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Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2025 15:01:23 +0000
To: Leo Wandersleb <lwandersleb@gmail.com>
From: "'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List" <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Pre-emptive commit/reveal for quantum-safe migration (poison-pill)
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Hi Leo,

When a user reveals a transaction + commitment proof, are you
assuming it will be included in a block? Or is the reveal TX
somehow put "on ice" for those 144 blocks, and only then mined?=20


If the former, this implies your protocol would need to allow
double-spending of UTXOs even after many confirmations, as
Tim has noted. Otherwise having an older announcement wouldn't
give any advantage. I don't see how you'd implement this without
breaking many founding assumptions of Bitcoin, maybe introducing
some new special "confirmed-but-pending" state specifically
for the outputs of these reveal TXs.

If the latter, and the TX isn't immediately mineable, then how
exactly do nodes know when to consider it consensus-valid?
Imagine you're a node and you receive a reveal transaction
with a valid (old enough) commitment proof. The TX claims
to have been created 144 blocks ago and thus should be
mineable. But how do you verify that, if the TX wasn't
included in a past block?

regards,
conduition

On Thursday, June 5th, 2025 at 7:55 AM, Leo Wandersleb <lwandersleb@gmail.c=
om> wrote:

> Hi Boris, hi list,
> I think the weak announcement is a bad idea once EC crypto is broken to t=
he point where an attacker can break the key before the transaction gets mi=
ned but the strong announcements should still hold as they have less urgenc=
y. If the attacker sees the transaction in a strong announcement with a ful=
l transaction, he cannot win even if he gets into a block first, as the str=
ong announcement proves a prior commitment to that transaction and would wi=
n even if it gets mined only some blocks later.
>=20

> A scheme where the announcement does not contain the full transaction is =
problematic as the transaction might then turn out to not be valid. Then no=
des would wait for the "winning" wtxid blocking the UTXO forever.
>=20

> So the scheme is:
>=20

> After activation at block height X:
>=20

> 1. **Vulnerable UTXOs cannot be spent directly** - they require a prior a=
nnouncement
> 2. **Commitment** to a wTXID that spends the vulnerable UTXO. Multiple wT=
XIDs can be stored in a hash tree in an OP_RETURN
> 3. **Reveal** full transaction with proof of prior commitment but not as =
a normal transaction yet
> 4. **Counter Reveal**: For 144 blocks, others can reveal older commitment=
s. This protects exposed pubkeys!
> 5. **After 144 blocks**: The UTXO can be spent according to the strongest=
 announcement (oldest commitment of valid transaction wins).
>=20

> As (5) is just the normal transaction, the scheme is a soft fork and comp=
atible with pre-recorded transactions where the keys were lost. It would at=
 least double the on-chain costs for these vulnerable UTXOs as they would h=
ave to store the full transaction twice. We can make the announcements prun=
able again though.
>=20

> Best,
>=20

> Leo
> On Wednesday, 4 June 2025 at 20:40:32 UTC+2 Boris Nagaev wrote:
>=20

> > Hi Leo,
> >=20

> > I think it is possible to provide privacy for Satoshi and also reduce t=
he size of a weak announcement (strong announcements can already be small: =
just a txid or a Merkle root of many txids).
> >=20

> > Importantly, we cannot include the whole signed transaction in the weak=
 announcement. Doing so would leak the EC public key immediately, allowing =
an attacker to create their own valid weak announcement. We must avoid reve=
aling the public key until the actual spending transaction is broadcast.
> >=20

> > We need a scheme where the EC public key is not leaked in a weak announ=
cement, but the legitimate owner can verify it, while no one else can. Also=
, once the EC public key is revealed, anyone should be able to verify a pas=
t weak announcement (to validate the transaction when it is broadcast). Thi=
s reduces to the following requirement: we need a proof of knowledge of the=
 EC public key that can be verified if the public key is known and provides=
 no information otherwise.
> >=20

> > I think this is called a zero-knowledge proof. One simple approach coul=
d be to apply a tagged hash function to the concatenation of the EC public =
key and the future wTXID, and include this in the weak announcement. The st=
ructure would be:
> >=20

> > -   UTXO (previous TXID and output index)
> > -   future spending wTXID
> > -   proof :=3D tagged_hash(EC public key || wTXID)
> >=20

> > The wTXID is included in the concatenation to bind the proof to a parti=
cular future transaction. Otherwise, someone could copy a weak announcement=
 and substitute their own wTXID.
> >=20

> > Satoshi could publish a strong announcement now and then monitor all we=
ak announcements involving his UTXOs. If someone publishes a weak announcem=
ent for one of his coins, he could verify the "proof" field. If it is valid=
, it would mean someone has cracked his key with a quantum computer, and he=
 would need to use his strong announcement immediately to reclaim the funds=
 before the attacker does.
> >=20

> > Best,
> > Boris
> >=20

> > On Wednesday, June 4, 2025 at 2:40:53=E2=80=AFPM UTC-3 Leo Wandersleb w=
rote:
> >=20

> > > Hi Boris,
> > > the announcements, weak and strong would have to not be transactions =
yet to be compatible with legacy nodes and thus keep it a soft-fork. They c=
ould be OP_RETURN data. Only after the 144 blocks, the upgraded full nodes =
would allow the inclusion of the actual transaction. This would mean the tr=
ansaction would be both in full in the OP_RETURN strong announcement and wi=
thout the witness part later, so it would be a bit expensive this way but m=
aybe we can do better?
> > >=20

> > > A node that gets updated would have to re-index all the blockchain to=
 find announcements if we don't introduce a time frame for actually using t=
he announcements. We could also say that any announcement has to be used wi=
thin another 1000 blocks. Then the upgrading node would have to re-index th=
e last 1000 blocks.
> > >=20

> > > The legitimate owner of a UTXO might wait for an attack for privacy r=
easons. My proposal would allow Satoshi himself to make all his UTXOs quant=
um safe without any of us learning about him being active. He could add one=
 64B OP_RETURN in 2027 and when QC becomes an issue, we would learn about h=
im having been active in 2027 in 2040 when actually somebody tried to attac=
k and not in 2027 when people started to panic because of imminent quantum =
breakthroughs.
> > > Hmm ... a problem is the weak announcement doesn't require keys, so a=
nybody could provoke Satoshi to come forward. Maybe we have to add key owne=
rship as a requirement for the "weak" announcement, too. So it should also =
contain a serialized transaction.
> > >=20

> > > Best,
> > >=20

> > > Leo
> > >=20

> > > On Wednesday, 4 June 2025 at 04:15:59 UTC+2 Nagaev Boris wrote:
> > >=20

> > > > Hi Leo,
> > > >=20

> > > > Thanks for the clarifications, much appreciated!
> > > > I have a couple of questions:
> > > >=20

> > > > 1. How is a weak announcement stored in the blockchain and in the U=
TXO set?
> > > > I assume it must be a transaction, correct? And it should somehow m=
ark
> > > > the UTXO as planned to be spent for 144 blocks?
> > > > How would older (non-upgraded) nodes interpret a transaction
> > > > containing a weak announcement? Would they just skip over it withou=
t
> > > > any special processing?
> > > > If so, is there a problem for nodes that upgrade after the fork: wo=
uld
> > > > they have to reprocess all blocks since the fork to find and index =
all
> > > > missed weak announcements?
> > > >=20

> > > > 2. In the case of reclaiming a UTXO after a weak announcement by an
> > > > attacker: why would the legitimate owner wait for a weak announceme=
nt
> > > > at all?
> > > > If the EC public key was already leaked, it seems they should publi=
sh
> > > > a strong announcement themselves rather than wait. If the EC public
> > > > key wasn't leaked, there's nothing to worry about even if someone
> > > > publishes a weak announcement: they are most likely bluffing, since
> > > > they wouldn't have the actual public key.
> > > >=20

> > > > Best,
> > > > Boris
> > > >=20

> > > > On Tue, Jun 3, 2025 at 3:29=E2=80=AFPM Leo Wandersleb <lwand...@gma=
il.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi conduition,
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks for your careful analysis - excellent catches.
> > > > >
> > > > > You're absolutely right about the txid vulnerability. The commitm=
ent must be to the complete transaction including witness data (wTXID or eq=
uivalent) to prevent an attacker from pre-committing to unsigned transactio=
ns. This is essential - otherwise an attacker could indeed enumerate the UT=
XO set and create commitments without knowing the private keys.
> > > > >
> > > > > Regarding updates: You're correct that frequent updates would be =
needed as wallets receive new UTXOs. However, I don't see this as a major i=
ssue - users could batch their commitments periodically (say, monthly) rath=
er than after every transaction. The scheme is particularly important for e=
xisting UTXOs that already have exposed pubkeys (old P2PK, reused addresses=
, etc.). For new UTXOs, wallets should ideally migrate to quantum-safe addr=
esses once available. OpenTimestamps aggregation would indeed help with sca=
ling and provide plausible deniability about the number of UTXOs being prot=
ected.
> > > > >
> > > > > The time delay serves a different purpose than you might expect. =
It's not about preventing commitment forgery after pubkey exposure, but rat=
her about allowing priority based on commitment age when multiple parties c=
laim the same UTXO:
> > > > >
> > > > > 1. Weak announcement starts the 144-block window
> > > > > 2. During this window, anyone with a strong commitment can reveal=
 it
> > > > > 3. The oldest valid commitment wins
> > > > >
> > > > > This creates the "poison pill" effect: an attacker might crack a =
key and try to spend a UTXO, but if the original owner has an older commitm=
ent, they can reclaim it during the window. The uncertainty about which UTX=
Os have poison pills makes attacking large "lost" UTXOs risky - hence less =
disruptive to the network.
> > > > >
> > > > > The delay essentially allows a "commitment priority contest" wher=
e age determines the winner, protecting users who prepared early while stil=
l allowing these users to not move their funds.
> > > > >
> > > > > Best,
> > > > >
> > > > > Leo
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Googl=
e Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group.
> > > > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,=
 send an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com.
> > > > > To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/b=
itcoindev/5e393f57-ac87-40fd-93ef-e1006accdb55n%40googlegroups.com.
> > > >=20

> > > >=20

> > > >=20

> > > > --
> > > > Best regards,
> > > > Boris Nagaev
>=20

> --
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> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an=
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> To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoinde=
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