Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1SUhQ6-0004DH-12 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 16 May 2012 16:49:50 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of coinlab.com designates 209.85.214.175 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.214.175; envelope-from=peter@coinlab.com; helo=mail-ob0-f175.google.com; Received: from mail-ob0-f175.google.com ([209.85.214.175]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1SUhQ0-00020l-Ky for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 16 May 2012 16:49:50 +0000 Received: by obhx4 with SMTP id x4so1645857obh.34 for ; Wed, 16 May 2012 09:49:39 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type:x-gm-message-state; bh=LzYREj8qrhn/C+uyLspXwMS6UBzSEvoNZKXgy0+jZ0Q=; b=pxPUgTzUjt8TSXZjjFWMu+P+DqWYoQpqFeaOe5rPaTNN8lmTy8Z/6V86eDDhtnFa0W JKIxlY1ehIdsLqpnDQcD8RjnAeHv3Vbmd9NvRSpXdgzshc+yRH5kzuboJzwreak1m4+j YNR33qjxAVd1OG5jffsC9ye+dVflyu362ncG+JL/LCjeUTdxsj1L+RktKljUfJRyI5vS oVyfjVmJQa+RXtHaDC2F07ZyXIjMkPAgDzSlu8bM5JHv3g4r3wPl+ybdn1g+DQ8Nf+D3 Mzc4kdyMWzzqZNVPwY9dkbwdTpklRZzc+qgNGD7B0QM/kz8/lJWt8PLX05hSGilNPsFT WdDQ== Received: by 10.182.119.101 with SMTP id kt5mr3388331obb.70.1337186979056; Wed, 16 May 2012 09:49:39 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.182.35.227 with HTTP; Wed, 16 May 2012 09:49:18 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <1337186094.12490.YahooMailNeo@web121005.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> References: <1337186094.12490.YahooMailNeo@web121005.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> From: Peter Vessenes Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 09:49:18 -0700 Message-ID: To: Amir Taaki Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d0444ee1fe28bcd04c02a1a38 X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnnDhSrzns/zw7/5YN60diojZq9PUkOc9/uHaaCmSKvBVGXDWAP1+gBf3qG/NA2sqdn9KhH X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message X-Headers-End: 1SUhQ0-00020l-Ky Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net" Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 33 - Stratized Nodes X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 16:49:50 -0000 --f46d0444ee1fe28bcd04c02a1a38 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Thanks for this, Amir. My initial reactions: 1) This is cool and useful (but see 3) 2) This is significantly less secure than validating an entire blockchain; it's certainly worth working out some use cases here in more detail than just a sample conversation. More on this below 3) What about discovery? Will a client now have the chance to look for NODE_STRATIZED clients on IRC? How do you envision a stratized server decides which transactions to relay/store? Or is it just a caching layer in front of a high quality blockchain service? If it is just a caching service, the question of cache hits / misses is an interesting one as well. 4) What are the economic motivations to run a stratized server? Other than cheating people of course. 5) Seems like a 'send me everything for this source address' is going to save a lot of roundtrip conversations for what I imagine the most common request will be. Inre: majority agreement on transactions, and even balances, it would be nice to work out some theoretical security / cost / value calculations for the following scenarios: Likely value and cost to someone of subverting / lying about 1) An n-confirmation transaction, n > 0 2) A 0 confirmation transaction 3) A NODE_STRATIZED transaction chain for a client with m connections to NODE_STRATIZED servers 4) An address balance request for a client with m connections to NODE_BALANCE_INFO (I made this name up) servers Peter --f46d0444ee1fe28bcd04c02a1a38 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks for this, Amir.

My initial reactions:

1)= This is cool and useful (but see 3)
2) This is significantly les= s secure than validating an entire blockchain; it's certainly worth wor= king out some use cases here in more detail than just a sample conversation= . More on this below
3) What about discovery? Will a client now have the chance to look for= NODE_STRATIZED clients on IRC? How do you envision a stratized server deci= des which transactions to relay/store? Or is it just a caching layer in fro= nt of a high quality blockchain service? If it is just a caching service, t= he question of cache hits / misses is an interesting one as well.=A0
4) What are the economic motivations to run a stratized server? Other = than cheating people of course.
5) Seems like a 'send me ever= ything for this source address' is going to save a lot of roundtrip con= versations for what I imagine the most common request will be.

Inre: majority agreement on transactions, and even bala= nces, it would be nice to work out some theoretical security / cost / value= calculations for the following scenarios:

Likely = value and cost to someone of subverting / lying about
1) An n-confirmation transaction, n > 0
2) A 0 confirmati= on transaction
3) A NODE_STRATIZED transaction chain for a client= with m connections to NODE_STRATIZED servers
4) An address balan= ce request for a client with m connections to NODE_BALANCE_INFO (I made thi= s name up) servers

Peter
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