Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1S2qtd-0007Ub-Te for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 29 Feb 2012 21:17:13 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from sulfur.webpack.hosteurope.de ([217.115.142.104]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1S2qtX-0000wj-JX for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 29 Feb 2012 21:17:13 +0000 Received: from 84-73-121-121.dclient.hispeed.ch ([84.73.121.121] helo=[192.168.0.21]); authenticated by sulfur.webpack.hosteurope.de running ExIM with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) id 1S2qdj-0008Bc-Bu; Wed, 29 Feb 2012 22:00:47 +0100 Message-ID: <4F4E91FC.6030003@justmoon.de> Date: Wed, 29 Feb 2012 22:00:44 +0100 From: Stefan Thomas User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:10.0.2) Gecko/20120216 Thunderbird/10.0.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-bounce-key: webpack.hosteurope.de;moon@justmoon.de;1330550227;bd339dd8; X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. X-Headers-End: 1S2qtX-0000wj-JX Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Duplicate transactions vulnerability X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 29 Feb 2012 21:17:14 -0000 > The purpose of this mail is asking for support for adding this rule to > the protocol rules. If there is consensus this rule is the solution, I > hope pools and miners can agree to update their nodes without lengthy > coinbase-flagging procedure that would only delay a solution. So, who > is in favor? Looks good to me. I also second the notion that we should deploy this quickly, given that it's a bug fix. On 2/28/2012 5:48 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > Hello all, > > as some of you may know, a vulnerability has been found in how the > Bitcoin reference client deals with duplicate transactions. Exploiting > it is rather complex, requires some hash power, and has no financial > benefit for the attacker. Still, it's a security hole, and we'd like > to fix this as soon as possible. > > A simple way to fix this, is adding an extra protocol rule[1]: > > Do not allow blocks to contain a transaction whose hash is equal to > that of a former transaction which has not yet been completely spent. > > I've written about it in BIP30[2]. There is a patch for the reference > client, which has been tested and verified to make the attack > impossible. The change is backward compatible in the same way BIP16 > is: if a supermajority of mining power implements it, old clients can > continue to function without risk. > > The purpose of this mail is asking for support for adding this rule to > the protocol rules. If there is consensus this rule is the solution, I > hope pools and miners can agree to update their nodes without lengthy > coinbase-flagging procedure that would only delay a solution. So, who > is in favor? > > [1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Protocol_rules > [2] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/BIP_0030 >