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In-Reply-To: <55AFBBE6.3060702@electrum.org>
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Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 18:04:32 +0200
Message-ID: <CAAt2M1-wf53=qUM+Q=1YrkEz+WT5PnZsobfzdNENtV5dN7847w@mail.gmail.com>
From: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com>
To: Thomas Voegtlin <thomasv@electrum.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0160bb1629d451051b78ed64
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Making Electrum more anonymous
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- Sent from my tablet
Den 22 jul 2015 17:51 skrev "Thomas Voegtlin via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
>
> Hello,
>
> Although Electrum clients connect to several servers in order to fetch
> block headers, they typically request address balances and address
> histories from a single server. This means that the chosen server knows
> that a given set of addresses belong to the same wallet. That is true
> even if Electrum is used over TOR.
>
> There have been various proposals to improve on that, but none of them
> really convinced me so far. One recurrent proposal has been to create
> subsets of wallet addresses, and to send them to separate servers. In my
> opinion, this does not really improve anonymity, because it requires
> trusting more servers.
>
> Here is an idea, inspired by TOR, on which I would like to have some
> feedback: We create an anonymous routing layer between Electrum servers
> and clients.

Why not look at something like Dissent? http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/

This protocol reduces the impact of Sybil attacks.

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<p dir="ltr"></p>
<p dir="ltr">- Sent from my tablet<br>
Den 22 jul 2015 17:51 skrev &quot;Thomas Voegtlin via bitcoin-dev&quot; &lt;<a href="mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt;:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hello,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Although Electrum clients connect to several servers in order to fetch<br>
&gt; block headers, they typically request address balances and address<br>
&gt; histories from a single server. This means that the chosen server knows<br>
&gt; that a given set of addresses belong to the same wallet. That is true<br>
&gt; even if Electrum is used over TOR.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There have been various proposals to improve on that, but none of them<br>
&gt; really convinced me so far. One recurrent proposal has been to create<br>
&gt; subsets of wallet addresses, and to send them to separate servers. In my<br>
&gt; opinion, this does not really improve anonymity, because it requires<br>
&gt; trusting more servers.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Here is an idea, inspired by TOR, on which I would like to have some<br>
&gt; feedback: We create an anonymous routing layer between Electrum servers<br>
&gt; and clients.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Why not look at something like Dissent? <a href="http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/">http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/</a></p>
<p dir="ltr">This protocol reduces the impact of Sybil attacks. <br>
</p>

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