Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8DFDCC002D for ; Sun, 16 Oct 2022 19:27:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6209B40144 for ; Sun, 16 Oct 2022 19:27:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 6209B40144 X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DopnsywPQsDH for ; Sun, 16 Oct 2022 19:27:20 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:15:39 by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 4FFC040120 Received: from mslow1.mail.gandi.net (mslow1.mail.gandi.net [217.70.178.240]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4FFC040120 for ; Sun, 16 Oct 2022 19:27:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from relay6-d.mail.gandi.net (unknown [IPv6:2001:4b98:dc4:8::226]) by mslow1.mail.gandi.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5112ACDAC2 for ; Sun, 16 Oct 2022 19:03:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (Authenticated sender: email@yancy.lol) by mail.gandi.net (Postfix) with ESMTPA id D1B51C0004; Sun, 16 Oct 2022 19:03:51 +0000 (UTC) MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Sun, 16 Oct 2022 21:03:51 +0200 From: email@yancy.lol To: Jeremy Rubin , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <903a46d95473714a7e11e33310fe9f56@yancy.lol> X-Sender: email@yancy.lol Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_6613a7ef5663763303175a29a5e1d139" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 16 Oct 2022 19:36:37 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Does Bitcoin require or have an honest majority or a rational one? (re rbf) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 16 Oct 2022 19:27:22 -0000 --=_6613a7ef5663763303175a29a5e1d139 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed > The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining > representation in majority decision > making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it > could be subverted by anyone > able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially > one-CPU-one-vote. The majority > decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest > proof-of-work effort invested > in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the > honest chain will grow the > fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an > attacker would have to > redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then > catch up with and surpass the > work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a > slower attacker catching up > diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added. It's interesting that Nash Equilibrium isn't mentioned here. Since each miner has the option to either contribute to the longest chain or not, even if the miners know what strategy the other miners will use, they still wouldn't change their decision to contribute to the majority. > For example, if I run a shop that takes rain checks, but I sell an > item to a higher bidder who didn't have a hold on the item, that is > not honest, but it may be selfish profit maximizing. It would be honest if the store policy said ahead of time they are allowed to sell rain checks for more in such an occurrence. Although this is a good example of the difference between honest and rational. I think this means it's not a Nash Equilibrium if we needed to rely on the store owner to be honest. > Satoshi said an honest majority is required for the chain to be > extended. Honest is not really defined though. Honesty, in my > definition, is that you follow a pre specified rule, rational or not. My take is that "rational" is probably a better word than honest. In terms of a Nash Equilibrium, each participant is simply trying to maximize their outcome and honesty doesn't matter (only that participants are rational). > It seems a lot of the RBF controversy is that Protocol developers have > aspired to make the honest behavior also be the rational behavior. > This is maybe a good idea because, in theory, if the honest behavior > is rational then we can make a weaker assumption of selfishness > maximizing a parameter. I'm curious, can RBF can be described by a Nash Equilibrium? If yes, then it also shouldn't matter if participants are honest? > Overall, it might be nice to more tightly document what bitcoins > assumptions are in practice and what those assumptions do in terms of > properties of Bitcoin, as well as pathways to weakening the > assumptions without compromising the behaviors users expect the > network to have. An "extended white paper" if you will. White paper 1.1 :D > A last reflection is that Bitcoin is specified with an honest majority > assumption, but also has a rational dishonest minority assumption over > both endogenous (rewards) and exogenous (electricity) costs. Satoshi > did not suggest, at least as I read it, that Bitcoin works with an > rational majority assumption. (If anyone thinks these three are > similar properties you can make some trivial counterexamples) My take is the opposite unless I'm missing something. Participants are always incentivized to choose the rational solution (Not to waste electricity on a minority chain). Cheers, -Yancy On 2022-10-16 19:35, Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev wrote: > The Bitcoin white paper says: > > The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining > representation in majority decision > making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it > could be subverted by anyone > able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially > one-CPU-one-vote. The majority > decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest > proof-of-work effort invested > in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the > honest chain will grow the > fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an > attacker would have to > redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then > catch up with and surpass the > work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a > slower attacker catching up > diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added. > > This, Satoshi (who doesn't really matter anyways I guess?) claimed > that for Bitcoin to function properly you need a majority honest > nodes. > > There are multiple behaviors one can describe as honest, and > economically rational or optimizing is not necessarily rational. > > For example, if I run a shop that takes rain checks, but I sell an > item to a higher bidder who didn't have a hold on the item, that is > not honest, but it may be selfish profit maximizing. > > Satoshi said an honest majority is required for the chain to be > extended. Honest is not really defined though. Honesty, in my > definition, is that you follow a pre specified rule, rational or not. > > It seems a lot of the RBF controversy is that Protocol developers have > aspired to make the honest behavior also be the rational behavior. > This is maybe a good idea because, in theory, if the honest behavior > is rational then we can make a weaker assumption of selfishness > maximizing a parameter. > > However, Satoshi did not particularly bound what aspects of honesty > are important for the network, because there isn't a spec defining > exactly what is honest or not. And also as soon as people are honest, > you can rely on that assumption for good effect. > > And sometimes, defining an honest behavior can be creating a higher > utility system because most people are "law abiding citizens" who > might not be short term rational. For example, one might expect that > miners would be interested in making sure lightning closes are > "accurate" because increasing the utility of lightning is good for > Bitcoin, even if it is irrational. > > It seems that the NoRBF crowd want to rely on an honest majority > assumption where the honest behavior is not doing replacement if not > requested. This is really not much different than trying to close > lightning channels "the right way". > > However, where it may be different, is that even in the presence of > honest majority, the safety of 0conf isn't assured given the potential > of race conditions in the mempool. Therefore it's not clear to me that > 0conf working well is something you can drive from the Honest Majority > Assumption (where honest includes first seen). > > Overall, it might be nice to more tightly document what bitcoins > assumptions are in practice and what those assumptions do in terms of > properties of Bitcoin, as well as pathways to weakening the > assumptions without compromising the behaviors users expect the > network to have. An "extended white paper" if you will. > > It's somewhat clear to me that we shouldn't weaken assumptions that > only seem local to one subsystem of Bitcoin if they end up > destabilizing another system. In particular, things that decrease > "transaction utility" for end users decrease the demand for > transactions which hurts the fee market's longer term viability, even > if we feel good about making an honest policy assumption into a self > interested policy assumption. > > A last reflection is that Bitcoin is specified with an honest majority > assumption, but also has a rational dishonest minority assumption over > both endogenous (rewards) and exogenous (electricity) costs. Satoshi > did not suggest, at least as I read it, that Bitcoin works with an > rational majority assumption. (If anyone thinks these three are > similar properties you can make some trivial counterexamples) > > Cheers, > > Jeremy > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --=_6613a7ef5663763303175a29a5e1d139 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
= The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining
representatio= n in majority decision
making. If the majority were based on one-IP-a= ddress-one-vote, it
could be subverted by anyone
able to allocat= e many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially
one-CPU-one-vote. The majorit= y
decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greates= t
proof-of-work effort invested
in it. If a majority of CPU powe= r is controlled by honest nodes, the
honest chain will grow the
= fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an
a= ttacker would have to
redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blo= cks after it and then
catch up with and surpass the
work of the = honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a
slower atta= cker catching up
diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are ad= ded.
=  
= It's interesting that Nash Equilibrium isn't mentioned here.  Since ea= ch miner has the option to either contribute to the longest chain or not, e= ven if the miners know what strategy the other miners will use, they still = wouldn't change their decision to contribute to the majority.
=  
= For example, if I run a shop that takes rain checks, but I sell an
ite= m to a higher bidder who didn't have a hold on the item, that is
not h= onest, but it may be selfish profit maximizing.
=  
= It would be honest if the store policy said ahead of time they are allowed = to sell rain checks for more in such an occurrence.  Although this is = a good example of the difference between honest and rational.  I think= this means it's not a Nash Equilibrium if we needed to rely on the store o= wner to be honest.
=  
= Satoshi said an honest majority is required for the chain to be
extend= ed. Honest is not really defined though. Honesty, in my
definition, is= that you follow a pre specified rule, rational or not.
=  
= My take is that "rational" is probably a better word than honest.  In = terms of a Nash Equilibrium, each participant is simply trying to maximize = their outcome and honesty doesn't matter (only that participants are ration= al).
=  
= It seems a lot of the RBF controversy is that Protocol developers have
aspired to make the honest behavior also be the rational behavior.
Th= is is maybe a good idea because, in theory, if the honest behavior
is = rational then we can make a weaker assumption of selfishness
maximizin= g a parameter.
=  
= I'm curious, can RBF can be described by a Nash Equilibrium?  If yes, = then it also shouldn't matter if participants are honest?
=  
= Overall, it might be nice to more tightly document what bitcoins
assum= ptions are in practice and what those assumptions do in terms of
prope= rties of Bitcoin, as well as pathways to weakening the
assumptions wit= hout compromising the behaviors users expect the
network to have. &nbs= p;An "extended white paper" if you will.
=  
= White paper 1.1 :D
=  
= A last reflection is that Bitcoin is specified with an honest majority
assumption, but also has a rational dishonest minority assumption over
both endogenous (rewards) and exogenous (electricity) costs. Satoshi
did not suggest, at least as I read it, that Bitcoin works with an
ra= tional majority assumption. (If anyone thinks these three are
similar = properties you can make some trivial counterexamples)
=  
= My take is the opposite unless I'm missing something.  Participants ar= e always incentivized to choose the rational solution (Not to waste electri= city on a minority chain).
=  
= Cheers,
= -Yancy
=
On 2022-10-16 19:35, Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev wrote:
The Bitcoin white paper says:

The proof-of= -work also solves the problem of determining
representation in majorit= y decision
making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-v= ote, it
could be subverted by anyone
able to allocate many IPs. = Proof-of-work is essentially
one-CPU-one-vote. The majority
deci= sion is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest
proof= -of-work effort invested
in it. If a majority of CPU power is control= led by honest nodes, the
honest chain will grow the
fastest and = outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an
attacker woul= d have to
redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it= and then
catch up with and surpass the
work of the honest nodes= =2E We will show later that the probability of a
slower attacker catch= ing up
diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added.
=
This, Satoshi (who doesn't really matter anyways I guess?) claimedthat for Bitcoin to function properly you need a majority honest
no= des.

There are multiple behaviors one can describe as honest, a= nd
economically rational or optimizing is not necessarily rational.
For example, if I run a shop that takes rain checks, but I sell an=
item to a higher bidder who didn't have a hold on the item, that isnot honest, but it may be selfish profit maximizing.

Satoshi= said an honest majority is required for the chain to be
extended. Hon= est is not really defined though. Honesty, in my
definition, is that y= ou follow a pre specified rule, rational or not.

It seems a lot = of the RBF controversy is that Protocol developers have
aspired to mak= e the honest behavior also be the rational behavior.
This is maybe a g= ood idea because, in theory, if the honest behavior
is rational then w= e can make a weaker assumption of selfishness
maximizing a parameter.<= br />
However, Satoshi did not particularly bound what aspects of hone= sty
are important for the network, because there isn't a spec defining=
exactly what is honest or not. And also as soon as people are honest,=
you can rely on that assumption for good effect.

And somet= imes, defining an honest behavior can be creating a higher
utility sys= tem because most people are "law abiding citizens" who
might not be sh= ort term rational. For example, one might expect that
miners would be = interested in making sure lightning closes are
"accurate" because incr= easing the utility of lightning is good for
Bitcoin, even if it is irr= ational.

It seems that the NoRBF crowd want to rely on an honest= majority
assumption where the honest behavior is not doing replacemen= t if not
requested. This is really not much different than trying to c= lose
lightning channels "the right way".

However, where it = may be different, is that even in the presence of
honest majority, the= safety of 0conf isn't assured given the potential
of race conditions = in the mempool. Therefore it's not clear to me that
0conf working well= is something you can drive from the Honest Majority
Assumption (where= honest includes first seen).

Overall, it might be nice to more = tightly document what bitcoins
assumptions are in practice and what th= ose assumptions do in terms of
properties of Bitcoin, as well as pathw= ays to weakening the
assumptions without compromising the behaviors us= ers expect the
network to have.  An "extended white paper" if you= will.

 It's somewhat clear to me that we shouldn't weaken = assumptions that
only seem local to one subsystem of Bitcoin if they e= nd up
destabilizing another system. In particular, things that decreas= e
"transaction utility" for end users decrease the demand for
tra= nsactions which hurts the fee market's longer term viability, even
if = we feel good about making an honest policy assumption into a self
inte= rested policy assumption.

A last reflection is that Bitcoin is s= pecified with an honest majority
assumption, but also has a rational d= ishonest minority assumption over
both endogenous (rewards) and exogen= ous (electricity) costs. Satoshi
did not suggest, at least as I read i= t, that Bitcoin works with an
rational majority assumption. (If anyone= thinks these three are
similar properties you can make some trivial c= ounterexamples)

Cheers,

Jeremy
_________________= ______________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfo= undation.org
https:/= /lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
--=_6613a7ef5663763303175a29a5e1d139--