Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z6Zu2-0005RI-My for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sun, 21 Jun 2015 07:42:54 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.192.182 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.192.182; envelope-from=elombrozo@gmail.com; helo=mail-pd0-f182.google.com; Received: from mail-pd0-f182.google.com ([209.85.192.182]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z6Zu1-0000Jl-IH for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sun, 21 Jun 2015 07:42:54 +0000 Received: by pdbki1 with SMTP id ki1so118295428pdb.1 for ; Sun, 21 Jun 2015 00:42:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 10.66.222.103 with SMTP id ql7mr47054652pac.144.1434872567903; Sun, 21 Jun 2015 00:42:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.102] (cpe-76-167-237-202.san.res.rr.com. [76.167.237.202]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id x16sm16016319pbt.87.2015.06.21.00.42.45 (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Sun, 21 Jun 2015 00:42:46 -0700 (PDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.2 \(2098\)) Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_DCBBA85C-9C47-4058-A47A-B4B50CD9DF2F"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512 X-Pgp-Agent: GPGMail 2.5b6 From: Eric Lombrozo In-Reply-To: Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2015 00:42:43 -0700 Message-Id: <30AF043D-A1F8-4502-8280-EBED6063B6B6@gmail.com> References: <20150619103959.GA32315@savin.petertodd.org> <04CE3756-B032-464C-8FBD-7ACDD1A3197D@gmail.com> <812d8353e66637ec182da31bc0a9aac1@riseup.net> <1727885.UUNByX4Jyd@crushinator> <83A7C606-B601-47D2-BE10-2A1412D97514@gmail.com> <8a49c53a032503eeca4f51cdef725fe1@riseup.net> <6d025db96e7aec4e6e47a76883a9a1e3@riseup.net> <70534C5D-8834-42B5-B495-FD9975E8FCF4@gmail.com> To: Jeff Garzik X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.2098) X-Spam-Score: -0.8 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (elombrozo[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature -0.2 AWL AWL: Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address X-Headers-End: 1Z6Zu1-0000Jl-IH Cc: Bitcoin Dev , Justus Ranvier Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2015 07:42:54 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_DCBBA85C-9C47-4058-A47A-B4B50CD9DF2F Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_2111B0D6-F6AE-45CA-A4AC-7108B217ED2D" --Apple-Mail=_2111B0D6-F6AE-45CA-A4AC-7108B217ED2D Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > On Jun 20, 2015, at 11:45 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote: >=20 > On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 5:54 PM, Eric Lombrozo > wrote: > but we NEED to be applying some kind of pressure on the merchant end = to upgrade their stuff to be more resilient >=20 > Can you be specific? What precise technical steps would you have = BitPay and Coinbase do? We upgrade our stuff to... what exactly? >=20 > -- > Jeff Garzik > Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist > BitPay, Inc. https://bitpay.com/ Thanks for asking *the* question, Jeff. We often get caught up in these = philosophical debates=E2=80=A6but at the end of the day we need = something concrete. Even more important than the specific software you=E2=80=99re using is = the security policy. If you must accept zero confirmation transactions, there are a few = concrete things you can do to reduce your exposure: 1) limit the transaction amounts for zero confirmation transactions - do = not accept them for very high priced goods=E2=80=A6especially if they = require physical shipping. 2) limit the total amount of unconfirmed revenue you=E2=80=99ll tolerate = at any given moment - if the amount is exceeded, require confirmations. 3) give merchants of subscription services (i.e. servers, hosting, = etc=E2=80=A6) the ability to shut the user out if a double-spend is = detected. 4) collect legal information on purchasers (or have the merchants = collect this information) so you have someone to go after if they try to = screw you 5) create a risk profile for users=E2=80=A6and flag suspicious behavior = (i.e. someone trying to purchase a bunch of stuff that totally doesn=E2=80= =99t fit into their purchasing habits). 6) get insurance (although right now reasonably-priced insurance is = probably pretty hard to obtain since statistics are generally of little = use=E2=80=A6we=E2=80=99re entering uncharted territory). 7) set up a warning system and a =E2=80=9Cpanic=E2=80=9D button so that = if you start to see an attack you can immediately disable all zero = confirmation transactions system-wide. 8) independently verify all inbound transactions and connect to multiple = network nodes=E2=80=A6check them against one another. As for software tools to accomplish these things, we can talk about that = offline :) - Eric Lombrozo --Apple-Mail=_2111B0D6-F6AE-45CA-A4AC-7108B217ED2D Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
On Jun 20, 2015, at 11:45 PM, Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@bitpay.com> = wrote:

On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 5:54 PM, Eric Lombrozo = <elombrozo@gmail.com> = wrote:
 but we NEED = to be applying some kind of pressure on the merchant end to upgrade = their stuff to be more resilient

Can you be = specific?  What precise technical steps would you have BitPay and = Coinbase do?  We upgrade our stuff to... what = exactly?

--
Jeff Garzik
Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc.      https://bitpay.com/

Thanks for = asking *the* question, Jeff. We often get caught up in these = philosophical debates=E2=80=A6but at the end of the day we need = something concrete.

Even more important than the specific software you=E2=80=99re = using is the security policy.

If you must accept zero confirmation = transactions, there are a few concrete things you can do to reduce your = exposure:

1) = limit the transaction amounts for zero confirmation transactions - do = not accept them for very high priced goods=E2=80=A6especially if they = require physical shipping.
2) limit the total = amount of unconfirmed revenue you=E2=80=99ll tolerate at any given = moment - if the amount is exceeded, require confirmations.
3) give merchants of subscription services (i.e. servers, = hosting, etc=E2=80=A6) the ability to shut the user out if a = double-spend is detected.
4) collect legal = information on purchasers (or have the merchants collect this = information) so you have someone to go after if they try to screw = you
5) create a risk profile for users=E2=80=A6and = flag suspicious behavior (i.e. someone trying to purchase a bunch of = stuff that totally doesn=E2=80=99t fit into their purchasing = habits).
6) get insurance (although right now = reasonably-priced insurance is probably pretty hard to obtain since = statistics are generally of little use=E2=80=A6we=E2=80=99re entering = uncharted territory).
7) set up a warning system = and a =E2=80=9Cpanic=E2=80=9D button so that if you start to see an = attack you can immediately disable all zero confirmation transactions = system-wide.
8) independently verify all inbound = transactions and connect to multiple network nodes=E2=80=A6check them = against one another.


As for software tools to = accomplish these things, we can talk about that offline :)


- Eric Lombrozo




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