Return-Path: <antoine.riard@gmail.com> Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 875E0C002D for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; Tue, 21 Jun 2022 23:46:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4EE7740C28 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; Tue, 21 Jun 2022 23:46:01 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 4EE7740C28 Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=VADQc/ao X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id h9MjmIu9Uw1s for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; Tue, 21 Jun 2022 23:46:00 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 2DC9240116 Received: from mail-il1-x130.google.com (mail-il1-x130.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::130]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2DC9240116 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; Tue, 21 Jun 2022 23:46:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-il1-x130.google.com with SMTP id h20so4398411ilj.13 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; Tue, 21 Jun 2022 16:46:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=XLog6hV6QP6+R2zWDsP6HiHPSG/F7CLjLs7jEjy32Cs=; b=VADQc/aoy8EsU+KqNfPaH3GsvBjaFkJvGHWWfWrNWb8VXOHjgr5a9S2n5b5rht5pMv qUpZ8YgNaX+lwd7UVUT9yND/fiT56340FKk8mK8HSfHEaug/tpVmbNOzo5fOk7iicmXp BIiGczGDrnENheJIywukfzVrYI6iKW1YpYjcjUJK1sElafi2YANIsK8UKMNzmu4/jiAV obx2mz23cHxbqc2JgiSpy7Z4kygGKW22jFL5IKZfFOXy/pcH4SkhWEablnhdnqIomYb4 bNp/PdmrjgFAJigBK08cdrvMpmFO6zw8TQNK3vf55zgextsWyDhpiFr/p3EydUdkfsEY 976A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=XLog6hV6QP6+R2zWDsP6HiHPSG/F7CLjLs7jEjy32Cs=; b=c6AHCG+TDAW1lDTykabsbKQUDWpQmx3csY40ExoUar7CwfTSDBexEn9U9y51X5iox4 yC9zgLYTAP34q/BsflsX4O2HjtaSrdD6wCKsINR1PbqS+N6uAGXrpbQIddy630QJoVkw lh1uwBImbtDyJ+DjAzdjL6ZOJ06hhK1Er2HET4qNuDFR1hFroglFVtNlxRbkn82jB99p m5+eZQ610SZ4LdSE2i8B5UJiNRCj7YSPm5W3VAMUcXD4SIfCGKIXGesz9NkgCJXJctCD eSUZ82GrZKQ5a9K47ktO2YQf6tDES/vQ22vC68PkCUaSYPjwn/xFvc4UVCDLa88o1jPq KgjQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora/sjTm1etNNgV3fidfXIqRPm5ELeDjAjLMJDFlXSXaSYlDqExV+ fAGufnrSFjgzBcOyPxbI/Wls3z3f347WFQqmBRr8ymT1b80= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1uQojwDy7Z/IwKB+Dz1KlZPyCmeh1l3NmCFggKEp6m6TUjEDHnw1ZChkDd12aWXmH9MQcpojio2v9lhyaf8JjQ= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6e02:1b83:b0:2d9:2313:94c with SMTP id h3-20020a056e021b8300b002d92313094cmr453423ili.191.1655855159274; Tue, 21 Jun 2022 16:45:59 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <CALZpt+GOh-7weEypT9JrzcwthZJqHOfj7sf9FMuqi5_FZv0g7w@mail.gmail.com> <YrEHo+3XLDNgIOnz@petertodd.org> In-Reply-To: <YrEHo+3XLDNgIOnz@petertodd.org> From: Antoine Riard <antoine.riard@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 19:45:48 -0400 Message-ID: <CALZpt+EL=k_6iE5B950oz3EdLaQbRvgCNYZ8Lko4fcONcACvfw@mail.gmail.com> To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000009173a605e1fdd229" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 00:02:05 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s security X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 23:46:01 -0000 --0000000000009173a605e1fdd229 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bumping txs without th= e > opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also made sure txs would propagate to > the above node. As of right now, it's up to 32 replacements (once per block), > without any of them mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at the > minimum possible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block arrives > without the tx getting mined. So that's evidence we don't have much full-rbf > hash power at this moment. > > You can see the current status at: https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/ That's interesting. I'm not sure if we can conclude of the absence of full-rbf hash power at this moment, as it could also be a lack of full-rbf propagation path towards such potential hash power. I think the day we see an opt-out replacement transaction mined, it would constitute a good hint of full-rbf hash power (assuming the tx-relay topology stays relatively stable across the transaction issuance...) Anyway, if/when the `fullrbf` patch lands in Bitcoin Core, including automatic outbound connections to few `NODE_REPLACE_BY_FEE` peers, I'm thinking of reaching out to a few mining node operators to advocate them with the new policy setting. Antoine Le lun. 20 juin 2022 =C3=A0 19:49, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> a =C3=A9= crit : > On Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 08:25:11PM -0400, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > For that reason, I believe it would be beneficial to the flourishing of > > multi-party funded transactions to fix the Dos vector by seeing a subse= t > of > > the network running full-rbf and enabling propagation of honest > multi-party > > transactions to the interested miners, replacing potential non-signalin= g > > double-spend from a malicious counterparty. Moving towards that > direction, > > I've submitted a small patch against Bitcoin Core enabling it to turn o= n > > full-rbf as a policy, still under review [3]. The default setting stays > > **false**, i.e keeping opt-in RBF as a default replacement policy. I've > > started to run the patch on a public node at 146.190.224.15. > > BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bumping txs without th= e > opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also made sure txs would propagat= e > to > the above node. As of right now, it's up to 32 replacements (once per > block), > without any of them mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at > the > minimum possible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block arriv= es > without the tx getting mined. So that's evidence we don't have much > full-rbf > hash power at this moment. > > You can see the current status at: > https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/ > > -- > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > --0000000000009173a605e1fdd229 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <div dir=3D"ltr">> BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bu= mping txs without the<br>> opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also = made sure txs would propagate to<br>> the above node. As of right now, i= t's up to 32 replacements (once per block),<br>> without any of them= mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at the<br>> minimum p= ossible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block arrives<br>> = without the tx getting mined. So that's evidence we don't have much= full-rbf<br>> hash power at this moment.<br>> <br>> You can see t= he current status at: <a href=3D"https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.= org/">https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/</a><br><br>That's = interesting. I'm not sure if we can conclude of the absence of full-rbf= hash power at this moment, as it could also be a lack of full-rbf propagat= ion path towards such potential hash power. I think the day we see an opt-o= ut replacement transaction mined, it would constitute a good hint of full-r= bf hash power (assuming the tx-relay topology stays relatively stable acros= s the transaction issuance...)<br><br>Anyway, if/when the `fullrbf` patch l= ands in Bitcoin Core, including automatic outbound connections to few `NODE= _REPLACE_BY_FEE` peers, I'm thinking of reaching out to a few mining no= de operators to advocate them with the new policy setting.<br><br>Antoine<b= r></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr= ">Le=C2=A0lun. 20 juin 2022 =C3=A0=C2=A019:49, Peter Todd <<a href=3D"ma= ilto:pete@petertodd.org">pete@petertodd.org</a>> a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br>= </div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b= order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Mon, Jun 13, 202= 2 at 08:25:11PM -0400, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote:<br> > For that reason, I believe it would be beneficial to the flourishing o= f<br> > multi-party funded transactions to fix the Dos vector by seeing a subs= et of<br> > the network running full-rbf and enabling propagation of honest multi-= party<br> > transactions to the interested miners, replacing potential non-signali= ng<br> > double-spend from a malicious counterparty. Moving towards that direct= ion,<br> > I've submitted a small patch against Bitcoin Core enabling it to t= urn on<br> > full-rbf as a policy, still under review [3]. The default setting stay= s<br> > **false**, i.e keeping opt-in RBF as a default replacement policy. I&#= 39;ve<br> > started to run the patch on a public node at 146.190.224.15.<br> <br> BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bumping txs without the<= br> opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also made sure txs would propagate = to<br> the above node. As of right now, it's up to 32 replacements (once per b= lock),<br> without any of them mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at th= e<br> minimum possible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block arrives= <br> without the tx getting mined. So that's evidence we don't have much= full-rbf<br> hash power at this moment.<br> <br> You can see the current status at: <a href=3D"https://alice.btc.calendar.op= entimestamps.org/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://alice.btc.c= alendar.opentimestamps.org/</a><br> <br> -- <br> <a href=3D"https://petertodd.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">http= s://petertodd.org</a> 'peter'[:-1]@<a href=3D"http://petertodd.org"= rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">petertodd.org</a><br> </blockquote></div> --0000000000009173a605e1fdd229--