Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z4IgH-0000T8-MB for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 15 Jun 2015 00:55:17 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.220.51 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.220.51; envelope-from=elombrozo@gmail.com; helo=mail-pa0-f51.google.com; Received: from mail-pa0-f51.google.com ([209.85.220.51]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z4IgG-0002uK-HZ for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 15 Jun 2015 00:55:17 +0000 Received: by pacyx8 with SMTP id yx8so54609479pac.2 for ; Sun, 14 Jun 2015 17:55:10 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 10.70.8.131 with SMTP id r3mr39389000pda.62.1434329710874; Sun, 14 Jun 2015 17:55:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.102] (cpe-76-167-237-202.san.res.rr.com. [76.167.237.202]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id le17sm10278830pab.2.2015.06.14.17.55.09 (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Sun, 14 Jun 2015 17:55:10 -0700 (PDT) Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.2 \(2098\)) Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_25D3CD58-3475-44C5-964C-FB84EBB3D32B"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512 X-Pgp-Agent: GPGMail 2.5b6 From: Eric Lombrozo In-Reply-To: <674CED15-3F4C-4E24-BCA2-3C474CC01708@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2015 17:55:07 -0700 Message-Id: <35D2C620-DCCF-4D2C-B72C-07B276A28862@gmail.com> References: <674CED15-3F4C-4E24-BCA2-3C474CC01708@gmail.com> To: Adam Back X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.2098) X-Spam-Score: -1.4 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (elombrozo[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.2 AWL AWL: Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address X-Headers-End: 1Z4IgG-0002uK-HZ Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] comments on BIP 100 X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 00:55:17 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_25D3CD58-3475-44C5-964C-FB84EBB3D32B Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > On Jun 14, 2015, at 5:53 PM, Eric Lombrozo = wrote: >=20 > I think the whole complexity talk is missing the bigger issue. >=20 > Sure, per block validation scales linearly (or = quasilinearly=E2=80=A6there=E2=80=99s an O(log n) term in there = somewhere but it=E2=80=99s probably dominated by linear factors at = current levels=E2=80=A6asymptotic limits don=E2=80=99t always apply very = well to finite systems). And there=E2=80=99s an O(n^2) bandwidth issue. For accuracy=E2=80=99s sake, I meant to say O(n log n). >=20 > The real issue, though, is validation cost. The n in O(n) here does = not represent block size - it represents the size of the entire block = chain for every new validator that must be synchronized! It means we = have no way to construct short proofs (or at least arguments that are = computationally *hard* to forge) without requiring the validator to = maintain the complete system state. And currently, there is no mechanism = for directly compensating validators. >=20 > A full validator that goes offline even for a short period of time = takes a while to fully catch up to the rest of the network - and = starting up a new validator from scratch will continue to be = painful=E2=80=A6even for those of us who=E2=80=99ve turned this into = routine by now, let alone new nontechnical users. >=20 > Satoshi=E2=80=99s SPV is not a real solution - it=E2=80=99s a mere = suggestion that wasn=E2=80=99t fully thought out at the time of the = Bitcoin white paper. Besides lacking a good validation security model, = practical implementations of it weaken privacy and complicate client = implementations substantially=E2=80=A6and the worst part, it still = doesn=E2=80=99t scale all that well. The validator still has to query = every single block (even if filtered) back to the first transaction = (which cannot be determined without doing a blockchain scan anyway). >=20 > So yes, we will most certainly need algorithmic improvements! >=20 > - Eric Lombrozo >=20 >=20 >> On Jun 14, 2015, at 4:58 PM, Adam Back wrote: >>=20 >> Hi Mike >>=20 >> On 15 June 2015 at 00:23, Mike Hearn wrote: >>>> One thing that is concerning is that few in industry seem inclined = to >>>> take any development initiatives or even integrate a library. >>>=20 >>> Um, you mean except all the people who have built more scalable = wallets over >>> the past few years, which is the only reason anyone can even use = Bitcoin >>> from their phone? >>=20 >> No slight intended obviously to people who do write actual client = code. >>=20 >> That was probably insufficiently specific, let me rephrase: I am >> referring to the trend that much of the industry is built on web2.0 >> technology using bitcoin via a library in a web scripting language, >> often with consensus bugs, and even outsourcing and not even running >> their own full node, so that the service itself offered to their = users >> isn't even SPV secure to the operator. As well as being heavily = based >> on a third-party custody model that is the root cause of the repeated >> wallet breaches. Some of these companies have a noted tendency not = to >> upgrade or fix code. >>=20 >> So I mean this not to call out specific companies, but in the sense >> that if we're technologists we should be trying to move the = technology >> forward, not just changing parameters which run into an O(n^2) = scaling >> wall or break decentralisation security. And we shouldnt take the >> above state of affairs as an immutable reality. It can not persist >> for bitcoin to reach maturity on scale nor security. >>=20 >>> I still think you guys don't recognise what you are actually asking = for here >>> - scrapping virtually the entire existing investment in software, = wallets >>> and tools. >>=20 >> As I said I dont think we can expect Bitcoin to scale with no further >> algorithmic improvements. Algorithmic improvements take code. There >> is reasonable scope to build in an incrementally deployable way, >> there's plenty of time for people to code, test and opt-in to things, >> the sky is not falling. Companies do care about scaling, and can >> invest in the integration and coding implied to improve their = products >> scalability, they have an economic incentive to do it and there is no >> scalable and safe way todo it without this work. >>=20 >>> Computational complexity for the entire network is O(nm) where >>> n=3Dtransactions and m=3Dfully validating nodes. There is no fixed = relationships >>> between those two variables. >>=20 >> I am referring to global bandwidth O(n^2) with n=3Dusers, or O(n) per >> user bandwidth cost to the system, while O(nm) is accurate nodes is = an >> internal system concept. Anyway suffice to say the network does not >> scale O(1) in per user cost. >>=20 >>> "Exposing the companies to back-pressure" sounds quite nice and = gentle. Let >>> me rephrase it to be equivalent but perhaps more direct: you mean = "breaking >>> the current software ecosystem to force people into a new, fictional = system >>> that bears little resemblance to the Bitcoin we use today, whether = they want >>> that or not". >>>=20 >>> As nothing that has been proposed so far (Lightning, merge mined = chains, >>> extension blocks etc) has much chance of actual deployment any time = soon, >>> that leaves raising the block size limit as the only possible path = left. >>=20 >> A hard-fork takes a long period of time to deploy due to the >> non-upgrade risk, people are working on things in the mean-time. >> There can be a case for some increase to create some breathing room = to >> work on scaling and decentralising tech, I just mean to say that if = we >> do it in isolation, we're not focussing on the big picture. >>=20 >> Adam >>=20 >> = --------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---- >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >=20 --Apple-Mail=_25D3CD58-3475-44C5-964C-FB84EBB3D32B Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name=signature.asc Content-Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVfiJrAAoJEJNAI64YFENUBLoP/iRqjwXtQClFc6P2PachVA4Z XbowdfWywtDffeK+n0JoUNl69G89JAsM5fq2SXyAwZnBgF5VhQq1AxLIFXScU2nk r6DYprGGxtNXuYAG7xI++6CaVNWKnBs36O6ZXd58pIWtaUrgtj1/rkxR9bKngnDC jmf4Dw+Jv5+mSdHegqQ4lSSfB7UER5l0wKsBVDkLQIs4IfPz6h+Se4T2WuKC02Po T72bjkjv/7Kf/Gw8EUOb+Ze5BPDAnNTnFDNw6WpB4rE8RCOWcgeYleeS7pOBQy78 Iva+Xu6IyRVNpUjHEEMSU5heuz2YLPxmwQa1+YJB2Hjn+YB+2KjPoT1RczSFIL6c u4vaXLdu8pT5UnZPL9Xt6U641yuCpIMr0cCf+TmgoTzabO2LzTyqqywPgmQ8HdZH yssbdLHQgQtT6fT2sD2GIknEK2dpeKSKNXR993+vHSaC6RY6CIbcGgwOb2wt1+lW dlKruZ7hXnaVE86waZOqb3KX35r4DxQU5V97Vn9mPpTmKF7uLcDiz3bZa/kTkUgs PA+wYiBLD5c5w7oQRF3sRW0v258hiN6OZzbjXw0WIU6XZ/XxtdVqtvxHyRMSIKpl nBrxfohHMAzIVffjm9YYUltCKALkGUNM0FSUFFo7ggJmJuixdKk9B4+AfKkZN6fE uE5OpJ+/mtMdxglCC5JZ =raZd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Apple-Mail=_25D3CD58-3475-44C5-964C-FB84EBB3D32B--