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From: Nagaev Boris <bnagaev@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 18:33:56 -0300
Message-ID: <CAFC_Vt6vqZkeenfrsqSj4T3+4+L2KMam0o0FeWJ4VzBEWE=HfA@mail.gmail.com>
To: yurisvb@pm.me
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Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Lamport scheme (not signature) to economize on L1
Precedence: list

On Tue, Dec 19, 2023 at 6:22=E2=80=AFPM <yurisvb@pm.me> wrote:
>
> Thank you for putting yourself through the working of carefully analyzing=
 my proposition, Boris!
>
> 1) My demonstration concludes 12 bytes is still a very conservative figur=
e for the hashes. I'm not sure where did you get the 14 bytes figure. This =
is 2*(14-12) =3D 4 bytes less.

I agree. It should have been 12.

> 2) Thank you for pointing out that ECCPUB is necessary. That's exactly ri=
ght and I failed to realize that. To lessen the exposure, and the risk of m=
iner of LSIG, it can be left to be broadcast together with LAMPPRI.
>
> 3) I avail to advocate for economizing down the fingerprint to just 128 b=
its for the weakest-link-principle, since 128 bits is a nearly ubiquitous s=
tandard, employed even by the majority of seeds. Not an argument against pl=
ain Schnorr, because Schnorr keys could use it too, but, compared with curr=
ent implementations, we have that would be 20-16=3D4 bytes less.

I think that the digest size for hash should be 2x key size for
symmetric encryption. To find a collision (=3D break) for a hash
function with digest size 128 bits one needs to calculate ~ 2^64
hashes because of the birthday paradox.

> 4) [Again, argument against plain, because it cuts for both sides:] To ec=
onomize even further, there is also the entropy-derivation cost trade-off o=
f N times costlier derivation for log2(N) less bits. If applied to the Addr=
ess, we could shave away another byte.
>
> 5) T0 is just the block height of burying of LSIG doesn't need to be buri=
ed. T2 can perfectly be hard-coded to always be the block equivalent of T0 =
+ 48 hours (a reasonable spam to prevent innocent defaulting on commitment =
due to network unavailability). T1 is any value such as T0 < T1 < T2, (typi=
cally T1 <=3D T0+6) of user's choosing, to compromise between, on one hand,=
 the convenience of unfreezing UTXO and having TX mining completed ASAP and=
, on the other, avoiding the risk of blockchain forking causing LAMPPRI to =
be accidentally leaked in the same block height as LSIG, which allows for s=
ignatures to be forged. So this is 16 bytes less.
>
> Miners would keep record of unconfirmed BL's, because of the reward of mi=
ning either possible outcome of it (successful transaction or execution of =
commitment). Everything is paid for.
>
> So, unless I'm forgetting something else, all other variables kept equal,=
 we have 20 bytes lighter than Schnorr; and up to 25 bytes less the current=
 implementation of Schnorr, if items 3 and 4 are implemented too. Already w=
e have a reduction of between 21% and 26%, while, so far, nobody in the mai=
ling list has disputed how 'outrageously' conservative the 12 bytes figure =
is.

26% reduction of block space utilization would be great, but the price
of relying on 12 bytes hashes (only need 2^48 hashes to find a
collision) is too much for that, IMHO.

Another consideration is about 12 byte hashes. Let's try to figure out
if they are resistant to rainbow table attack by a large organization.
Let's assume that the rainbow table has a chain length of 1024^3 (billion).
What storage size is needed? 2^96 * 12 / 1024^3 =3D 900 exabytes.
Both chain length and storage size seems prohibitively high for today,
but tomorrow the hash function can be optimized, memory can be
optimized, storage can become cheaper etc. And this attack may be
affordable for state level attackers.

> Any other objections?
>
> YSVB
>


--=20
Best regards,
Boris Nagaev