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From: Peter Vessenes <peter@coinlab.com>
Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 09:49:18 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 33 - Stratized Nodes
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Thanks for this, Amir.

My initial reactions:

1) This is cool and useful (but see 3)
2) This is significantly less secure than validating an entire blockchain;
it's certainly worth working out some use cases here in more detail than
just a sample conversation. More on this below
3) What about discovery? Will a client now have the chance to look for
NODE_STRATIZED clients on IRC? How do you envision a stratized server
decides which transactions to relay/store? Or is it just a caching layer in
front of a high quality blockchain service? If it is just a caching
service, the question of cache hits / misses is an interesting one as well.
4) What are the economic motivations to run a stratized server? Other than
cheating people of course.
5) Seems like a 'send me everything for this source address' is going to
save a lot of roundtrip conversations for what I imagine the most common
request will be.

Inre: majority agreement on transactions, and even balances, it would be
nice to work out some theoretical security / cost / value calculations for
the following scenarios:

Likely value and cost to someone of subverting / lying about
1) An n-confirmation transaction, n > 0
2) A 0 confirmation transaction
3) A NODE_STRATIZED transaction chain for a client with m connections to
NODE_STRATIZED servers
4) An address balance request for a client with m connections to
NODE_BALANCE_INFO (I made this name up) servers

Peter

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<div>Thanks for this, Amir.
</div><div><br></div><div>My initial reactions:</div><div><br></div><div>1)=
 This is cool and useful (but see 3)</div><div>2) This is significantly les=
s secure than validating an entire blockchain; it&#39;s certainly worth wor=
king out some use cases here in more detail than just a sample conversation=
. More on this below</div>

<div>3) What about discovery? Will a client now have the chance to look for=
 NODE_STRATIZED clients on IRC? How do you envision a stratized server deci=
des which transactions to relay/store? Or is it just a caching layer in fro=
nt of a high quality blockchain service? If it is just a caching service, t=
he question of cache hits / misses is an interesting one as well.=A0</div>

<div>4) What are the economic motivations to run a stratized server? Other =
than cheating people of course.</div><div>5) Seems like a &#39;send me ever=
ything for this source address&#39; is going to save a lot of roundtrip con=
versations for what I imagine the most common request will be.</div>

<div><br></div><div>Inre: majority agreement on transactions, and even bala=
nces, it would be nice to work out some theoretical security / cost / value=
 calculations for the following scenarios:</div><div><br></div><div>Likely =
value and cost to someone of subverting / lying about</div>

<div>1) An n-confirmation transaction, n &gt; 0</div><div>2) A 0 confirmati=
on transaction</div><div>3) A NODE_STRATIZED transaction chain for a client=
 with m connections to NODE_STRATIZED servers</div><div>4) An address balan=
ce request for a client with m connections to NODE_BALANCE_INFO (I made thi=
s name up) servers</div>

<div><br></div><div>Peter</div>

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