easily be reached thanks to the nearby Nice international airport. For more information, refer to: http://esorics04.eurecom.fr/visitor_information.html From Yves.Roudier at eurecom.fr Fri Sep 3 17:30:19 2004 From: Yves.Roudier at eurecom.fr (Yves.Roudier@eurecom.fr) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:42 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] RAID 2004 - Last Call for Participation Message-ID: <200409031730.i83HUJSu018143@zinnia.eurecom.fr> [Apologies for multiple copies of this announcement] CALL FOR PARTICIPATION RAID 2004 "Intrusion Detection and Society" Seventh International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection Sponsored by SAP, France Telecom, and Région PACA Institut Eurecom, Sophia-Antipolis, French Riviera, France September 15-17, 2004 http://raid04.eurecom.fr RAID 2004 will be collocated with ESORICS 2004 The RAID symposium brings together leading researchers and practitioners from academia, government, and industry to discuss intrusion detection technologies and issues from research and commercial perspectives. This year's program features a single technical track with 14 full papers and 2 practical experience reports selected from almost 120 submissions. It also includes invited speakers, a poster session as well as an abstracts' session. TECHNICAL PROGRAM ----------------- Wednesday, September 15th ========================= 09.00 Registration opens 12.30 Lunch 14.00 - 14.15 Welcome 14.15 - 15.15 Invited Talk: Lessons in Intrusion Detection Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Internet Security, CA, USA 15.15 - 15.45 Coffee break 15.45 - 16.45 Modelling process behaviour - Chair: Alfonso Valdes, (SRI International, USA) Automatic Extraction of Accurate Application-Specific Sandboxing Policy, Lap-chung Lam and Tzi-cker Chiueh, Rether Networks Inc., Centereach N.Y., USA Context Sensitive Anomaly Monitoring of Process Control Flow to Detect Mimicry Attacks and Impossible Paths, Haizhi Xu, Wenliang Du, and Steve J. Chapin, Systems Assurance Institute, Syracuse University, USA 16.45 - 17.00 Break 17.00 - 18.00 Abstract session 18.00 - Poster session Thursday, September 16th ======================== 09.00 - 10.30 Detecting Worms and Viruses - Chair: John McHugh (CMU/SEI CERT, USA) HoneyStat: Local Worm Detection Using Honeypots, David Dagon, Xinzhou Qin, Guofei Gu, Wenke Lee, Julian Grizzard, John Levine, and Henry Owen, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA Fast Detection of Scanning Worm Infections, Jaeyeon Jung (1), Stuart E. Schechter (2), and Arthur W. Berger (1), (1) MIT CSAIL, USA (2) Harvard DEAS, USA. Detecting Unknown Massive Mailing Viruses Using Proactive Methods Ruiqi Hu and Aloysius K. Mok, Dept of Computer Sciences, University of Texas at Austin, USA 10.30 - 11.00 Coffee break 11.00 - 12.30 Attack and Alert Analysis - Chair: Diego Zamboni (IBM Research, Switzerland) Using Adaptive Alert Classification to Reduce False Positives in Intrusion Detection, Tadeusz Pietraszek, IBM Zürich Research Laboratory, Switzerland. Attack Analysis and Detection for Ad Hoc Routing Protocols Yi-an Huang, Wenke Lee, College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA. On the Design and Use of Internet Sinks for Network Abuse Monitoring Vinod Yegneswaran (1), Paul Barford (1), Dave Plonka (2), (1) Dept of Computer Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA, (2) Dept of Information Technology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA 12.30 - 14.00 Lunch 14.00 - 15.00 Invited Talk: Fighting Fraud in Telecom Environments Håkan Kvarnström TeliaSonera AB, Sweden 15.00 - 15.30 Coffee break 15.30 - 16.30 Practical Experience - Chair: George Mohay (Queensland University of Technology, Australia) Monitoring IDS Background Noise Using EWMA Control Charts and Alert Information Jouni Viinikka and Herve Debar, France Telecom R&D, Caen, France Experience with a Commercial Deception System, Brian Hernacki, Jeremy Bennett, Thomas Lofgren, Symantec Corporation, Redwood City, USA 16.30 - 17.30 Poster session Friday, September 17th ====================== 09.00 - 10.30 Anomaly Detection - Chair: Christopher Kruegel, (Technical University of Vienna, Austria) Anomalous Payload-based Network Intrusion Detection Ke Wang Salvatore J. Stolfo, Computer Science Dept, Columbia University, USA Anomaly Detection Using Layered Networks Based on Eigen Co-occurrence Matrix Mizuki Oka (1), Yoshihiro Oyama (2,3), Hirotake Abe (1), and Kazuhiko Kato (1,3), (1) University of Tsukuba, Japan, (2) University of Tokyo, Japan, (3) Japan Science and Technology Cooperation, Japan Seurat: A Pointillist Approach to Anomaly Detection Yinglian Xie (1), Hyang-Ah Kim (1), David R. O'Hallaron (1,2) Michael K. Reiter (1,2), and Hui Zhang (1,2), (1) Dept of Computer Science, Carnegie-Mellon University, USA (2) Dept of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie-Mellon University, USA 10.30 - 11.00 Coffee Break 11.00 - 12.30 Formal Analysis for Intrusion Detection - Chair: Wenke Lee (Georgia Tech, USA) Detection of Interactive Stepping Stones with Maximum Delay Bound: Algorithms and Confidence Bounds Avrim Blum, Dawn Song, Shobha Venkataraman Carnegie Mellon University, USA. Formal Reasoning about Intrusion Detection Systems Tao Song (1), Calvin Ko (2), Jim Alves-Foss (3), Cui Zhang (4), and Karl Levitt (1), (1) Computer Security Laboratory, University of California, Davis, USA, (2) NAI LAbs, Network Associates Inc., Santa Clara, CA, USA, (3) Center for Secure and Dependable Systems, University of Idaho, USA (4) Computer Science Dept, California State University, Sacramento, USA. RheoStat : Real-time Risk Management Ashish Gehani and Gershon Kedem, Dept of Computer Science, Duke University, USA 12.30 - 12.45 Concluding remarks 12.45 - 14.00 Lunch ORGANIZING COMMITTEE -------------------- General Chair: Refik Molva Program Chairs: Erland Jonsson Alfonso Valdes Publication Chair: Magnus Almgren Publicity Chair: Yves Roudier Sponsor Chair: Marc Dacier PROGRAM COMMITTEE ----------------- Tatsuya Baba (NTT Data, Japan) Lee Badger (DARPA, USA) Sungdeok Cha (KAIST, Korea) Steven Cheung (SRI International, USA) Herve Debar (France Telecom R&D, France) Simone Fischer-Hubner (Karlstad University, Sweden) Steven Furnell (University of Plymouth, UK) Dogan Kesdogan (RWTH Aachen, Germany) Chris Kruegel (Technical University of Vienna, Austria) Hakan Kvarnstrom (TeliaSonera R&D, Sweden) Wenke Lee (Georgia Tech, USA) Douglas Maughan (DHS HSARPA, USA) Roy Maxion (Carnegie Mellon University, USA) John McHugh (CMU/SEI CERT, USA) Ludovic Me (Supelec, France) George Mohay (Queensland University of Technology, Australia) Vern Paxson (ICSI and LBNL, USA) Giovanni Vigna (UCSB, USA) Andreas Wespi (IBM Research, Switzerland) Felix Wu (UC Davis, USA) Diego Zamboni (IBM Research, Switzerland) STEERING COMMITTEE ------------------ Chair: Marc Dacier (Eurecom, France) Herve Debar (France Telecom R&D, France) Deborah Frincke (University of Idaho, USA) Huang Ming-Yuh (The Boeing Company, USA) Wenke Lee (Georgia Institute of Technology, USA) Ludovic Me (Supelec, France) S. Felix Wu (UC Davis, USA) Andreas Wespi (IBM Research, Switzerland) Giovanni Vigna (UCSB, USA) VENUE / TRAVEL -------------- RAID 2004 will be held on the French Riviera coast, about 20 km West of Nice and 15 km Northeast of Cannes. The conference will take place at Institut Eurecom / CICA, in the Sophia Antipolis science park, which can easily be reached thanks to the nearby Nice international airport. For more information, refer to: http://raid04.eurecom.fr/visitor_information.html From chandasandipan at yahoo.co.in Sat Sep 4 06:33:52 2004 From: chandasandipan at yahoo.co.in (=?iso-8859-1?q?Sandipan=20Chanda?=) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] hacking something Message-ID: <20040904063352.48287.qmail@web8301.mail.in.yahoo.com> sir, can't u hack and send me an e-mail address from rediff matchmaker? i will provide u details where u can find the member. chandasandipan@yahoo.co.in Yahoo! India Matrimony: Find your life partneronline. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040904/ec68325e/attachment.html From mail at akbars.net Mon Sep 6 19:22:49 2004 From: mail at akbars.net (Imran Akbar) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] stanford startup looking for programmers Message-ID: <413CB909.10805@akbars.net> Hi, I am forming a startup company to develop an idea I have succesfully tested. I need: a C++ programmer with GTK+ experience a VoIP programmer who knows RTP/UDP communication, SIP, compression/encryption, etc. a distributed (P2P) database designer with socket programming knowledge Thanks, Imran From mmukarrams at yahoo.com Tue Sep 7 14:44:47 2004 From: mmukarrams at yahoo.com (Muhammad Mukarram Bin Tariq) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] stanford startup looking for programmers In-Reply-To: <413CB909.10805@akbars.net> Message-ID: <20040907144447.22706.qmail@web80410.mail.yahoo.com> hello imran, my name is mukarram, presently a PhD student at GA Tech, but stuck in Pakistan waiting visa. I am taking this opportunity to teach Graduate Level Courses in one of the universities in Pakistan. I was wondering if you would be consider to get your programming done from my students, and provide the necessary funding. I have myself extended experience in VoIP and area of networking. I have worked for DoCoMo USA Labs, San Jose as a research engineer for little over 3 years, and have also worked on designing and implementing SIP and H.323 based VoIP stacks in distant past. Thankyou, Looking forward to your reply, -- Mukarram Imran Akbar wrote: Hi, I am forming a startup company to develop an idea I have succesfully tested. I need: a C++ programmer with GTK+ experience a VoIP programmer who knows RTP/UDP communication, SIP, compression/encryption, etc. a distributed (P2P) database designer with socket programming knowledge Thanks, Imran _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers@zgp.org http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers _______________________________________________ Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences Muhammad Mukarram Bin Tariq http://www.geocities.com/mmukarrams/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040907/0a9b9f04/attachment.htm From pseudonym778 at lycos.com Wed Sep 8 00:02:19 2004 From: pseudonym778 at lycos.com (pseudonym778@lycos.com) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] (no subject) Message-ID: <20040908000219.5F629C6119@ws7-5.us4.outblaze.com> Otto is a platform that will: * Leverage the visibility of high-profile sites of the world wide web, allowing counter-commentary that will be as visible as the original content. * Recognize content and provide the same commentary, regardless of the location where it is republished. * Evince surreptitious changes made to content. * Allow for pseudonymous comments. * Allow for amassing of reputation. * Have no central authority or server. Otto is written in Java and driven off of a JDBC backend. The first two points of the above are for the most part complete, and the p2p networking has rudimentary messaging so far. I'm writing to this list for several reasons: 1) I'm looking for some teammembers for this project with skills with the following technologies: Java, HTTP, HTML, XMLHTTP, p2p networking, crypto (bouncycastle API). Eventually, the project will hopefully encompass technologies such as advanced routing and digital currencies. 2) I haven't yet decided on a license for the software (leaning towards GPL or LGPL) so any expert advice is gratefully accepted. 3) I need to find a home for development and I'm wondering if anyone has suggestions. I'm thinking perhaps sourceforge or setting up my own server someplace. Any opinions on sourceforge or tips on hosting are appreciated. 4) Early release to those who are interested in toying with it. Thanks everyone! I don't know what the list etiquette is here, but I imagine most of the replies would be better suited for direct emails than a p2p mailing list, so please do that if possible. I'll follow-up on-list once I have some sort of permanent hosting available. --Pseudonym778 -- _______________________________________________ Find what you are looking for with the Lycos Yellow Pages http://r.lycos.com/r/yp_emailfooter/http://yellowpages.lycos.com/default.asp?SRC=lycos10 From pseudonym778 at lycos.com Wed Sep 8 00:03:59 2004 From: pseudonym778 at lycos.com (pseudonym778@lycos.com) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] New Project Announcement: Otto Message-ID: <20040908000359.CFA44C6119@ws7-5.us4.outblaze.com> Otto is a platform that will: * Leverage the visibility of high-profile sites of the world wide web, allowing counter-commentary that will be as visible as the original content. * Recognize content and provide the same commentary, regardless of the location where it is republished. * Evince surreptitious changes made to content. * Allow for pseudonymous comments. * Allow for amassing of reputation. * Have no central authority or server. Otto is written in Java and driven off of a JDBC backend. The first two points of the above are for the most part complete, and the p2p networking has rudimentary messaging so far. I'm writing to this list for several reasons: 1) I'm looking for some teammembers for this project with skills with the following technologies: Java, HTTP, HTML, XMLHTTP, p2p networking, crypto (bouncycastle API). Eventually, the project will hopefully encompass technologies such as advanced routing and digital currencies. 2) I haven't yet decided on a license for the software (leaning towards GPL or LGPL) so any expert advice is gratefully accepted. 3) I need to find a home for development and I'm wondering if anyone has suggestions. I'm thinking perhaps sourceforge or setting up my own server someplace. Any opinions on sourceforge or tips on hosting are appreciated. 4) Early release to those who are interested in toying with it. Thanks everyone! I don't know what the list etiquette is here, but I imagine most of the replies would be better suited for direct emails than a p2p mailing list, so please do that if possible. I'll follow-up on-list once I have some sort of permanent hosting available. --Pseudonym778 -- _______________________________________________ Find what you are looking for with the Lycos Yellow Pages http://r.lycos.com/r/yp_emailfooter/http://yellowpages.lycos.com/default.asp?SRC=lycos10 From eugen at leitl.org Wed Sep 8 06:57:49 2004 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] Re: [i2p] E language over I2P (fwd from derick_eddington@yahoo.com) Message-ID: <20040908065749.GQ1457@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Derick Eddington ----- From: Derick Eddington Date: Tue, 7 Sep 2004 20:44:59 -0700 (PDT) To: i2p@i2p.net Subject: Re: [i2p] E language over I2P -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I had thought of the idea of E objects each having a unique I2P destination and that being their unique identifier but I think there are two problems with that. A capability (ObjID in E) is "a necessary and sufficient condition" and bestows "authority with designation". Authority is restricted by making it impossible to even designate the thing/action and the ability to designate is all you need to have authority. Security/access policy is done by controlling who knows what ObjIDs (who can designate what) and designing your objects accordingly (with all kinds of neat patterns for sophisticated relationships not possible any other way). ObjIDs of many kinds of object must be knowable by only one entity other than the creator. I'm not familiar with DHTs but when I look at my I2P router console I see a listing of "Kademlia Network DB Contents" which I'm thinking is the portion of the DHT that's been distributed to me, meaning I have knowledge of these destinations. I2P destinations put in the distributed hash table are necessarily known to the I2P participant storing that part of the DHT, correct? If this is so, destinations can't be ObjIDs because the storer has come to have a capability illegally (according to capability security). I think another problem with having destinations as ObjIDs would be the overhead of computing two keypairs for every new object in situations where many many new objects need to be created continuously. (I'm correct in thinking the overhead is more than reading 128 to 256 random bits from a PRNG, right?). Having objects in the same Vat (interpreter address space) that can't be known to be in the same Vat definitely could have uses, and IIRC, E already does or is planning to support multiple VatIDs (which would be I2P destinations in our discussion) per interpreter, with which you could have as few objects per VatID and as many VatIDs as needed. As for E moving to JMS (or any MOM), I'd like to keep the changes to E as small as possible so for now I'm just interested in getting CapTP to run over streaming I2P and using destinations as VatIDs. I do like the idea of E Vats simultaneously supporting anonymous and non-anonymous inter-object communication and that should be supported by whatever changes/additions to E I'm considering. How is the more robust and efficient successor to the ministreaming library coming along? Will it replace the net.i2p.client.streaming.* implementation or will the API be the same? I'm wondering how I should take this into account as I explore the details of modifying E. Derick Eddington -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.5 (GNU/Linux) iQIVAwUBQT5+TbYUeoIU0wXLAQIK7w//TfMYEx7i/A+j0njInMAnxuRAPlbkOfLt 0RPLkdaMiGvnsVHA1gsaOr0itybxeRsqWKEVc4LSM8fbPyN9eqczT13vsI+G7DO1 A0JKTpS2Ug9Sand4hT5jKz7V4m/0KlqeBRCEYHRm4HHTzgm4CZ4gJHUHbVf4q01r RRVC5yNZJtMGyiJk8sbc40+kaPW5DcQop5Nb8Z/kRC9n6VA1Udovwf8QkO8SyhUK JqhBJ3YOGj+i+v4MHZB9CKBiTRbufcLZRHOaqNS9YYseLOO+a9dOv3Ne7FIh0FEd ajhMuy0bTB9f1W8wa04a603hU0Z1R1XZXdvEL7HTpzfrXmQZatSACRFE5KIXGjMd xdWIupcK2FS2eVRm6CLwoztcbVgszmMa8iw6eKJjBKkCgPjJPr/88048Zwh2ZFUg o57NhI30QRtWymthXikLJMNIO+fLvi5gLAPC7vgYMtcaEUOYZ4klqSkKau8SF5ZK LUPIBzeZ26wVUqN9WTdEMm3Q6iarsimH/2Fx1Ry/4aajIIw9Zb2wL8E1RNk4/ZCL ldB8ruEGosk38U0QdQ2qHmyRawWzD7x617lnKwuTm8ZCgpamv0ISj/65RaRNhdcK /Ww1V8FzuQejV3/uV70A1ToRZ0hnYqnBNniJB+kRBifMZb73XeZQUIoj3dvY39cC 5i859V9RuwE= =zgb1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? New and Improved Yahoo! Mail - Send 10MB messages! http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail _______________________________________________ i2p mailing list i2p@i2p.net http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040908/2ad9c5c4/attachment.pgp From eugen at leitl.org Tue Sep 14 06:15:12 2004 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] [i2p] naming ideas (fwd from derick_eddington@yahoo.com) Message-ID: <20040914061512.GQ1457@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Derick Eddington ----- From: Derick Eddington Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 18:05:08 -0700 (PDT) To: i2p@i2p.net Subject: [i2p] naming ideas -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I've been thinking a little about naming and I have a scheme I'll throw out here. SDSI and PNML have naming-paths denoted with an apostrophe-s syntax, ie: "Bob's eepsite" or "Bobeepsite". (I like dot syntax, like "Bob.Eepsite", better so I suggest that.) The user's addressbook has a sub-addressbook for "Bob" of name=>dest supplied by Bob in which "eepsite" would be looked up. Sub-addressbooks could also name other sub-addressbooks so name-paths like "Bob.Brother.blog" could be done. Compared to a one-level addressbook, I think this would greatly reduce the hassle of name collisions and everyone having to try to think of unique names to suggest for all their dests and likewise for users needing to come up with names (not that this couldn't still be done). Nyms could have signing keys. They are GUIDs for the nym and with which nyms sign and publish their addressbooks as and how users associate their chosen name for the nym with their local sub-addressbooks for the nym. This would securely associate multiple destinations with a nym and could allow for revocation of compromised destination keys and updating of the new dest for the name. (Is there anything beyond the obvious in the threat model and implications of destination key compromise in I2P?) When I2P gets big, having to maintain your local address book and keep in sync with all the published names could become too burdensome. A remote querying protocol could exist and name service providers could specialize in maintaining and providing a massive number of names. They would have a nym GUID/pubkey and users would name it whatever they want (ie "NamesRUs") and have a local sub-addressbook for them; in the sub-addressbook would be a standardized name like "resolver" which points to a destination which provides the remote querying service. When you say "NamesRUs.AcmeCo" and "AcmeCo" is not already in the sub-addressbook, "resolver" is queried for it. This has the benefits of: * distributed and decentralized * under the control of the user * interesting possibilities for naming-path combinations from addressbooks exported by disparate entities * few if any collision and coming-up-with-names hassles * revocation of compromised destination keys * possible potential for some sort of reputation web-of-trust integration * able to choose and simultaneously use multiple name service providers which overcomes having too many names for users to manage (the benefits of DNS), as well as having the above attributes Derick Eddington -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.5 (GNU/Linux) iQIVAwUBQUZA17YUeoIU0wXLAQILVQ/+IQW7Dv5XWwwOu2rBQSWSUpeiJOrXQE3R zMfHsxDKtsU+PjWPRbRgw1fqVxN4ddm5gcZEIs2XjKTq4So6bCXaCr9XqTqVcQh6 ndeVXqT2kP8n8ofkfLQqeorEpcFHKyXmOrPtQxNggL8oQGQMOgmRlT0fW0dcxKYY /Ezcp30ufkwbcpAF7sRXHs6IoQfeotz71oFfRDOE0sV6KQEqGpDS068oGO1A1TjK iRB4RdsuIiV0C9wQld9f5bs7/pcv/ogFl32yYjWCG4QD8xzZjYTwB1/ytqCbKzUn w5Sh1pI3n3hiVt9GR7ByKn4P4yYQebPbdI1tM0H75NFQA1w6p18ab0sV5ogDcxsi jJBcFCfZmngLCq9Sbdr+3elVC6jsy9zCyYeeY19r4w7DFFDS8ArmcH3zrevtbusE zuRSHR0YcsKmycTRZ8AVMp8k4220Na4ztjDigfOMIFRNKLXq89G/vg0ox7Esfo9M RH8Vt2cZjtIh7w0u1OvWQfq6FJU1jTCugmgFnnm5sbzSUf0xTY6OPPreoGaZnJNr VL5WgL0oxFUQiJK1qvXOvi7rZlJ/LClZcx5FH+H39iP1TsbT4C0x6YdKY+QwkotA 8eRJeBEw96I9w5pV0l8ramNUiNHXNpnpgt6QmCa+dnEl2hVs2X1YZcPIrwwJSNRP jtviTFuekJ0= =da+i -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? New and Improved Yahoo! Mail - 100MB free storage! http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail _______________________________________________ i2p mailing list i2p@i2p.net http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040914/63e67fb0/attachment.pgp From eric at aquameta.com Wed Sep 15 02:29:00 2004 From: eric at aquameta.com (Eric Hanson) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized Message-ID: <20040915022900.A29001@aquameta.com> Here's a problem that I'm sure other apps have addressed, and I'm wondering what are some good solution out there: How does a p2p application keeps metadata about a file on the filesystem synchronized with the location of the file? When a file gets moved, how does the metadata automatically update to point to the new location? Thanks, Eric From emis-liz at dsv.su.se Wed Sep 15 07:34:04 2004 From: emis-liz at dsv.su.se (lisheng) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized In-Reply-To: <20040915022900.A29001@aquameta.com> References: <20040915022900.A29001@aquameta.com> Message-ID: <2054.62.202.73.20.1095233644.squirrel@62.202.73.20> maybe send a notify message? and the message handler will handle with it? > Here's a problem that I'm sure other apps have addressed, and > I'm wondering what are some good solution out there: > > How does a p2p application keeps metadata about a file on the > filesystem synchronized with the location of the file? When a > file gets moved, how does the metadata automatically update to > point to the new location? > > Thanks, > Eric > _______________________________________________ > p2p-hackers mailing list > p2p-hackers@zgp.org > http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > _______________________________________________ > Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: > http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences > Lisheng Engineering and Management of Information System KTH(Royal Institute of Technology)/SU(Stockholm University) From eric at aquameta.com Wed Sep 15 14:51:57 2004 From: eric at aquameta.com (Eric Hanson) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized In-Reply-To: <2054.62.202.73.20.1095233644.squirrel@62.202.73.20>; from emis-liz@dsv.su.se on Wed, Sep 15, 2004 at 09:34:04AM +0200 References: <20040915022900.A29001@aquameta.com> <2054.62.202.73.20.1095233644.squirrel@62.202.73.20> Message-ID: <20040915145157.A10872@aquameta.com> That's kind of what I was thinking, but I don't even know where to start looking on how to do it. It's going to be a Java app, so I can write a listener to listen for moves, deletes and renames and sync on that. But, say on a OSX box, is there an event thrown that can be tapped into somehow? How about Windows? How about Linux? lisheng (emis-liz@dsv.su.se) wrote: > maybe send a notify message? and the message handler will handle with it? > > > Here's a problem that I'm sure other apps have addressed, and > > I'm wondering what are some good solution out there: > > > > How does a p2p application keeps metadata about a file on the > > filesystem synchronized with the location of the file? When a > > file gets moved, how does the metadata automatically update to > > point to the new location? > > > > Thanks, > > Eric > > _______________________________________________ > > p2p-hackers mailing list > > p2p-hackers@zgp.org > > http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > > _______________________________________________ > > Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: > > http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences > > > > > Lisheng > Engineering and Management of Information System > KTH(Royal Institute of Technology)/SU(Stockholm University) > > _______________________________________________ > p2p-hackers mailing list > p2p-hackers@zgp.org > http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > _______________________________________________ > Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: > http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences From bert at web2peer.com Wed Sep 15 15:10:48 2004 From: bert at web2peer.com (bert@web2peer.com) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized Message-ID: <20040915151048.D7A739E992@ws6-2.us4.outblaze.com> Even if there were events that could be tapped, you'd have to tap them through JNI if your app is in Java. The simplest approach is to periodically "crawl" the portion of the filesystem of interest to ensure synchronization. Not a great solution but I've found it to work well enough in practice. Just make sure you throttle the crawl & run it in a low priority thread to avoid excessively annoying the user. ----- Original Message ----- From: Eric Hanson Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2004 14:51:57 +0000 To: "Peer-to-peer development." Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized > That's kind of what I was thinking, but I don't even know where > to start looking on how to do it. It's going to be a Java app, > so I can write a listener to listen for moves, deletes and > renames and sync on that. But, say on a OSX box, is there an > event thrown that can be tapped into somehow? How about > Windows? How about Linux? From markus-kern at gmx.net Wed Sep 15 15:20:39 2004 From: markus-kern at gmx.net (Markus Kern) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized In-Reply-To: <20040915145157.A10872@aquameta.com> References: <20040915022900.A29001@aquameta.com> <2054.62.202.73.20.1095233644.squirrel@62.202.73.20> <20040915145157.A10872@aquameta.com> Message-ID: <13523272453.20040915172039@gmx.net> On Wednesday, September 15, 2004, 4:51:57 PM Eric Hanson wrote: > That's kind of what I was thinking, but I don't even know where > to start looking on how to do it. It's going to be a Java app, > so I can write a listener to listen for moves, deletes and > renames and sync on that. But, say on a OSX box, is there an > event thrown that can be tapped into somehow? How about > Windows? How about Linux? On Windows there is ReadDirectoryChangesW [1] to monitor directory trees for changes. How easy this would be to use in Java (especially in asynchronous mode) I don't know. There also seem to be issues with the time resolution this method offers [2]. Apparently some events are only triggered once per hour for performance reasons. [1] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/fileio/base/readdirectorychangesw.asp [2] http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;q245214 From eric at aquameta.com Wed Sep 15 16:08:53 2004 From: eric at aquameta.com (Eric Hanson) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized In-Reply-To: <13523272453.20040915172039@gmx.net>; from markus-kern@gmx.net on Wed, Sep 15, 2004 at 05:20:39PM +0200 References: <20040915022900.A29001@aquameta.com> <2054.62.202.73.20.1095233644.squirrel@62.202.73.20> <20040915145157.A10872@aquameta.com> <13523272453.20040915172039@gmx.net> Message-ID: <20040915160853.A21950@aquameta.com> Markus Kern (markus-kern@gmx.net) wrote: > > That's kind of what I was thinking, but I don't even know where > > to start looking on how to do it. It's going to be a Java app, > > so I can write a listener to listen for moves, deletes and > > renames and sync on that. But, say on a OSX box, is there an > > event thrown that can be tapped into somehow? How about > > Windows? How about Linux? > > On Windows there is ReadDirectoryChangesW [1] to monitor directory > trees for changes. How easy this would be to use in Java (especially > in asynchronous mode) I don't know. I'm thinking more of going the other way, writing something in C that calls the Java daemon upon the event of a move delete or rename. So using ReadDirectoryChangesW would rely on a polling mechanism? This isn't going to work for my uses because... ok let me explain a bit. The idea -- and at this point it's just an idea -- is to create an application level filesystem metadata layer. Basically implement something that will behave like WinFS in that you can associate arbitrary XML metadata with any file on the filesystem. Except do it in Java using a Java XML database, so the whole thing can be cross platform and provide a standard API. The hard part is the integration with each filesystem it hopes to run on -- the synchronization problem. Finding a robust solution that simply sends a message (over REST even) to a running java daemon from a OS event would be ideal. So if I understand correctly, ReadDirectoryChangesW uses the windows Last Accessed property, which is stored with the file. This doesn't quite cut it because it relies on a polling of the entire filesystem periodically checking last accessed stats. Maybe it's possible to access the guts of the filesystem? I'm not an expert in OS-level programming, but it seems like there should be some sort of event or notification that can be tapped into. Eric From markus-kern at gmx.net Wed Sep 15 16:34:01 2004 From: markus-kern at gmx.net (Markus Kern) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized In-Reply-To: <20040915160853.A21950@aquameta.com> References: <20040915022900.A29001@aquameta.com> <2054.62.202.73.20.1095233644.squirrel@62.202.73.20> <20040915145157.A10872@aquameta.com> <13523272453.20040915172039@gmx.net> <20040915160853.A21950@aquameta.com> Message-ID: <16627673546.20040915183401@gmx.net> On Wednesday, September 15, 2004, 6:08:53 PM Eric Hanson wrote: > Markus Kern (markus-kern@gmx.net) wrote: >> > That's kind of what I was thinking, but I don't even know where >> > to start looking on how to do it. It's going to be a Java app, >> > so I can write a listener to listen for moves, deletes and >> > renames and sync on that. But, say on a OSX box, is there an >> > event thrown that can be tapped into somehow? How about >> > Windows? How about Linux? >> >> On Windows there is ReadDirectoryChangesW [1] to monitor directory >> trees for changes. How easy this would be to use in Java (especially >> in asynchronous mode) I don't know. > I'm thinking more of going the other way, writing something in C > that calls the Java daemon upon the event of a move delete or > rename. > So using ReadDirectoryChangesW would rely on a polling > mechanism? This isn't going to work for my uses because... ok > let me explain a bit. > So if I understand correctly, ReadDirectoryChangesW uses the > windows Last Accessed property, which is stored with the file. > This doesn't quite cut it because it relies on a polling of the > entire filesystem periodically checking last accessed stats. The time of last access is not used to determine changes when using ReadDirectoryChangesW. It can be one of the properties you monitor however in which case the one hour resolution applies. There are various ways to use ReadDirectoryChangesW. You can use it synchronously in which case Windows simply buffers all changes and gives them to you the next time you call the function. This is probably the easiest way to do it. You can sleep a while, check for new events and send them to your Java application, then loop. The danger with this approach is that the buffer may overflow while you are sleeping and additional events will simply be dropped. Another way is to set up a callback which is called by Windows when there are any changes. Since your application will not do anything else and you thus don't need the main thread this solution is probably not the most elegant either. A third possibilty is to set up an event object, pass it to ReadDirectoryChangesW and then wait on the object in a loop. There are some comments in the MSDN which indicate this may not work on Windows 9x/ME though. Some experimentation will be needed here. From clausen at gnu.org Thu Sep 16 00:15:01 2004 From: clausen at gnu.org (Andrew Clausen) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized In-Reply-To: <20040915145157.A10872@aquameta.com> References: <20040915022900.A29001@aquameta.com> <2054.62.202.73.20.1095233644.squirrel@62.202.73.20> <20040915145157.A10872@aquameta.com> Message-ID: <20040916001500.GA25402@gnu.org> On Wed, Sep 15, 2004 at 02:51:57PM +0000, Eric Hanson wrote: > That's kind of what I was thinking, but I don't even know where > to start looking on how to do it. It's going to be a Java app, > so I can write a listener to listen for moves, deletes and > renames and sync on that. But, say on a OSX box, is there an > event thrown that can be tapped into somehow? How about > Windows? How about Linux? In Linux, there is a daemon called the "File Alteration Monitor" (FAM). Cheers, Andrew From lutianbo at software.ict.ac.cn Thu Sep 16 09:43:45 2004 From: lutianbo at software.ict.ac.cn (Lutianbo) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] How to picture a figure Message-ID: <006001c49bd1$a9020ad0$9402000a@ictltbo> Hi all, Can anybody tell me how to picture figures in papers. I'm now using Microsoft excel, but I find that the figures pictured by this software is not so good as those in others' papers.Is there any other software? Thanks in advance! --Victor Lu -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040916/d59c889a/attachment.html From macambira at gmail.com Thu Sep 16 16:24:52 2004 From: macambira at gmail.com (Tiago Macambira) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] How to picture a figure In-Reply-To: <006001c49bd1$a9020ad0$9402000a@ictltbo> References: <006001c49bd1$a9020ad0$9402000a@ictltbo> Message-ID: You could export those images created by excel to a vector format - say wmf or emf - and use libwmf-bin utilities to convert it to eps. You could also use gnuplot instead of excel to generate your pictures: it shouldn't be that dificult to create the pictures once you had all the data processed by excel. Besides, gnuplot outputs good-quality eps pictures, ready to be used in LaTex documents... []s Tiago Alves Macambira From aharwood at cs.mu.OZ.AU Fri Sep 17 03:57:10 2004 From: aharwood at cs.mu.OZ.AU (Aaron Harwood) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] How to picture a figure In-Reply-To: References: <006001c49bd1$a9020ad0$9402000a@ictltbo> Message-ID: Gnuplot can also output xfig (or just fig) format for any "final touches" to a plot/figure... before exporting as eps. --aaron On 17/09/2004, at 2:24 AM, Tiago Macambira wrote: > You could export those images created by excel to a vector format - > say wmf or emf - and use libwmf-bin utilities to convert it to eps. > > You could also use gnuplot instead of excel to generate your pictures: > it shouldn't be that dificult to create the pictures once you had all > the data processed by excel. Besides, gnuplot outputs good-quality eps > pictures, ready to be used in LaTex documents... > > []s > Tiago Alves Macambira > _______________________________________________ > p2p-hackers mailing list > p2p-hackers@zgp.org > http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > _______________________________________________ > Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: > http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Aaron Harwood Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering. The University of Melbourne. http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~aharwood/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/enriched Size: 1168 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040917/fe8634f9/attachment.bin From meynier at revealtechnology.com Fri Sep 17 20:04:13 2004 From: meynier at revealtechnology.com (Laurent Meynier) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] bay area startup - P2P developers Message-ID: <005701c49cf1$81604d40$9600a8c0@sonata> I am looking for individuals interested in developing an enterprise P2P application. Solution at this time is only targeted at the MSFT platform and is to be completed in VC/VB, although a lot of our experimental work is Linux based. Can be a part-time or full-time arrangement and can be integrated into graduate studies if required. Startup is located in the Bay Area (San Francisco atm) but current members are spread out so location shouldn't be an issue. Contact me directly if you are interested and I can provide as much information as required. meynier@revealtechnology.com -lm -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040917/cb87f2a9/attachment.html From list-p2phack at ruffledpenguin.org Sun Sep 19 20:48:57 2004 From: list-p2phack at ruffledpenguin.org (Adam Lydick) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] keeping metadata synchronized In-Reply-To: <20040915145157.A10872@aquameta.com> References: <20040915022900.A29001@aquameta.com> <2054.62.202.73.20.1095233644.squirrel@62.202.73.20> <20040915145157.A10872@aquameta.com> Message-ID: <1095626937.20286.18.camel@lothlorien> On Wed, 2004-09-15 at 07:51, Eric Hanson wrote: > That's kind of what I was thinking, but I don't even know where > to start looking on how to do it. It's going to be a Java app, > so I can write a listener to listen for moves, deletes and > renames and sync on that. But, say on a OSX box, is there an > event thrown that can be tapped into somehow? How about > Windows? How about Linux? If you can use C# (at least for the fs daemon) you can take advantage of a class called "FileSystemWatcher" which provides a nice eventing model for changes to the monitored directory tree. This should work on Win32, Linux, and OSX. It uses FAM on linux, the MS implementation probably uses the native API for tracking changes, OSX either uses some native change tracking API or uses polling. All of these have the potential to drop changes if the change queue gets too large (ex: you delete a large directory tree all at once or do a large copy operation) and I'm not sure what recovery mechanisms are available in the event of a drop. I would hope that you would see a "directory changed, but I lost the detail under it" sort of message so that you could re-walk that portion of the tree, but you would need to investigate that. Another issue is that FAM doesn't monitor entire trees, just directories, and it has a hard limit on the number that it can monitor at a time. I suspect they work around this by recursively adding directories down the tree. Obviously this might cause problems with large trees or multiple users of your application. If you figure out all of the details of this, I'd be very curious to hear about them. Even if you are unwilling to use the CLR class libraries, you could probably port the Mono version of FileSystemWatcher to java. Hope that helps, Adam Lydick From eugen at leitl.org Wed Sep 22 11:59:29 2004 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] [i2p] starting a dialog of anonymous interface to i2p (fwd from kirk@wits-end.braille.uwo.ca) Message-ID: <20040922115928.GW1457@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Kirk Reiser ----- From: Kirk Reiser Date: 22 Sep 2004 07:53:40 -0400 To: i2p@i2p.net Subject: [i2p] starting a dialog of anonymous interface to i2p User-Agent: Gnus/5.09 (Gnus v5.9.0) Emacs/21.3 Hello everyone: I have been interested lately in the ability to pass mail into and out of i2p to the rest of the world. In my musings I realize that the problem is exactly the same for many other ip applications not just mail. I wish I had a good answer or even one which would work reliably even if it wasn't particularly good but I haven't been able to think of anything which would work consistently. I am not interested in probabilities of legal protection such as is covered by phrases like "plausible deniability." It seems we must find some thing which will provide absolute anonymity whatever level of protection that is if we want general acceptance of i2p before we've supplanted the entire Internet. The outgoing problem is that in the general IP world one IP address talks to another address to pass information on various ports. The originating address is normally traceable if a router log fairly close to the source can be obtained. In the case of i2p that might not trace back to the actual source of the packets but it is traceable to the machine which made the outgoing connection from i2p. It seems to me that incoming traffic is basically the same problem once the information is in i2p it is probably going to be anonymous in the long run once our security geeks or foil hats as jrandom calls them are done, but the interface is the same problem. Each gateway machine in or out of i2p is a possible target for organizations which don't hold i2p's values close to their hearts like many of us do! Are we to have specific machines/nodes which will volunteer to be a gateway? Should every machine/node be a gateway if it is addressable? How many nodes does i2p need before it would generally not be profitable for an organization to coerce individuals just because they were involved with some project which might be considered subversive? If one were to have specific volunteer gateways who in their right minds might volunteer for that position knowing they are opening themselves for all sorts of persecution. How affective would it be for us to do IP spoofing on outgoing connections? I am sure there are many routers which wouldn't pass traffic which didn't have originating IP addresses in it's address range but if one could have nodes which would have access to routers designed to handle more general traffic on large network segments then anonymity might be obtained in that case. It seems to me you would also want to modify MAC addresses on those machines. On larger public segments such as cable one might also be able to do spoofing within the hosting organizations allocated address space. Has anyone considered the possibility of routing via MAC addresses? It seems their advantage is that they do not group together into address space such as say a class 'c' address range which can easily be filtered and tracked providing more anonymity if spoofed. A problem with incoming traffic is domain naming. When we mail someone, we send to their specific email address, if we were to use mail gateways for example it may prove cumbersome to propagate lists of gateways which folks could remember when sending to friends in i2p. Maybe this has all been hashed over before I didn't find anything I found to useful on a casual search but I may have been looking for the wrong thing. I don't mean to sound negative either because I really am not. I believe these issues need some type of solution in preparation for the time when i2p is fully deployed. I also know that I do not have the necessary education to make these questions into a trivial bump in the road. I hope that others do though so that we might get on with developing whatever trivial processes will provide the solutions. Kirk/baffled -- Well that's it then, colour me gone! _______________________________________________ i2p mailing list i2p@i2p.net http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040922/bf985853/attachment.pgp From anwitaman at hotmail.com Thu Sep 23 12:42:31 2004 From: anwitaman at hotmail.com (Anwitaman Datta) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] content meta-information Message-ID: Hello, Can any one provide some pointers on publicly available information about shared content harvested from any of the file-sharing networks, like the real file names (plus meta-information like artist/etc. will be great). Also, are there logs of queries made in such systems? Thanks, Anwitaman Keep your faith in all beautiful things; in the sun when it is hidden, in the Spring when it is gone. Roy R. Gilson _________________________________________________________________ The new MSN toolbar! Your shortcut to the internet! http://toolbar.msn.co.in/ Access a world of convenience! From gojomo at bitzi.com Thu Sep 23 13:08:29 2004 From: gojomo at bitzi.com (Gordon Mohr (@ Bitzi)) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] content meta-information In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4152CACD.7070408@bitzi.com> Anwitaman Datta wrote: > Hello, > Can any one provide some pointers on publicly available information > about shared content harvested from any of the file-sharing networks, > like the real file names (plus meta-information like artist/etc. will be > great). My project Bitzi, a collaborative catalog of circulating media files, may provide info for many such files. See: http://bitzi.com > Also, are there logs of queries made in such systems? People have compiled such lists by running modified clients, but I don't know of any public data sets. - Gordon @ Bitzi From ian at locut.us Thu Sep 23 13:12:50 2004 From: ian at locut.us (Ian Clarke) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] content meta-information In-Reply-To: <4152CACD.7070408@bitzi.com> References: <4152CACD.7070408@bitzi.com> Message-ID: <455EB38A-0D62-11D9-9A3D-000D932C5880@locut.us> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23 Sep 2004, at 14:08, Gordon Mohr (@ Bitzi) wrote: > > My project Bitzi, a collaborative catalog of circulating media files, > may > provide info for many such files. See: > > http://bitzi.com I'm curious, do you think Bitzi could be vulnerable to attack by copyright holders due to its centralised nature? Clearly in a sane world you wouldn't be, but we all know that it isn't a sane world, particularly where copyright law is concerned :-/ Ian. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (Darwin) iD8DBQFBUsvTQtgxRWSmsqwRAvItAJ93tmsMULOo0nuDrqnJ1kO2Gig/DACfTNy0 ds5vZFsC61W9z6ebh3idhbU= =/qWH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From gojomo at bitzi.com Sat Sep 25 22:10:22 2004 From: gojomo at bitzi.com (Gordon Mohr (@ Bitzi)) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] content meta-information In-Reply-To: <455EB38A-0D62-11D9-9A3D-000D932C5880@locut.us> References: <4152CACD.7070408@bitzi.com> <455EB38A-0D62-11D9-9A3D-000D932C5880@locut.us> Message-ID: <4155ECCE.6030101@bitzi.com> Ian Clarke wrote: > On 23 Sep 2004, at 14:08, Gordon Mohr (@ Bitzi) wrote: > >> >> My project Bitzi, a collaborative catalog of circulating media files, may >> provide info for many such files. See: >> >> http://bitzi.com > > > I'm curious, do you think Bitzi could be vulnerable to attack by > copyright holders due to its centralised nature? > > Clearly in a sane world you wouldn't be, but we all know that it isn't a > sane world, particularly where copyright law is concerned :-/ I presume you're talking about legal attacks, rather than technical attacks. You're right that copyright law has problems, and no project or business can be certain that it won't face legal harassment and nuisance suits. However, even with suboptimal copyright laws, we're confident that Bitzi's services are legal in our operating jurisdiction: San Francisco, California, USA. Our activities are protected by applicable law, precedent, and fundamental speech rights. Even when we collect and publish metadata about files whose reproduction is limited by copyright laws, Bitzi neither directly nor indirectly participates in any infringing acts, and the metadata itself has important legal uses. As just one example, I don't think Anwitaman Dattam, whose query started this thread, is attempting anything illegal. I suspect (after quick Googling) that he's performing academic research. His research is technical, but as time goes on, the Bitzi dataset will also be important to cultural, legal, and historical researchers -- and even marketers and policymakers -- who want to understand what's happening with the rise of decentralized digital distribution. As long as our services and publications are inherently legal, it shouldn't matter whether we provide them in a centralized or decentralized way. Often it's easier to get something started, and prove its usefulness, using a centralized model. Difficult trust and convergence issues are minimized when there is one canonical center. Later, the system can decentralize for efficiency and resilence. The open licensing of the Bitzi dataset should help other people explore more decentralized approaches even while Bitzi itself uses a centralized system. - Gordon @ Bitzi From zooko at zooko.com Sun Sep 26 12:04:11 2004 From: zooko at zooko.com (Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] censorship resistance and anonymity (was: newbie mnet questions...) In-Reply-To: <20040926053810.GA7507@spawar.navy.mil> References: <20040709032552.GA17794@spawar.navy.mil> <5D939AFC-D345-11D8-A4A2-000A95E2A184@zooko.com> <20040926053810.GA7507@spawar.navy.mil> Message-ID: <2D373A2C-0FB4-11D9-B33D-000A95E2A184@zooko.com> I'm going to move this discussion from mnet-devel to p2p-hackers, even though p2p-hackers has grown to 724 subscribers and it is intimidating to disturb the peace of so many e-mail addresses. Because what is this the list for, then, if it is so big, and so full of prestigious researchers, that no one dare post to it? --Zooko On 2004, Jul 11, zooko@zooko.com wrote: >> Personally, I think that the basic Freenet concept of achieving >> anonymity by combining forwarding with routing (with the filesystem) >> is flawed. In my opinion, even if Freenet's latest design (NGrouting >> with erasure coding) can be made to perform well, the anonymity >> achieved will still be minimal -- i.e. it will provide anonymity only >> against very limited attackers. >> >> Mnet does not attempt to provide anonymity. As I've said, I think it >> would be a mistake to attempt to do that in the same layer as routing >> and the filesystem. It could be provided in a lower layer in one of >> two ways: >> >> 1. The "one-hop privacy" approach, which means implementing an >> anonymous routing system in EGTP (Mnet's communications layer). >> >> 2. Using an anonymous routing system that someone else has developed, >> such as MixMinion or Tor: On 2004, Sep 26, at 02:38, seberino@spawar.navy.mil wrote: > > Zooko > > I've been thinking more about p2p systems and our conversation. > Correct me if I'm wrong but it seems like Freenet is > the only project I know of that is doing the > original job of trying to provide a censor proof/attack proof/ > anonymous p2p system. > > I agree with your idea that MixMinion is potentially > a great way to add anonymity to a p2p system. However, I think > Freenet goes a few steps farther in that in addition to not knowing > who the authors are, they try to prevent you from even knowing *where* > something is stored. Who cares? If a system *only* provided anonymity > it would still be censorable if someone could find out where > objectionable content was stored and attack it somehow. > > In this sense, I'm thinking Freenet is in a class all it's own. > Everything else seems like "just another file sharing system". > I could be wrong but to me Freenet now is looking like the p2p system > to work on. I would appreciate hearing your opinions on these matters. seberino: This is a good question! (By which I mean: I have to actually think in order to answer this one.) I'm thinking about the difference between "censorship resistance" and "anonymity". Mnet current attempts censorship resistance without anonymity. An attacker who wants to delete a file from Mnet needs to overcomes the erasure coding and the tendency of nodes to replicate data blocks. Freenet also includes those two defenses, plus it attempts to hide the identity of the server from the attacker. MixMinion provides two kinds of anonymity: sender anonymity and recipient anonymity. They are very different, because if you are going to send a message to an anonymous recipient, you must first acquire a cryptographic blob that enables your message to route to him without enabling you to track him down. That's tricky! But MixMinion does a pretty good job of it, while paying a price in increased complexity, latency, and rates of packet loss. In a hypothetical Mnet+MixMinion (which I'll call "M+MM") if the Mnet nodes used recipient-anonymity then they would have the same kind of protection that Freenode nodes have except that their anonymity would be stronger (see below) and their communications less efficient. Why would M+MM nodes have stronger recipient-anonymity than Freenet nodes have? At the risk of over-simplifying, MixMinion is designed to withstand an attacker with more points of attack, and at lower levels of the network protocol stack. Freenet is designed to provide anonymity against an attacker who runs Freenet nodes. MixMinion is designed to provide anonymity against an attacker who runs many of the IP routers than your nodes use for their Internet service (in addition to running MixMinion nodes) The reason that such an attacker can penetrate the recipient-anonymity of Freenet is that he can do traffic analysis -- he can observe the timing and patterns of messages that pass among Freenet nodes, even if he doesn't know the contents of most of them. For example, if there is an attacker who has packet sniffers on the right IP routers, then he can inject a request for a file into the Freenet network by sending the request to Freenet node 1. Then he simply watches and sees what happens next. If Freenet node 1 sends a message back containing the file, without having exchanged messages with anyone else in the interim, then he knows for certain that Freenet node 1 is storing a copy of that file. If Freenet node 1 instead sends a message to Freenet node 2, then he has to see what Freenet node 2 does. Anonymity researchers have developed extensive understanding of how such traffic analysis attacks can strip away the anonymity from mixes such as Freenet, even when those mixes use sophisticated and expensive countermeasures which Freenet currently does not. [1] So I think the bottom line on the question of integration versus layering of censorship resistance is that the Freenet concept of "anonymity as censorship resistance" can be understood as "recipient-anonymity for the servers that store data and respond to requests for that data". That feature could be implemented with a separate anonymity layer as long as the anonymity layer offers recipient-anonymity. I would love to know if I've missed anything important in that analysis. Even if you, seberino, still think that Freenet's integrated filesystem/anonymity/censorship-resistance layer is the way to go, that doesn't mean Freenet is the only current project that you can work on. Freenet has inspired several similar projects such as AntsP2P and Mute [2]. I haven't looked into them and know little other than that they are new and are somewhat inspired by Freenet. There is also, of course, GNUnet [3]. It is not new, and it does integrate anonymity, censorship resistance, and file-system. There are also the other systems that we have discussed before. If you've investigated some of them and want to report on what you've learned I would love to hear it. This is not to say that you shouldn't work on Freenet! Of course you should. Freenet is a good project. Regards, Zooko [1] http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/ [2] http://www.infoanarchy.org/story/2004/9/23/185140/280 [3] http://www.ovmj.org/GNUnet/ From list-p2phack at ruffledpenguin.org Mon Sep 27 08:31:49 2004 From: list-p2phack at ruffledpenguin.org (Adam Lydick) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] content meta-information In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1096273909.32409.297.camel@lothlorien> Something I posted a while back: A sampling of raw, non-source-correlated queries can be found in a flat file in my old gnutella crawl. http://ruffledpenguin.org/projects/gnutella_crawl/ - Adam On Thu, 2004-09-23 at 05:42, Anwitaman Datta wrote: > Hello, > Can any one provide some pointers on publicly available information about > shared content harvested from any of the file-sharing networks, like the > real file names (plus meta-information like artist/etc. will be great). > Also, are there logs of queries made in such systems? > > Thanks, > Anwitaman From oskar.s at gmail.com Mon Sep 27 19:54:50 2004 From: oskar.s at gmail.com (Oskar Sandberg) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] censorship resistance and anonymity (was: newbie mnet questions...) In-Reply-To: <2D373A2C-0FB4-11D9-B33D-000A95E2A184@zooko.com> References: <20040709032552.GA17794@spawar.navy.mil> <5D939AFC-D345-11D8-A4A2-000A95E2A184@zooko.com> <20040926053810.GA7507@spawar.navy.mil> <2D373A2C-0FB4-11D9-B33D-000A95E2A184@zooko.com> Message-ID: On 26 Sep 2004 09:04:11 -0300, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote: > I'm thinking about the difference between "censorship resistance" and > "anonymity". As I have attempted to define it, these are two different things. In real life, of course, one may argue that they are not - as long as people are made of meat that can be injured having your identity exposed means you can be censored. But when one is trying to look at the structure of data publishing networks, it is (IMHO) useful to try to narrow the definition of "censorship resistance" to just the ability for an attacker to make published data unavailable. This is typically something different than author/reader anonymity, but may be related to storer anonymity (since if you cannot tell who is storing data, it is difficult to make it unavailable). I'll deal with the issues you bring up with CR and anonymity separately, especially with regards to Freenet (though it should be noted that I am no longer actively working on the main Freenet project, and my opinions should not be seen as the opinions of those who do). 1) Censorship Resistance With this narrowed as described above, I propose the formal definition of CR (*) as the ratio between the complexity of an attack to make a given piece of data unavailable, and the complexity of an attack to knock out the entire network. In this sense, a network would be fully censorship resistant (CR-1 implying a ratio 1) if removing any data meant knocking out the entire network, while it would have no resistance (CR-1/n) if knocking out a single node in the network was enough to remove some data. The order of the ratio is most important, so I'll use CR-f(n) for anything with ratio > c f(n) for some constant c. Both CR-1 and CR-1/n networks exist: if every document is stored at every node, then the network is automatically CR-1, and a normal file sharing network without caching is CR-1/n. Whether a fully caching network is the only possible CR-1 network is an interesting question - I would think that without making special assumptions about the capabilities of the attacker it probably is. In this context, I don't believe that duplicating data by erasure coding does much at all. The network is CR-1/n even if each piece of data is stored in x places, and that won't change unless you start to put some rather unrealistic restrictions on the attacker (ie, he can only attack y nodes in k hours or something like that). It is sort of like the difference between a checksum and a secure one-way hash. The checksum is good to ensure that two documents do not accidentally have the same value, but against an intentional attack with that purpose it is useless. In the same sense erasure codes are good at avoiding data accidentally becoming unavailable, but useless on their own against an attack for just that purpose. The question can be raised whether Freenet is a lot better in this respect. The truth is I don't know exactly. Freenet certainly tries harder to make removing data difficult then most other networks, but whether that is actually successful is anybody's guess. I would be very curious to hear if anybody has strategies (beyond just pure caching) by which P2P data publishing networks can be made more resistant to censorship (even CR-1/sqrt(n) would be pretty good!) (*) If there is already a formal definition of this I will gracefully go hide in the intellectual corner of shame. 2) Anonymity I think you are correct in pointing out that Freenet's attempt to do routing and mixing at the same time ends up with pretty poor anonymity, but I think you are using the wrong arguments. I think that even though Freenet does not spend as much effort on it as some of the truly paranoid mixnets, its current resistance to traffic analysis is pretty good. Data and messages are padded in size, and with the traffic levels being high (on the order of thousands of queries flowing through nodes every hour) I think timing analysis would be pretty difficult. Perhaps possible for an extremely determined and resourceful attacker, but certainly more difficult than other methods. Freenet's basic problem is that the anonymity it offers is, at the very best, the "Crowds" model. All queries are forwarded in the open (they have to be, as each node needs to route them, and thus know what the query is), so the only anonymity left is deniability: initiating nodes can claim they were just passing the query. This is pretty weak to start with (personally, I would rather not be made a suspect at all, then be a suspect who can deny it) and fails in Freenet for two reasons: 1) Different queries in Freenet are correlated. Websites contain many elements, and when I fetch one from Freenet my node will forward queries for all the elements to it's neighbors. It might be possible to claim that I was forwarding just a single of those queries, but that all the queries for a data elements in a single site would have been forwarded to me at the same time is highly unlikely. This is made worse by the fact that Freenet uses splitting and erasure coding on large files: download a movie and it might have thousands of parts, if just one of your neighbors noticed that he got queries for 100 of those parts from you, he will have good reason to believe you initiated all of them. 2) Rather stupidly, Freenet queries SAY when they were started. Or rather, they say through how many more hoops they should be routed, but in practice this amounts to more or less the same thing. There is a default value at which clients initiate queries, and if you get a query with "hops to live" one less then that you can be pretty sure the guy who sent it to you wasn't just forwarding. Given these issues, I think I have gotten the current developers of the main Freenet application to agree that the only way it will really become anonymous is by adding a couple of steps of true onion based mix routing before the Freenet part kicks in. This would be a system much like what you (Zooko) was suggesting (if I understood correctly) and I believe this is currently the long term plan for author/reader anonymity in Freenet. I wrote pretty long document about these (and other issues) with Freenet a couple of weeks ago. People can read it here: http://www.math.chalmers.se/~ossa/fnet.pdf if they are interested. It should be noted that there has been some progress since I wrote to rectify some of the problems with Freenet's development model that I point to, so all those criticisms are not valid any longer. // oskar From eugen at leitl.org Tue Sep 28 18:10:19 2004 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] [i2p] weekly status notes [sep 28] (fwd from jrandom@i2p.net) Message-ID: <20040928181019.GW1457@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from jrandom ----- From: jrandom Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 10:18:32 -0700 To: i2p@i2p.net Subject: [i2p] weekly status notes [sep 28] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi y'all, weekly update time * Index: 1) New transport 2) 0.4.1 status 3) ??? * 1) New transport The 0.4.1 release has been taking longer than expected, but the new transport protocol and implementation is in place with everything that has been planned - IP detection, low cost connection establishment, and an easier interface to help debug when connections are failing. This is done by completely throwing out the old transport protocol and implementing a new one, though we've still got the same buzzwords (2048bit DH + STS, AES256/CBC/PKCS#5). If you'd like to review the protocol, its in the docs [1]. The new implementation is also a lot cleaner, since the old version was just a bunch of updates accumulated over the last year. [1] http://dev.i2p.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/i2p/router/java/src/net/i2p/rout er/transport/tcp/package.html?&content-type=text/html Anyway, there are some things in the new IP detection code that are worth mentioning. Most importantly, it is entirely optional - if you specify an IP address on the config page (or in the router.config itself), it will always use that address, no matter what. However, if you leave that blank, your router will let the first peer it contacts tell it what its IP address is, which it will then start listening on (after adding that to its own RouterInfo and placing that in the network database). Well, thats not quite true - if you haven't explicitly set an IP address, it will trust anyone to tell it what IP address it can be reached at whenever the peer has no connections. So, if your internet connection restarts, perhaps giving you a new DHCP address, your router will trust the first peer it is able to reach. Yes, this means no more dyndns. You're still of course welcome to keep using it, but its not necessary. However, this does not do all that you want - if you have a NAT or firewall, knowing your external IP address is only half of the battle - you still need to poke the hole for the inbound port. But, its a start. (as an aside, for people running their own private I2P networks or simulators, there is a new pair of flags to be set i2np.tcp.allowLocal and i2np.tcp.tagFile) * 2) 0.4.1 status Beyond the items on the roadmap for 0.4.1, I want to get a few more things in there - both bugfixes and network monitoring updates. I'm tracking down some excessive memory churn issues at the moment, and I want to explore some hypotheses about the occational reliability issues on the net, but we'll be ready to roll out the release soon, perhaps thursday. It unfortunately will not be backwards compatible, so it'll be a little bumpy, but with the new upgrade process and the more forgiving transport implementation, it shouldn't be as bad as the previous backwards incompatible updates. * 3) ??? Yeah, we've had short updates the last two weeks, but thats because we're in the trenches focusing on the implementation, rather than various higher level designs. I could tell you about the profiling data, or the 10,000 connection tag cache for the new transport, but thats not so interesting. However y'all may have some additional things to discuss, so swing on by the meeting tonight and let 'er rip. =jr -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.1 iQA/AwUBQVmbSxpxS9rYd+OGEQLRLQCfXYW9hGbiTALFtsv7L803qAJlFocAoPPO +PlRUSxbgmI4M7QSDte/eCnP =vO07 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ i2p mailing list i2p@i2p.net http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040928/d1d9ccee/attachment.pgp From justin at chapweske.com Wed Sep 29 17:58:19 2004 From: justin at chapweske.com (Justin Chapweske) Date: Sat Dec 9 22:12:43 2006 Subject: [p2p-hackers] [Fwd: EFF: Call On Congress to Oppose the Induce Act Tomorrow] Message-ID: <1096480699.14544.365.camel@bog> Every one of you should be calling your Senators today. Thanks, -Justin -------------- next part -------------- An embedded message was scrubbed... From: unknown sender Subject: no subject Date: no date Size: 3230 Url: http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/attachments/20040929/8db53129/attachment.mht