Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1QwGAQ-0001Su-93 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 24 Aug 2011 16:19:02 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from rhcavuit02.kulnet.kuleuven.be ([134.58.240.130] helo=cavuit02.kulnet.kuleuven.be) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1QwGAP-0000Bh-Ad for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 24 Aug 2011 16:19:02 +0000 X-KULeuven-Envelope-From: sipa@ulyssis.org X-Spam-Status: not spam, SpamAssassin (not cached, score=-48.797, required 5, autolearn=disabled, DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED 0.00, FAKE_REPLY_C 0.00, FREEMAIL_FROM 0.00, KUL_SMTPS -50.00, NML_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED 1.20) X-KULeuven-Scanned: Found to be clean X-KULeuven-ID: 4963D128081.A47F8 X-KULeuven-Information: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Received: from smtps01.kuleuven.be (smtpshost01.kulnet.kuleuven.be [134.58.240.74]) by cavuit02.kulnet.kuleuven.be (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4963D128081 for ; Wed, 24 Aug 2011 18:18:54 +0200 (CEST) Received: from smtp.ulyssis.org (mail.ulyssis.student.kuleuven.be [193.190.253.235]) by smtps01.kuleuven.be (Postfix) with ESMTP id 083A731E702 for ; Wed, 24 Aug 2011 18:18:54 +0200 (CEST) Received: from wop.ulyssis.org (wop.intern.ulyssis.org [192.168.0.182]) by smtp.ulyssis.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 93266F8004 for ; Wed, 24 Aug 2011 18:22:28 +0200 (CEST) Received: by wop.ulyssis.org (Postfix, from userid 615) id 2DA3D87C1B0; Wed, 24 Aug 2011 18:18:54 +0200 (CEST) Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 18:18:54 +0200 X-Kuleuven: This mail passed the K.U.Leuven mailcluster From: Pieter Wuille To: Bitcoin Dev Message-ID: <20110824161853.GA29981@ulyssis.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) X-Spam-Score: 1.2 (+) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (pieter.wuille[at]gmail.com) 0.0 DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED No valid author signature, adsp_override is CUSTOM_MED 0.0 FAKE_REPLY_C FAKE_REPLY_C 1.2 NML_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED ADSP custom_med hit, and not from a mailing list 0.0 AWL AWL: From: address is in the auto white-list X-Headers-End: 1QwGAP-0000Bh-Ad Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] New standard transaction types: time to schedule a blockchain split? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 16:19:02 -0000 On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 11:12:10AM -0400, Gavin Andresen wrote: > So, if we are going to have new releases that are incompatible with > old clients why not do things right in the first place, implement or > enable opcodes so the new bitcoin addresses can be small, and schedule > a block chain split for N months from now. What was the reason for disabling these opcodes in the first place? I can understand wanting to prevent excessive signature-verification, or limitation of arithmetic to a limited amount of bits, but completely disabling all arithmetic beyond addition and subtraction, and all bitwise operations seems very limiting to me. Thus, if we agree to do a future incompatible update, i would vote to re-enable these, and maybe allow arithmetic up to 520 or 1024 bits numbers. While we're at it, some additional opcodes could be useful. Either a custom operator to do boolean evaluation, or a few more lowlevel operations. Given the presence of bitwise operators, you could have scripts that process a sequence of pubkey/signature pairs, build up a number in which each bit corresponds to a valid signature, and then do some bitwise checks on this number. I'd argue that a "count number of bits set in number" opcode would be very useful for this. In short: I'm in favor of re-enabling opcodes, and possibly adding an OP_BITCOUNT operation. -- Pieter