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From: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 10:03:58 -0400
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To: Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org>
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Small Nodes: A Better Alternative to Pruned Nodes
Precedence: list

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> But as you've observed, the failure probabilities are rather high,
> especially if an active attacker targets nodes carrying less commonly
> available blocks.

Wouldn't the solution be for nodes to use whatever mechanism an attacker
uses to determine less commonly available blocks and choose to store a
random percentage of them as well as their deterministic random set?

IE X blocks end of chain (spv bootstrap), Y% deterministic random set,  Z%
patch/fill set to deter attacks

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>&gt; But as you&#39;ve observed, the failure pro=
babilities are rather high,<br>&gt; especially if an active attacker target=
s nodes carrying less commonly<br>&gt; available blocks.=C2=A0 <br><br></di=
v>Wouldn&#39;t the solution be for nodes to use whatever mechanism an attac=
ker uses to determine less commonly available blocks and choose to store a =
random percentage of them as well as their deterministic random set?=C2=A0 =
<br><br>IE X blocks end of chain (spv bootstrap), Y% deterministic random s=
et,=C2=A0 Z% patch/fill set to deter attacks<br><br></div><div><br></div></=
div>

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