Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1XAhy1-0001CH-Bh for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:03:33 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.219.46 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.219.46; envelope-from=mh.in.england@gmail.com; helo=mail-oa0-f46.google.com; Received: from mail-oa0-f46.google.com ([209.85.219.46]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1XAhxz-00020O-Uw for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:03:33 +0000 Received: by mail-oa0-f46.google.com with SMTP id m1so5817982oag.33 for ; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 09:03:26 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.60.52.5 with SMTP id p5mr23842996oeo.55.1406304206377; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 09:03:26 -0700 (PDT) Sender: mh.in.england@gmail.com Received: by 10.76.35.234 with HTTP; Fri, 25 Jul 2014 09:03:26 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <53D1AF6C.7010802@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 18:03:26 +0200 X-Google-Sender-Auth: xwK1356Xc7dmRXiiHhCd-_miCRQ Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: Aaron Voisine Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11332c8eaae56e04ff06b618 X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (mh.in.england[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1XAhxz-00020O-Uw Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net" Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Time X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:03:33 -0000 --001a11332c8eaae56e04ff06b618 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sorry, you're right. I'd have hoped a delay that doubles on failure each time up to some max would be good enough, relying on the p2p network to unlock a PIN feels weird, but I can't really quantify why or what's wrong with it so I guess it's just me :-) On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 4:45 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote: > The problem is if someone moves system time forward between app launches. > The lockout period doesn't have to be all that precise, it just makes you > wait for the next block, then 5, then 25, and so on. Using a well > known time server over https would also be a good option, but the wallet > app already has the chain height anyway. > > > On Friday, July 25, 2014, Mike Hearn wrote: > >> Given that the speed at which the block chain advances is kind of >> unpredictable, I'd think it might be better to just record the time to disk >> when a PIN attempt is made and if you observe time going backwards, refuse >> to allow more attempts until it's advanced past the previous attempt. >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 7:56 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote: >> >>> It's based on the block height, not the block's timestamp. If you have >>> access to the device and the phone itself is not pin locked, then you >>> can jailbreak it and get access to the wallet seed that way. A pin >>> locked device however is reasonably secure as the filesystem is >>> hardware aes encrypted to a combination of pin+uuid. This was just an >>> easy way to prevent multiple pin guesses by changing system time in >>> settings, so that isn't the weakest part of the security model. >>> >>> Aaron Voisine >>> breadwallet.com >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 8:21 PM, William Yager >>> wrote: >>> > On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:39 PM, Gregory Maxwell >>> > wrote: >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Is breadwallet tamper resistant & zero on tamper hardware? otherwise >>> >> this sounds like security theater.... I attach a debugger to the >>> >> process (or modify the program) and ignore the block sourced time. >>> >> >>> > >>> > It's an iOS application. I would imagine it is substantially more >>> difficult >>> > to attach to a process (which, at the very least, requires root, and >>> perhaps >>> > other things on iOS) than to convince the device to change its system >>> time. >>> > >>> > That said, the security benefits might not be too substantial. >>> > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and >>> > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck >>> > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code >>> > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now. >>> > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds >>> > _______________________________________________ >>> > Bitcoin-development mailing list >>> > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >>> > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >>> > >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and >>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck >>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code >>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now. >>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Bitcoin-development mailing list >>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >>> >> >> > > -- > > Aaron Voisine > breadwallet.com > --001a11332c8eaae56e04ff06b618 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Sorry, you're right. I'd have hoped a delay that d= oubles on failure each time up to some max would be good enough, relying on= the p2p network to unlock a PIN feels weird, but I can't really quanti= fy why or what's wrong with it so I guess it's just me :-)


On Fri, Jul 2= 5, 2014 at 4:45 PM, Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.com> wrote:=
The problem is if someone moves system time forward between app launches. T= he lockout period doesn't have to be all that precise, it just makes yo= u wait for the next block, then 5, then 25, and so on. Using a well known= =C2=A0time server over=C2=A0https would also be a good option,= but the wallet app already has the chain height anyway.


On Friday, July 25, 2014, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
Given that the speed at which the block chain advances is kind of unpredict= able, I'd think it might be better to just record the time to disk when= a PIN attempt is made and if you observe time going backwards, refuse to a= llow more attempts until it's advanced past the previous attempt.


On Fri, Jul 2= 5, 2014 at 7:56 AM, Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.co= m> wrote:
It's based on the block height, not the block's timestamp. If you h= ave
access to the device and the phone itself is not pin locked, then you
can jailbreak it and get access to the wallet seed that way. A pin
locked device however is reasonably secure as the filesystem is
hardware aes encrypted to a combination of pin+uuid. This was just an
easy way to prevent multiple pin guesses by changing system time in
settings, so that isn't the weakest part of the security model.

Aaron Voisine
breadwallet.com


On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 8:21 PM, William Yager <will.yager@gmail.com<= /a>> wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:39 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmai= l.com>
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Is breadwallet tamper resistant & zero on tamper hardware? oth= erwise
>> this sounds like security theater.... I attach a debugger to the >> process (or modify the program) and ignore the block sourced time.=
>>
>
> It's an iOS application. I would imagine it is substantially more = difficult
> to attach to a process (which, at the very least, requires root, and p= erhaps
> other things on iOS) than to convince the device to change its system = time.
>
> That said, the security benefits might not be too substantial.
>
> ------------------------------------------------= ------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index an= d
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest cod= e
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/= sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitco= in-development
>

---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---
Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
http://p.sf.net/sfu/b= ds
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment



--

Aaron Voisine
breadwallet.com

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