Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Wwtwn-00075z-CE for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 14:01:13 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of i-rme.es designates 209.85.217.170 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.217.170; envelope-from=rme@i-rme.es; helo=mail-lb0-f170.google.com; Received: from mail-lb0-f170.google.com ([209.85.217.170]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Wwtwj-0006i2-Uf for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 14:01:13 +0000 Received: by mail-lb0-f170.google.com with SMTP id 10so2937289lbg.1 for ; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 07:01:03 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=T8sVAnzvbd1n5k0x81IDboZXgshynMIFZYlge+n90gI=; b=kQEF+Cfnd8ytrqoXuaQtNrkMmHMA9ELmVQGvz2pu2pAK4EQX4L9IzgUelAqrc++kk9 XykLqx4UkCt16/R3uhreoFyiHYbQf/lCYVqDNMK3jT1Vd0YTsAX+TGKwvTjuWl/2QRZH 9s9tPeACDRT2rfCor8g4DWghU5F5aMuBT5KMNJn7MJ213ida01nhNeUksZ07ExpQ+YZR UPV9cn6anm9zrvFYLpqZ1GKuRwblxhZfPn5oVupvsOLhRAgcZzcJXIM645QkpCXXtgn+ VJAWeV0XNOrswrRlWm0DTjOswOgAdlinX03g1MkmQx0oLo0WQtuLFICKgyFLGHpXE9/N fbzA== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkPHlIZYQkjXngECBCMUzUB2ekxDVc2yb2vBFn2/3pc1kkjuFnp51Zr/sTeQMcuPgWY0XPZ MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.35.14 with SMTP id d14mr10252677lbj.43.1403013662978; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 07:01:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.152.199.8 with HTTP; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 07:01:02 -0700 (PDT) X-Originating-IP: [85.251.84.81] Received: by 10.152.199.8 with HTTP; Tue, 17 Jun 2014 07:01:02 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 16:01:02 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?UmHDumwgTWFydMOtbmV6?= To: Ron Elliott Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=14dae93d8f52ff497c04fc089200 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Wwtwj-0006i2-Uf Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposals for improving Bitcoin mining decentralization X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 14:01:13 -0000 --14dae93d8f52ff497c04fc089200 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Because he cant change the coinbase once the proof of work is done. El 17/06/2014 15:58, "Ron Elliott" escribi=C3= =B3: > In this scenario how do you ensure the miner solving the block cannot > reapportion the subsidy to himself rather than the pool? > On Jun 17, 2014 2:09 AM, "Ra=C3=BAl Mart=C3=ADnez" wrote: > >> First of all I apologice due to the possible mistakes in my writing >> below, I am not a Bitcoin developer but I have some knowledge about it. >> >> ---- >> >> We all know the recent news, Ghash pool controlling 51% of the hashrate. >> While some consider it a threat others think that is not harmful. >> >> The thing is that we have to do something to stop this from happening >> again. >> >> My proposal is to start thinking about miners that join a pool like >> independent miners and not slave miners, this includes creating a new >> mining protocol that does not rely on the pool sending the list of >> transactions to include in a block. Each individual miner has to collect >> transactions by his own and mine that, this can be achieved by running a >> full node or by running a SPV like node that ask other nodes for >> transactions. >> >> Once this protocol is developed and standarised we as a community could >> require all pools to use it (because its better, because is more >> trustless...), not by imposing it but by recommending it. >> >> Pool owners could send some instructions using this protocol to the mine= r >> about how many transactions to include per block (some pools want small >> blocks), how many 0 fee transactions to include, how much is the minimum >> fee per Kb to include transactions and some info about the Coinbase fiel= d >> in the block. >> >> This way is impossible to perform some of the possible 51% attacks: >> >> - A pool owner cant mine a new chain (selfish mining) (pool clients >> have a SPV or full node that has checkpoints and ask other peers abou= t the >> length of the chain) >> - A pool owner can't perform double spends or reverse transactions >> (pool clients know all the transactions relayed to the network, they = know >> if they are already included on a block) >> - A pool owner cant decide which transactions not to include (but >> they can configure the minimum fee). >> - A pool owner cant get all the rewards by avoiding other pools from >> mining blocks (Because the pool client knows the last block independe= ntly >> that is from his pool or other). >> >> >> The only thing that a 51% pool owner can do is to shut down his pool and >> drop the hashrate by 51% because he does not control the miners. >> >> If the pool owner owns all the hardware in the pool my proposal is not >> valid, if the pool clients dont use this protocol my proposal is not val= id. >> >> >> I want to know if this is possible or its been developed or there is >> already a working protocol that works like this, also I want to read oth= er >> people's ways to address this threat, thanks for reading. >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------= ------ >> HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk Solution= s >> Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems >> Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data. >> Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing & Easy Data Exploration >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/hpccsystems >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> >> --14dae93d8f52ff497c04fc089200 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Because he cant change the coinbase once the proof of work i= s done.

El 17/06/2014 15:58, "Ron Elliott" <= ;ronaldbelliott@gmail.com&g= t; escribi=C3=B3:

In this scenario how do you ensure the miner solving the blo= ck cannot reapportion the subsidy to himself rather than the pool?

On Jun 17, 2014 2:09 AM, "Ra=C3=BAl Mart=C3= =ADnez" <rme@i-rm= e.es> wrote:
First of all I apologice due to the possible mistakes= in my writing below, I am not a Bitcoin developer but I have some knowledg= e about it.

----

We all know t= he recent news, Ghash pool controlling 51% of the hashrate. While some cons= ider it a threat others think that is not harmful.

The thing is that we have to do something to stop this from = happening again.

My proposal is to start thinking = about miners that join a pool like independent miners and not slave miners,= this includes creating a new mining protocol that does not rely on the poo= l sending the list of transactions to include in a block. Each individual m= iner has to collect transactions by his own and mine that, this can be achi= eved by running a full node or by running a SPV like node that ask other no= des for transactions.

Once this protocol is developed and standarised we as a= community could require all pools to use it (because its better, because i= s more trustless...), not by imposing it but by recommending it.

Pool owners could send some instructions using this protocol= to the miner about how many transactions to include per block (some pools = want small blocks), how many 0 fee transactions to include, how much is the= minimum fee per Kb to include transactions and some info about the Coinbas= e field in the block.

This way is impossible to perform some of the possible = 51% attacks:
  • A pool owner cant mine a new chain (selfish = mining) (pool clients have a SPV or full node that has checkpoints and ask = other peers about the length of the chain)
  • A pool owner can't=C2=A0perform double spends or reverse transactio= ns (pool clients know all the transactions relayed to the network, they kno= w if they are already included on a block)
  • A pool owner cant decide= which transactions not to include (but they can configure the minimum fee)= .
  • A pool owner cant get all the rewards by avoiding other pools from= mining blocks (Because the pool client knows the last block independently = that is from his pool or other).

The onl= y thing that a 51% pool owner can do is to shut down his pool and drop the = hashrate by 51% because he does not control the miners.

If the pool owner owns all the hardware in the pool my = proposal is not valid, if the pool clients dont use this protocol my propos= al is not valid.


I want to know if = this is possible or its been developed or there is already a working protoc= ol that works like this, also I want to read other people's ways to add= ress this threat, thanks for reading.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------= -------
HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk Solutions Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems
Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data.
Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing & Easy Data Exploration http://p.sf.n= et/sfu/hpccsystems
_______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment

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