Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 959AF7AD for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 22:11:51 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ob0-f181.google.com (mail-ob0-f181.google.com [209.85.214.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9686BE8 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 22:11:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: by obbhe7 with SMTP id he7so38579610obb.0 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 15:11:50 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=jc/hzgVwsqs4W9v919laOvkzbwiUbK0tyAGqCQkU8bM=; b=vMICo6laEMioBPNMDtC20b86D8pXW00cLqocD9fjW2ftURhGY0QQb50B3ZM1QgGwXi +szpqXLdl6NBNM7winMoF4wzhp8druIIT3m7JCUv+WdrPyWeHh6RdtBUgZfRPhvCxb+v GfvIpCbtjx1jrlHYAi/6VhidY1HYeiN/P+Hn9XZ5KHHspLwltKFtjUobUjRM+RtHybVA qXLqLewn9/4eFd7quGRtozHqs4SFoxRFW6HpGfdoeggTZoEgVQaHzB2pJUg4JU/IgXCC WmvnGHzSZ0mkRHmqp8S+DlnVC/YyutVikgQzr9x4Y4ibeqquDpqnsl0FxoY1Mp4vtEE3 syMw== X-Received: by 10.182.108.170 with SMTP id hl10mr21152928obb.17.1439244710008; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 15:11:50 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.202.116.207 with HTTP; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 15:11:10 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Sergio Demian Lerner Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 19:11:10 -0300 Message-ID: To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0149d294af5ed5051cfc45a2 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_20,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] If you had a single chance to double the transactions/second Bitcoin allows... X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 22:11:51 -0000 --089e0149d294af5ed5051cfc45a2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 6:01 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > On Aug 7, 2015 11:19 PM, "Sergio Demian Lerner via bitcoin-dev" < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > b. Reduce the block rate to a half (average 5 minute blocks) > > > > Suppose this is a one time hard fork. There no drastic technical > problems with any of them: "SPV" mining and the relay network has shown > that block propagation is not an issue for such as small change. Mining > centralization won't radically change for a 2x adjustment. > > I don't understand this. All problems that result from propagation delay > are literally doubled by doing so. Centralization pressure results from the > ratio between propagation time and interblock time. Efficient propagation > algorithms like the relay network make this presumably grow sublinear with > larger blocks, but changing the interblock time affects it exactly > proportionally. > What I'm saying is that this ratio may have improved 20x since miners began using the TheBlueMatt relay network, so deteriorating the ratio 2x does not put miners in a unknown future, but in an future which is far better than the state they were a year ago. But SPV mining has improved the ratio another 2x (because headers can be pushed even faster, fit in a single network packet, and can do without inv/getdata round-trips because they basically "pay" for the bandwidth usage by its own proof of work). With a better wire protocol you can "propagate" a 10 MB block faster that the time it takes currently to propagate an empty block. So 10x deterioration of the ratio would be still something acceptable. All problems that result from propagation delay are literally doubled by > doing this. Doubling the block size has a smaller effect. You may argue > that these centralization effects are small, but reducing the interblock > time has a stronger effect on them than the block size. > > Also, you seem to consider SPV mining a good thing? > I'm not saying it's a good thing. I'm saying that it's impossible to avoid. It's a real incentive. It must exists so Bitcoin is incentive compatible. We can talk for hours and hours and we won't prevent miners from doing it. I predicted it back in 2013, without even being a miner myself. It's here to stay. Forever. It's a pity Greg chose that awful name of "SPV" mining instead some cool name like "Instant" mining that we could market as Bitcoin latest feature :) Do you consider the TheBlueMatt relay network a "good thing". NO! It's a very bad centralization thing, but it is unavoidable. I would like the relay network to be embedded on the standard network protocol, using local route optimizations to reduce latency for block propagation (there is one old paper on this, and it says that with local prioritization you can have a lower bound to get a propagation latency of at most two times the optimal value (possibly generated by the minimum spanning tree)). It requires trust between miners that know eachother, and fundamentally > breaks the security assumption of SPV clients... > No is does not. The incentive follows directly from the cheating cost (the subsidy). Even if I don't know you, I know you wouldn't waste 25 BTC to try to cheat me for 25 BTC with a probability of 1/100, that's for sure. On average, you loose 24.75 BTC per cheat attempt. "SPV" mining is safe as long as it is done for a certain bounded period of time and bounded number of blocks (e.g: 30 seconds from that last validated block, and no more than 1 non-validated block). SPV clients that accept a transaction with 1 confirmation are already in danger of orphaning, and long invalid "SPV" mining chain forks (as occurred last month) should never had occurred if limits were in-place. SPV mining incentive will stay until there is no subsidy, as many other incentives. SPV mining also must be there to prevent malicious actors from DoS-ing the relay network. If it's there, then the DoS incentive disappears. Let's code "instant" mining into Bitcoin Core, and do it right. Also as Michael Rudy points out, higher block rate means lower variance, and that's good for miners. Last, as I already said, having a lower average block interval strengthens Bitcoin value proposition, so miners would be delighted that their bitcoins are more worthy. --089e0149d294af5ed5051cfc45a2 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 6:01 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gm= ail.com> wrote:

On Aug 7, 2015 11:19 PM, "Sergio Demian Lerner vi= a bitcoin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote= :
> b. Reduce the block rate to a half (average 5 minute blocks)
>
> Suppose this is a one time hard fork. There no drastic technical probl= ems with any of them: "SPV" mining and the relay network has show= n that block propagation is not an issue for such as small change. Mining c= entralization won't radically change for a 2x adjustment.=C2=A0

I don't understand this. All problems that result= from propagation delay are literally doubled by doing so. Centralization p= ressure results from the ratio between propagation time and interblock time= . Efficient propagation algorithms like the relay network make this presuma= bly grow sublinear with larger blocks, but changing the interblock time aff= ects it exactly proportionally.

What I'm saying is= that this ratio may have improved 20x since miners began using the TheBlue= Matt relay network, so deteriorating the ratio 2x does not put miners in a = unknown future, but in an future which is far better than the state they we= re a year ago.

But SPV mining has improved the rat= io another 2x (because headers can be pushed even faster, fit in a single n= etwork packet, and can do without inv/getdata round-trips because they basi= cally "pay" for the bandwidth usage by its own proof of work).=C2= =A0
With a better wire protocol you can "propagate" a 1= 0 MB block faster that the time it takes currently to propagate an empty bl= ock.=C2=A0
So 10x deterioration of the ratio would be still somet= hing acceptable.

All problems that result from propagation delay are literall= y doubled by doing this. Doubling the block size has a smaller effect. You = may argue that these centralization effects are small, but reducing the int= erblock time has a stronger effect on them than the block size.

Also, you seem to consider SPV mining a good thing?

I'm not saying it's a good thing. I'm saying that= it's impossible to avoid. It's a real incentive. It must exists so= Bitcoin is incentive compatible. We can talk for hours and hours and we wo= n't prevent miners from doing it. I predicted it back in 2013, without = even being a miner myself. It's here to stay. Forever. It's a pity = Greg chose that awful name of "SPV" mining instead some cool name= like "Instant" mining that we could market as Bitcoin latest fea= ture :)

Do you consider the TheBlueMatt relay netw= ork a "good thing". NO! It's a very bad centralization thing,= but it is unavoidable. I would like the relay network to be embedded on th= e standard network protocol, using local route optimizations to reduce late= ncy for block propagation (there is one old paper on this, and it says that= with local prioritization you can have a lower bound to get a propagation = latency of at most two times the optimal value (possibly generated by the m= inimum spanning tree)).

=

It requires trust between miners that know eachother, and fu= ndamentally breaks the security assumption of SPV clients...

No is does not. The incentive follows directly from the cheating co= st (the subsidy). Even if I don't know you, I know you wouldn't was= te 25 BTC to try to cheat me for 25 BTC with a probability of 1/100, that&#= 39;s for sure. On average, you loose 24.75 BTC per cheat attempt.

"SPV" mining is safe as long as it is done for a = certain bounded period of time and bounded number of blocks (e.g: 30 second= s from that last validated block, and no more than 1 non-validated block). = SPV clients that accept a transaction with 1 confirmation are already in da= nger of orphaning, and long invalid "SPV" mining chain forks (as = occurred last month) should never had occurred if limits were in-place.

SPV mining incentive will stay until there is no subs= idy, as many other incentives. SPV mining also must be there to prevent mal= icious actors from DoS-ing the relay network. If it's there, then the D= oS incentive disappears.

Let's code "inst= ant" mining into Bitcoin Core, and do it right.

Also as Michael Rudy points out, higher block rate means lower variance,= and that's good for miners. Last, as I already said, having a lower av= erage block interval strengthens Bitcoin value proposition, so miners would= be delighted that their bitcoins are more worthy.


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