Return-Path: Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [140.211.166.136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 614EEC002D for ; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 21:05:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28CCF60D6F for ; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 21:05:41 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org 28CCF60D6F X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.2 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp3.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id TA7IkRQ9FkuN for ; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 21:05:40 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org 4CAC660D6A Received: from smtpauth.rollernet.us (smtpauth.rollernet.us [208.79.240.5]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4CAC660D6A for ; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 21:05:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtpauth.rollernet.us (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtpauth.rollernet.us (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB9132800064; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 14:05:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from webmail.rollernet.us (webmail.rollernet.us [IPv6:2607:fe70:0:14::a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by smtpauth.rollernet.us (Postfix) with ESMTPSA; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 14:05:36 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 11:05:36 -1000 From: "David A. Harding" To: Anthony Towns , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion In-Reply-To: References: User-Agent: Roundcube Webmail/1.4.10 Message-ID: X-Sender: dave@dtrt.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Rollernet-Abuse: Contact abuse@rollernet.us to report. Abuse policy: http://www.rollernet.us/policy X-Rollernet-Submit: Submit ID 4c3b.6351b820.244f0.0 Cc: Sergej Kotliar Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Opt-in full-RBF] Zero-conf apps in immediate danger X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 21:05:41 -0000 On 2022-10-20 09:58, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 02:37:53PM +0200, Sergej Kotliar via > bitcoin-dev wrote: >> AJ previously wrote: >> > presumably that makes your bitcoin >> > payments break down as something like: >> > 5% txs are on-chain and seem shady and are excluded from zeroconf >> > 15% txs are lightning >> > 20% txs are on-chain but signal rbf and are excluded from zeroconf >> > 60% txs are on-chain and seem fine for zeroconf >> Numbers are right. [...] > > [...] > > So the above suggests 25% of payments already get a sub-par experience > [...] > going full rbf would bump that from 25% to 85%, which would be pretty > terrible. Is it worth considering incremental steps between opt-in only (BIP125) and replace anything full RBF? For example, in addition to opt-in RBF rules, treat any transaction with a txid ending in `0x1` as replacable? I assume 1/16th (6.25%) of transactions would match that pattern (some of which already opt-in to RBF, so the net effect would be smaller). This would have the following advantages: 1. We could see if miners are willing to enable unsignaled RBF at all 2. We could gather more evidence on how the change affects zeroconf businesses and everyday users, hopefully without requiring they make immediate and huge changes 3. Any wallet authors that oppose unsignaled RBF can opt-out by grinding their txids, at least until full RBF is accomplished 4. We can increase the percentage of transactions subject to unsignaled RBF in later releases of Bitcoin Core, steadily moving the system towards full RBF without any sudden leaps (assuming nobody builds a successful relay and mining network with less restrictive replacement rules) I don't think this directly helps solve the problems with non-replacable transactions suffered by contract protocols since any adversary can opt-out of this scheme by grinding their txid, but I do think there's an advantage in transitioning slowly when people are still depending on previous behaviors. Thanks, -Dave