Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
From: vjudeu <vjudeu@gazeta.pl>
To: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>, "bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org"
 <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 2021 11:41:44 +0200
Message-Id: <128966745-bb0a93fd2653dc12305b953184cbcd13@pmq5v.m5r2.onet>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Gradual transition to an alternate proof without
 a hard fork.
Precedence: list

Yes, transition from Proof of Work to Proof of Something Else is possible i=
n a soft-fork way. All that is needed is getting miners and users support. =
Then, Proof of Work difficulty should drop to one, and the rest would be so=
lved by Proof of Something Else. Old miners still could use ASIC miners to =
produce blocks with higher Proof of Work, but then their blocks would be re=
jected. Currently, you can also make a block with enormously low hash, but =
if this block would contain two transactions sending the same coins to two =
different places, it would be rejected, no matter how low that hash would b=
e. As long as miners would produce enough Proof of Something Else and as lo=
ng as most nodes would use upgraded software, it should be resistant to suc=
h attacks.

So, technically speaking, it is possible. The most difficult part is gettin=
g miners and users supporting it.

On 2021-04-16 23:47:44 user Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@list=
s.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > I think you need to hard deprecate the PoW for this to work, otherwise =
all old miners are like "toxic waste".
> =

> what would be the incentive?   a POB would be required on every block
> (and would be lost if not used).   so any miner doing this would just
> be doing "extra work" and strictly losing money over a miner that
> doesn't.   a 99% reduction would be more than enough tho.
> =

> On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 5:24 PM Jeremy <jlrubin@mit.edu> wrote:
> >
> > I think you need to hard deprecate the PoW for this to work, otherwise =
all old miners are like "toxic waste".
> >
> > Imagine one miner turns on a S9 and then ramps up difficulty for everyo=
ne else.
> >
> > On Fri, Apr 16, 2021, 2:08 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-de=
v@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> Not sure of the best place to workshop ideas, so please take this with
> >> a grain of salt.
> >>
> >> Starting with 3 assumptions:
> >>
> >> - assume that there exists a proof-of-burn that, for Bitcoin's
> >> purposes, accurately-enough models the investment in and development
> >> of ASICs to maintain miner incentive.
> >> - assume the resulting timing problem "how much burn is enough to keep
> >> blocks 10 minutes apart and what does that even mean"  is also...
> >> perfectly solvable
> >> - assume "everyone unanimously loves this idea"
> >>
> >> The transition *could* look like this:
> >>
> >>  - validating nodes begin to require proof-of-burn, in addition to
> >> proof-of-work (soft fork)
> >>  - the extra expense makes it more expensive for miners, so POW slowly=
 drops
> >>  - on a predefined schedule, POB required is increased to 100% of the
> >> "required work" to mine
> >>
> >> Given all of that, am I correct in thinking that a hard fork would not
> >> be necessary?
> >>
> >> IE: We could transition to another "required proof" - such as a
> >> quantum POW or a POB (above) or something else ....  in a back-compat
> >> way (existing nodes not aware of the rules would continue to
> >> validate).
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> =