Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from <will.yager@gmail.com>) id 1WcOD3-0004hh-En for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 22 Apr 2014 00:05:13 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.192.46 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.192.46; envelope-from=will.yager@gmail.com; helo=mail-qg0-f46.google.com; Received: from mail-qg0-f46.google.com ([209.85.192.46]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1WcOD0-0008BF-1Y for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 22 Apr 2014 00:05:13 +0000 Received: by mail-qg0-f46.google.com with SMTP id j107so1296806qga.33 for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>; Mon, 21 Apr 2014 17:05:04 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.140.97.130 with SMTP id m2mr223661qge.23.1398125104581; Mon, 21 Apr 2014 17:05:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.140.27.135 with HTTP; Mon, 21 Apr 2014 17:05:04 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 21 Apr 2014 19:05:04 -0500 Message-ID: <CAG8oi1NDfoDBT_DmcBVhc0tMMhO55oDcrQBbGmqh9OfgsnG4Lg@mail.gmail.com> From: William Yager <will.yager@gmail.com> To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113a9b8235eb2f04f7965eb7 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (will.yager[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at http://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [209.85.192.46 listed in list.dnswl.org] 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1WcOD0-0008BF-1Y Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Proposal: Base58 encoded HD Wallet root key with optional encryption X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net> List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development> List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net> List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe> X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2014 00:05:13 -0000 --001a113a9b8235eb2f04f7965eb7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 The spec has been updated a bit. Even if the bulk of the key-stretching work has been outsourced to another device, and that device is compromised, the passphrase is now protected by minimum 8192 rounds of salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512. The idea is that more powerful devices (mobile phones, laptops, etc.) can do all the key-stretching on their own, whereas weaker devices with access to another device with more computing power (like Trezors) do a fair amount of key-stretching on their own, but can safely export the rest of the key-stretching to the other device. Will On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 10:17 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman < jeanpaulkogelman@me.com> wrote: > Hi everyone, > > We've been hard at work updating the spec to include features that were > requested. We've removed the Scrypt dependency that was present in the > initial drafts, added new KDFs, added plausible deniability and have a > reference implementation. > > > Kind regards, > > > Jean-Paul Kogelman > --001a113a9b8235eb2f04f7965eb7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <div dir=3D"ltr">The spec has been updated a bit.<div><br></div><div>Even i= f the bulk of the key-stretching work has been outsourced to another device= , and that device is compromised, the passphrase is now protected by minimu= m 8192 rounds of salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512.=C2=A0</div> <div><br></div><div>The idea is that more powerful devices (mobile phones, = laptops, etc.) can do all the key-stretching on their own, whereas weaker d= evices with access to another device with more computing power (like Trezor= s) do a fair amount of key-stretching on their own, but can safely export t= he rest of the key-stretching to the other device.</div> <div><br></div><div>Will</div><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra= "><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 10:17 PM, Jean-Paul Ko= gelman <span dir=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mailto:jeanpaulkogelman@me.com" tar= get=3D"_blank">jeanpaulkogelman@me.com</a>></span> wrote:<br> <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p= x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div>Hi = everyone,</div><div><br></div><div>We've been hard at work updating the= spec to include features that were requested. We've removed the Scrypt= dependency that was present in the initial drafts, added new KDFs, added p= lausible deniability and have a reference implementation.</div> <div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Kind regards,</div><div><br></div><div><= br></div><div>Jean-Paul Kogelman</div></div></blockquote></div></div></div>= </div> --001a113a9b8235eb2f04f7965eb7--