From: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
To: Jonathan Toomim <j@toom.im>, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <E76D5BF9-41BF-4AF5-BBAC-06F4EF574EBE@toom.im>
References: <CAPg+sBjJcqeqGLHnPyWt23z3YoCRGozQupuMxy51J_-hdkKBSA@mail.gmail.com>
	<E76D5BF9-41BF-4AF5-BBAC-06F4EF574EBE@toom.im>
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Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 14:44:25 +1030
Message-ID: <878u4poixq.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] On the security of softforks
Precedence: list

Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
writes:
> On Dec 18, 2015, at 10:30 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> 1) The risk of an old full node wallet accepting a transaction that is
>> invalid to the new rules.
>> 
>> The receiver wallet chooses what address/script to accept coins on.
>> They'll upgrade to the new softfork rules before creating an address
>> that depends on the softfork's features.
>> 
>> So, not a problem.
>
>
> Mallory wants to defraud Bob with a 1 BTC payment for some beer. Bob
> runs the old rules. Bob creates a p2pkh address for Mallory to
> use. Mallory takes 1 BTC, and creates an invalid SegWit transaction
> that Bob cannot properly validate and that pays into one of Mallory's
> wallets. Mallory then immediately spends the unconfirmed transaction
> into Bob's address. Bob sees what appears to be a valid transaction
> chain which is not actually valid.

Pretty sure Bob's wallet will be looking for "OP_DUP OP_HASH160
<pubKeyHash> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG" scriptSig.  The SegWit-usable
outputs will (have to) look different, won't they?

Cheers,
Rusty.