Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Yzkbt-000504-Hw for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 02 Jun 2015 11:43:57 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.212.177 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.212.177; envelope-from=nathan.cook@gmail.com; helo=mail-wi0-f177.google.com; Received: from mail-wi0-f177.google.com ([209.85.212.177]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Yzkbs-00056Z-Lm for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 02 Jun 2015 11:43:57 +0000 Received: by wikd7 with SMTP id d7so10680669wik.0 for ; Tue, 02 Jun 2015 04:43:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 10.180.86.198 with SMTP id r6mr30472544wiz.70.1433245430635; Tue, 02 Jun 2015 04:43:50 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.194.155.97 with HTTP; Tue, 2 Jun 2015 04:43:29 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Nathan Cook Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 14:43:29 +0300 Message-ID: To: Mike Hearn Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d04428c08c4e29705178774bb X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (nathan.cook[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Yzkbs-00056Z-Lm Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] =?utf-8?q?Fwd=3A_Block_Size_Increase_Requir?= =?utf-8?b?ZW1lbnRz4oCP?= X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 11:43:57 -0000 --f46d04428c08c4e29705178774bb Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On 2 June 2015 at 14:26, Mike Hearn wrote: > But the majority of the hashrate can now perform double spends on your >> chain! They can send bitcoins to exchanges, sell it, extract the money and >> build a new longer chain to get their bitcoins back. >> > Obviously if the majority of the mining hash rate is doing double spending > attacks on exchanges then the Bitcoin experiment is resolved as a failure > and it will become abandoned. This has been known since day one: it's in > the white paper. The basic assumption behind Bitcoin is that only a > minority of actors are dishonest - if the majority are then Satoshi's > scheme does not work. > > So you are not stating anything new here. > It's both consistent and credible for an agent to commit to honesty on a chain that it openly supports and dishonesty on a chain that it openly opposes. (Moral? Legal? Perhaps not.) That said, majority hashpower doesn't need to be dishonest to stop a change to large blocks. It just needs to refuse to build on blocks that it doesn't like. The minority isn't going to mine blocks larger than 1MB if it knows they'll be orphaned. --f46d04428c08c4e29705178774bb Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On 2= June 2015 at 14:26, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:

But the majority of the hashra= te can now perform double spends on your chain! They can send bitcoins to e= xchanges, sell it, extract the money and build a new longer chain to get th= eir bitcoins back.

Obviously if the majority of the mining hash rate is doing double s= pending attacks on exchanges then the Bitcoin experiment is resolved as a f= ailure and it will become abandoned. This has been known since day one: it&= #39;s in the white paper. The basic assumption behind Bitcoin is that only = a minority of actors are dishonest - if the majority are then Satoshi's= scheme does not work.

So you are not stating anyt= hing new here.
=C2=A0
I= t's both consistent and credible for an agent to commit to honesty on a= chain that it openly supports and dishonesty on a chain that it openly opp= oses. (Moral? Legal? Perhaps not.) That said, majority hashpower doesn'= t need to be dishonest to stop a change to large blocks. It just needs to r= efuse to build on blocks that it doesn't like. The minority isn't g= oing to mine blocks larger than 1MB if it knows they'll be orphaned.
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