Message-ID: <5450FAE1.5040508@certimix.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 11:34:09 -0300
From: Sergio Lerner <sergiolerner@certimix.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64;
	rv:16.0) Gecko/20121026 Thunderbird/16.0.2
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
References: <CAE28kUS-uDbd_Br3H5BxwRm1PZFpOwLhcyyZT9b1_VfRaBC9jw@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAJHLa0PeB-DMs2zo680FRvaejV-K97k2g0Ti9pPdaNeH+gYmog@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAE28kUSPb3ZC1nJyX7H__7cAgXvOvPbZ+Tub+htGd5+tujZndg@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAJHLa0M20QjBOwhOwJWJUcPBLzmaX1uuPy-6ytvJQWLZy68aeg@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAE28kUS7cr3i-pSew6Y+xvfLEY5D1mi4oHU-GXv+jEf-i_8sVQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<CABsx9T1RPkif1+DEsOLrFfr-sE=FCs_B5C5aZzKr6HZCHw15ag@mail.gmail.com>
	<CADfmNEk40DTHDB8if_y_2i_Omoszd_BgcSxf-oS+ZcQB0tZZhg@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAAS2fgSiz-XRVQ4V+KbrTUWG4=g=WGf8c-pF4b4fFnfyU9HOqQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAAS2fgRjwg_XyvzHbMhmaiW85LmmsW3YiXHyhpKMHd2a03pH2Q@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAE28kUSqqcsMJArK29nG+UCiTX9buiJbQoMb30-oH-G=eFxrnQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAJqsvLCG2Cv=7wzDLotunEUTnAvdxVLSGrMEtkAnmdoBgONBsg@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAAS2fgR4-V10i2D=v5-ZR9rWYcBjPKyRgGvgnG3JAmPKr4x19Q@mail.gmail.com>
	<CADfmNE=2yw65aVEr=HVLWGrcQMbvpRKjraaYZehtfX=xTbdsiw@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CADfmNE=2yw65aVEr=HVLWGrcQMbvpRKjraaYZehtfX=xTbdsiw@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Death by halving (pro-active proposals)
Precedence: list

Instead of discussing what will happen when the subsidy is halved (which
nobody really knows) maybe we can think about of what we can do to
mitigate any damage in case something unwanted happens. Let's be proactive.

For instance, any form of merged-mining (like higher frequency
side-chains) will end-up increasing miners profit, even by a small
margin. Then that margin can compensate miners not to turn off their
equipment. Then we can encourage merge-mining on SHA-256, instead of
discouraging SHA-256 alt-coins.

Also we can encourage mining during the "trouble" period by creating a
donation pool: suppose we manage to convince miners to donate 1% of
their revenue in order to pay back to the miners for the first month
after the reward halving. If every block pays 1% for 10 months, then
every block during the first month of halving will earn 20% more.  Of
course, convincing miners of this may be difficult, but not impossible.
It could be done automatically with nLockTime freeze of transactions
with high fees, so no TTP is necessary.

So here are two proposals, any other idea?

Best regards,
 Sergio.