Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 16:04:04 +1000
From: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
To: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Message-ID: <20181123060404.fu4eyzcynbppmjcy@erisian.com.au>
References: <CAPg+sBhuPG-2GXc+Bp0yv5ywry2fk56LPLT4AY0Kcs+YEoz4FA@mail.gmail.com>
	<87k1l6d6lb.fsf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Safer sighashes and more granular SIGHASH_NOINPUT
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On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 12:15:44PM +0100, Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> One minor thing that I noticed a while ago and that I meant
> to fix on BIP118 is that `hashSequence` does not need to be blanked for
> eltoo to work (since where it is needed we also use `sighash_single`),
> so I'm tempted to remove that redundant blanking. It may not make a lot
> of difference but it'd limit the ability to change the number of inputs
> to a NOINPUT transaction (this now being the only field that commits to
> the set of inputs).

Commiting to just the sequence numbers seems really weird to me; it
only really prevents you from adding inputs, since you could still
replace any input that was meant to be there by almost any arbitrary
other transaction...

I could see this *maybe* making sense if you at least committed to the
values of each input's outpoint; since that would be an actual constraint?

I don't think you can commit to anything else about the other inputs:

   -- txids of the other transactions wouldn't work if you had other
      NOINPUT txes, and would introduce O(N^2) validation cost if someone
      signed every input with NOINPUT but committed to the txids of
      every other input

   -- scriptPubKeys wouldn't really work for eltoo-like constructions
      that want to vary the scripts but apply the same sig, but might
      work sometimes?

   -- witness scripts for the other inputs could be unknown at your
      signing time, or arbitrarily large and thus a pain to have to send
      to a hardware wallet

Just treating NOINPUT as a subset of ANYONECANPAY seems simpler to
me though...

> As for your proposal, I really like the `sighash_scriptmask` proposal,
> and committing to the fees (with the `nofee` escape hatch) also works
> seems also a nice fix. My one concern is that introducing a new opcode
> to mask things in the sighash looks like a similar layering violation as
> `codeseparator` was, but that's just a minor issue imho.

I think OP_MASK is okay as far as layering goes, if you just think of it
as a (set of) multibyte "OP_MASKED_PUSH" opcode(s). So when you
pseudocode a script like:

    <n> OP_CSV OP_DROP <p> OP_CHECKSIG

and then decide <n> needs to be masked, you rewrite it as:

    [n] OP_CSV OP_DROP <p> OP_CHECKSIG

indicating n is masked, and don't worry about the exact bytes that will
encode the push, anymore than you currently worry about whether it's
OP_0, OP_1..16, <1..75>+1..75-bytes, PUSHDATA[1,2,3]+n+n-bytes.

As long as OP_MASK only applies to a PUSH and it's an error for OP_MASK
not to be immediately followed by that PUSH, I think that all works
out fine.

Cheers,
aj