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References: <lc5hmg$1jh$1@ger.gmane.org> <op.xacvcukvyldrnw@laptop-air>
	<20140127203435.GU38964@giles.gnomon.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 09:57:38 -0500
Message-ID: <CANOOu=-=DS9-Ry19HQbMev6=gCWwN_egYgA=5yEe2jtQPxn=8Q@mail.gmail.com>
From: Christophe Biocca <christophe.biocca@gmail.com>
To: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
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Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net"
	<bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	Andreas Schildbach <andreas@schildbach.de>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment Protocol for Face-to-face Payments
Precedence: list

> But the face-to-face case isn't intrinsically dependent on SSL security, and it's nice not to introduce that attack vector...

If the only concern is to make scan-to-pay work without reliance on
SSL's PKI, it might be better to specify the payment protocol url
*and* the public key used for signing right in the qr code. The wallet
connects to the url, fetches the payment request (maybe over a secure
connection, maybe not, doesn't matter), and verifies the signature
matches the public key from the qr code.

Downsides compared to embedding the entire request:
Payee needs to host/serve requests somewhere online. This introduces
reliability and DoS concerns.
Payer needs an internet connection to fetch the request.

Advantages:
Serve variable payment requests from the same qr code (improving
recipient privacy).
Still no hard dependency on CAs. Even if both CA and DNS are
compromised by an attacker, the worst they can do is Denial of
Service.
Optionally use CAs so that the wallet can attach an identity to who
you're paying by QR code. This partly addresses the problem of the
waiter overwriting the QR code. A non-PKI transaction would simply
show "Unknown recipient".
Much smaller QR code (only overhead is the key parameter, and you
could use a boolean param + the "address as public key" hack Mike
mentionned, for only 4 characters of overhead).
No need for a backward-incompatible bitcoin: scheme

On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 3:34 PM, Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 09:11:08AM -0800, Jeremy Spilman wrote:
>> On Mon, 27 Jan 2014 03:59:25 -0800, Andreas Schildbach
>> <andreas@schildbach.de> wrote:
>>
>> > SCAN TO PAY
>> > For scan-to-pay, the current landscape looks different. I assume at
>> > least 50% of Bitcoin transactions are initiated by a BIP21 URL encoded
>> > into a QR-code. Nevertheless, I tried to encode a payment request into
>> > the bitcoin URL. I used my existing work on encoding transactions into
>> > QR-codes. Steps to encode:
>>
>> Really interesting work. When using scan-to-pay, after the payer scans the
>> QR code with the protobuf PaymentRequest (not a URL to download the
>> PaymentRequest) are they using their own connectivity to submit the
>> Payment response?
>>
>> If we assume connectivity on the phone, might as well just get a URL from
>> the QR code and re-use existing infrastructure for serving that?
>
> My first thought was likewise.  In the case where the phone needs
> Internet connectivity anyway, why not include an HTTPS URL in a BIP 72 URL?
>
> I'm assuming that every client will have to support this is any case,
> since it's effectively mandated by the BIP, so why add another mode of
> operation?
>
> However, PaymentRequest-over-QR-code does seem to me to have one
> rather attractive advantage: the authentication model is orders of
> magnitude simpler and more intuitive for a face-to-face transaction
> than anything else.  You're saying "pay the coins to that thing over
> there displaying that QR code".  Which, most of the time, is exactly
> what you want.
>
> In the web case, it's fine to ignore the case where the URL domain has
> been subverted (and an cert obtained by the attacker) because in that
> case you've lost before you even get to payments (MitM attacker shows
> you a modified web page with different payment details).  But the
> face-to-face case isn't intrinsically dependent on SSL security, and
> it's nice not to introduce that attack vector...
>
> roy
>
>
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