MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CAJvkSsc_rKneeVrLkTqXJDKcr+VQNBHVJyXVe=7PkkTZ+SruFQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <ca674cee-6fe9-f325-7e09-f3efda082b6b@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <ca674cee-6fe9-f325-7e09-f3efda082b6b@gmail.com>
From: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 10:40:10 -0400
Message-ID: <CAJowKgKM-8kz2b7W5qihYfNvdzGkUxF4T4puXK95MKMuu83xkA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Jonas Nick <jonasdnick@gmail.com>, 
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000004c78b06013c987a"
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Blinded 2-party Musig2
Precedence: list

--00000000000004c78b06013c987a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

You can't choose R if you provide posk

On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 10:31=E2=80=AFAM Jonas Nick via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hi Tom,
>
> I'm not convinced that this works. As far as I know blind musig is still
> an open
> research problem. What the scheme you propose appears to try to prevent i=
s
> that
> the server signs K times, but the client ends up with K+1 Schnorr
> signatures for
> the aggregate of the server's and the clients key. I think it's possible =
to
> apply a variant of the attack that makes MuSig1 insecure if the nonce
> commitment
> round was skipped or if the message isn't determined before sending the
> nonce.
> Here's how a malicious client would do that:
>
> - Obtain K R-values R1[0], ..., R1[K-1] from the server
> - Let
>      R[i] :=3D R1[i] + R2[i] for all i <=3D K-1
>      R[K] :=3D R1[0] + ... + R1[K-1]
>      c[i] :=3D H(X, R[i], m[i]) for all i <=3D K.
>    Using Wagner's algorithm, choose R2[0], ..., R2[K-1] such that
>      c[0] + ... + c[K-1] =3D c[K].
> - Send c[0], ..., c[K-1] to the server to obtain s[0], ..., s[K-1].
> - Let
>      s[K] =3D s[0] + ... + s[K-1].
>    Then (s[K], R[K]) is a valid signature from the server, since
>      s[K]*G =3D R[K] + c[K]*a1*X1,
>    which the client can complete to a signature for public key X.
>
> What may work in your case is the following scheme:
> - Client sends commitment to the public key X2, nonce R2 and message m to
> the
>    server.
> - Server replies with nonce R1 =3D k1*G
> - Client sends c to the server and proves in zero knowledge that c =3D
>    SHA256(X1 + X2, R1 + R2, m).
> - Server replies with s1 =3D k1 + c*x1
>
> However, this is just some quick intuition and I'm not sure if this
> actually
> works, but maybe worth exploring.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

--00000000000004c78b06013c987a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">You can&#39;t choose R if you provide posk</div><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Jul 24, =
2023 at 10:31=E2=80=AFAM Jonas Nick via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:b=
itcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org=
</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=
Hi Tom,<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not convinced that this works. As far as I know blind musig is stil=
l an open<br>
research problem. What the scheme you propose appears to try to prevent is =
that<br>
the server signs K times, but the client ends up with K+1 Schnorr signature=
s for<br>
the aggregate of the server&#39;s and the clients key. I think it&#39;s pos=
sible to<br>
apply a variant of the attack that makes MuSig1 insecure if the nonce commi=
tment<br>
round was skipped or if the message isn&#39;t determined before sending the=
 nonce.<br>
Here&#39;s how a malicious client would do that:<br>
<br>
- Obtain K R-values R1[0], ..., R1[K-1] from the server<br>
- Let<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0R[i] :=3D R1[i] + R2[i] for all i &lt;=3D K-1<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0R[K] :=3D R1[0] + ... + R1[K-1]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0c[i] :=3D H(X, R[i], m[i]) for all i &lt;=3D K.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Using Wagner&#39;s algorithm, choose R2[0], ..., R2[K-1] such =
that<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0c[0] + ... + c[K-1] =3D c[K].<br>
- Send c[0], ..., c[K-1] to the server to obtain s[0], ..., s[K-1].<br>
- Let<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0s[K] =3D s[0] + ... + s[K-1].<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Then (s[K], R[K]) is a valid signature from the server, since<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0s[K]*G =3D R[K] + c[K]*a1*X1,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0which the client can complete to a signature for public key X.=
<br>
<br>
What may work in your case is the following scheme:<br>
- Client sends commitment to the public key X2, nonce R2 and message m to t=
he<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server.<br>
- Server replies with nonce R1 =3D k1*G<br>
- Client sends c to the server and proves in zero knowledge that c =3D<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0SHA256(X1 + X2, R1 + R2, m).<br>
- Server replies with s1 =3D k1 + c*x1<br>
<br>
However, this is just some quick intuition and I&#39;m not sure if this act=
ually<br>
works, but maybe worth exploring.<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000004c78b06013c987a--