Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D9766B7B for ; Fri, 23 Jun 2017 14:19:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-qt0-f177.google.com (mail-qt0-f177.google.com [209.85.216.177]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 91AA3E9 for ; Fri, 23 Jun 2017 14:19:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-qt0-f177.google.com with SMTP id f92so35415395qtb.2 for ; Fri, 23 Jun 2017 07:19:20 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id :subject:to:cc; bh=H2p2FfDvrq/oN7T+BzGf6dxStcH8kE7yevZcxGWAqMI=; b=G1WNfcEkYvjAI0ThSN/GiybS78HLn8GVpRep4/csnwHbKubXSTxmqtk9ku0VmhefYf PHZNKpyxobTSgkALC0uIDHzue5JCsRjpZ7iI9B6HHzv3i/Gkc0D1mMsKMTgbS0dP+dE1 7zgwrQsr6nl9wMDZJeJ0PyAHOiWYoLJkycdqV8thoSBRRkirtjjBjskJx9yOPcaUy5Bf tK3Sm+APA2ngNcDzUtHY+3HATeOHu6rsTj7y2jcAxrlxifLkRWy2m4aUbiV+acnuqbrk zAQ3bgIGWTifRQRHfXbCox5FeLP1G6pXzRN2up4FcfTIVT908FE3A71JYAKn61XMXG6I TKKQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from :date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=H2p2FfDvrq/oN7T+BzGf6dxStcH8kE7yevZcxGWAqMI=; b=nKz/jyQ8z+5iIEs+wZ/NFOdpm5fy8byATItnd0Kh7pykEl9VELuDkm/q3EZbtaJWk+ Iu00jbtR0kFyjb4/UB/C8rhZno9SsNvo/t7Ls+N8FZxRlC2QeRkPU0oeX/iSGiRLZLpq eiUsoJEIyQ3FqroN8wr7b4qxMnmfMYZdnAKnuiQRm9sgwJ/W1rPY94jpyRFh4G/yLb/2 uyRFEvNbIowp6QESuLMV31mUlg8E+st2MRHgKnSuLSsKHUxExRhD14QO0maN61hixD3Y U84kojsfzLbOPyJWml53j0LSSCIaxaLyo1dA4DrN6XoVnQrwM0h8Vdbos0uXBdYW195W X/XQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AKS2vOx4gWM/SWI3i8vVmhjlj/DOpTdWozCpG3M6/mFHxUSmHy1jkRwb J8yE5XKXdfxDSQBQctc6onamWGsLPlb3Ngg= X-Received: by 10.237.55.228 with SMTP id j91mr9913301qtb.68.1498227559594; Fri, 23 Jun 2017 07:19:19 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: earonesty@gmail.com Received: by 10.237.54.100 with HTTP; Fri, 23 Jun 2017 07:19:18 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <24f2b447-a237-45eb-ef9f-1a62533fad5c@gmail.com> <83671224-f6ff-16a9-81c0-20ab578aec9d@gmail.com> <6764b8af-bb4c-615d-5af5-462127bbbe36@gmail.com> <33d98418-10f0-3854-a954-14985d53e04b@gmail.com> From: Erik Aronesty Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 10:19:18 -0400 X-Google-Sender-Auth: J8H2_hrGzQw6sshZ5drpI8t4BwU Message-ID: To: Paul Sztorc Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a114340c27b7f8f0552a149ab" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 14:28:12 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain RfD -- Follow Up X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 14:19:22 -0000 --001a114340c27b7f8f0552a149ab Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively more expensive due to the extra depreciation cost. This depends on how long you expect to keep money on a side chain and how many transactions you plan on doing. Inflation is a great way of paying PoS / PoB miners - that cannot introduce issues with consolidation. If you design the inflation schedule correctly, it should be balance transaction costs *precisely*. Indeed, you can calculate the exact amount of inflation needed to guarantee that a side chain is always exactly 10 times cheaper than bitcoin. >As I posted to bitcoin-discuss last week, I support UTXO commitments for sidechains. Indeed, I think side chain nodes should always be fast-synced from 6 month old commitments and thus be ephemeral, cheap, and *never *appropriate for long term storage. This would provide the best possible incentive structure to keep the main chain secure, paid for with high clearing fees, etc. > I don't think that blind merged mining messes with the main chain's incentive structure The critical issue is that we cannot introduce protocol changes that *further *incentivize geographical and institutional consolidation. Miners who are able to deal with the bandwidth caused by drivechain coffee transactions will profit from these transactions, whereas smaller and more geographically distributed miners will not. Those miners will, in turn, build faster ASICs and buy more electricity and drive out smaller players. I think this is *abundantly *clear, and is the primary motivation behind preserving block size limits. If this premise is false (which it may be), or is skewed so as to damage bitcoin as a whole (could be as well), then that needs to be demonstrated *first*. The lightning model does the opposite of this. Miners watch fees increase and coming from an *orthoganal* protocol that cannot cause further centralization. One problem is that the main chain also *must* grow in response to bandwidth, or the disadvantages of using the main chain will weaken financial support and hashrate securing it. I believe this is also true, and that a "balancing act" will be Bitcoin's norm until we adopt something like BIP103 - which provides a steady and appropriate growth. On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Paul Sztorc wrote: > Responses inline. > > On 6/22/2017 9:45 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote: > > Users would tolerate depreciation because the intention is to have a cheap > way of transacting using a two-way pegged chain that isn't controlled by > miners. Who cares about some minor depreciation when the purpose of the > chain is to do cheap secure transactions forever? > > > Thus far you've claimed that these transactions would be "cheap", "[not] > controlled by miners", and "secure". > > They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively more > expensive due to the extra depreciation cost. > > I also doubt that they would be free of control by miners. 51% hashrate > can always filter out any message they want from anywhere. > > For the same reason, I don't understand why they would be any more or less > secure. > > So I think your way is just a more expensive way of accomplishing > basically the same result. > > > Add in UTXO commitments and you've got a system that is cheap and > secure-enough for transfer. storage and accumulation of a ledger... before > moving in to the main chain. > > > As I posted to bitcoin-discuss last week, I support UTXO commitments for > sidechains. > > Seems better to me than messing with the main chain's incentive structure > via merged mining. > > > I don't think that blind merged mining messes with the main chain's > incentive structure. Miners are free to ignore the sidechain (and yet still > get paid the same as other miners), as are all mainchain users. > > Paul > > > On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 9:27 AM, Paul Sztorc wrote: > >> Hi Erik, >> >> I don't think that your design is competitive. Why would users tolerate a >> depreciation of X% per year, when there are alternatives which do not >> require such depreciation? It seems to me that none would. >> >> Paul >> >> On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote: >> >> - a proof-of-burn sidechain is the ultimate two-way peg. you have to >> burn bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to mine the side chain. the size of >> the burn is the degree of security. i actually wrote code to do >> randomized blind burns where you have a poisson distribution >> (non-deterministic selected burn). there is no way to game it... it's >> very similar to algorand - but it uses burns instead of staking >> >> - you can then have a secure sidechain that issues a mining reward in >> sidechain tokens, which can be aggrregated and redeemed for bitcoins. the >> result of this is that any bitcoins held in the sidechain depreciate in >> value at a rate of X% per year. this deflation rate pays for increased >> security >> >> - logically this functions like an alt coin, with high inflation and >> cheap transactions. but the altcoin is pegged to bitcoin's price because >> of the pool of unredeemed bitcoins held within the side chain. >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Paul Sztorc wrote: >> >>> Hi Erik, >>> >>> As you know: >>> >>> 1. If a sidechain is merged mined it basically grows out of the existing >>> Bitcoin mining network. If it has a different PoW algorithm it is a new >>> mining network. >>> 2. The security (ie, hashrate) of any mining network would be determined >>> by the total economic value of the block. In Bitcoin this is >>> (subsidy+tx_fees)*price, but since a sidechain cannot issue new tokens it >>> would only be (tx_fees)*price. >>> >>> Unfortunately the two have a nasty correlation which can lead to a >>> disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy: users will avoid a network that is too >>> insecure; and if users avoid using a network, they will stop paying txn >>> fees and so the quantity (tx_fees)*price falls toward zero, erasing the >>> network's security. So it is quite problematic and I recommend just biting >>> the bullet and going with merged mining instead. >>> >>> And, the point may be moot. Bitcoin miners may decide that, given their >>> expertise in seeking out cheap sources of power/cooling, they might as well >>> mine both/all chains. So your suggestion may not achieve your desired >>> result (and would, meanwhile, consume more of the economy's resources -- >>> some of these would not contribute even to a higher hashrate). >>> >>> Paul >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/19/2017 1:11 PM, Erik Aronesty wrote: >>> >>> It would be nice to be able to enforce that a drivechain *not* have the >>> same POW as bitcoin. >>> >>> I suspect this is the only way to be sure that a drivechain doesn't >>> destabilize the main chain and push more power to miners that already have >>> too much power. >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > --001a114340c27b7f8f0552a149ab Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> They would cert= ainly not be cheap, because they are relatively more expensive due to the e= xtra depreciation cost.

This depends on how long you expect t= o keep money on a side chain and how many transactions you plan on doing. = =C2=A0 Inflation is a great way of paying PoS / PoB =C2=A0miners - that can= not introduce issues with consolidation. =C2=A0 If you design the inflation= schedule correctly, it should be balance transaction costs *precisely*. = =C2=A0 Indeed, you can calculate the exact amount of inflation needed to gu= arantee that a side chain is always exactly 10 times cheaper than bitcoin.<= br>
>As I posted to bitcoin-discuss = last week, I support UTXO commitments for sidechains.

Indeed, I think side chain nod= es should always be fast-synced from 6 month old commitments and thus be ep= hemeral, cheap, and never appropriate for long term storage.=C2=A0 T= his would provide the best possible incentive structure to keep the main ch= ain secure, paid for with high clearing fees, etc. =C2=A0=C2=A0

>=C2=A0I don't think that blind = merged mining messes with the main chain's incentive structure=C2=A0
The critical issue is that we cannot introduce protocol changes= that=C2=A0further=C2=A0incentivize=C2=A0geographical and institutio= nal consolidation.=C2=A0 Miners who are able to deal with the bandwidth cau= sed by drivechain coffee transactions will profit from these transactions, = whereas smaller and more geographically distributed miners will not. =C2=A0= Those miners will, in turn, build faster ASICs and buy more electricity an= d drive out smaller players. =C2=A0 I think this is abundantly clear= , and is the primary motivation behind preserving block size limits. =C2=A0= =C2=A0

If this premise is false (which it may be), or is skew= ed so as to damage bitcoin as a whole (could be as well), then that needs t= o be demonstrated first.=C2=A0

The lightnin= g model does the opposite of this. =C2=A0 Miners watch fees increase and co= ming from an *orthoganal* protocol that cannot cause further centralization= . =C2=A0=C2=A0

One problem is that the main chain also *must* grow i= n response to bandwidth, or the disadvantages of using the main chain will = weaken financial support and hashrate securing it. =C2=A0 I believe this is= also true, and that a "balancing act" will be Bitcoin's norm= until we adopt something like BIP103 - which provides a steady and appropr= iate growth.





=
On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com> wrote:
Responses inline.<= span class=3D"">

On 6/22/2017 9:45 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
Users would tolerate depreciation because the intention is to have a cheap way of transacting using a two-way pegged chain that isn't controlled by miners.=C2=A0 Who cares about = some minor depreciation when the purpose of the chain is to do cheap secure transactions forever?

 Thus far you've claimed that these transactions would be "chea= p", "[not] controlled by miners", and "secure".

They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively more expensive due to the extra depreciation cost.

I also doubt that they would be free of control by miners. 51% hashrate can always filter out any message they want from anywhere.

For the same reason, I don't understand why they would be any more or less secure.

So I think your way is just a more expensive way of accomplishing basically the same result.


Add in UTXO commitments and you've got a system that is cheap and secure-enough for transfer. storage and accumulation of a ledger... before moving in to the main chain.

As I posted to bitcoin-discuss last week, I support UTXO commitments for sidechains.

Seems better to me than messing with the main chain's incentive structure via merged mining.

 I don't think that blind merged mining messes with the main chain&#= 39;s incentive structure. Miners are free to ignore the sidechain (and yet still get paid the same as other miners), as are all mainchain users.

Paul

On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 9:27 AM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Erik,

I don't think that your design is competitive. Why woul= d users tolerate a depreciation of X% per year, when there are alternatives which do not require such depreciation? It seems to me that none would.

Paul

On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
- a proof-of-burn sidechain is the ultimate two-way peg. =C2=A0 you have to burn bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to mine the side chain. =C2=A0 the size of the burn is the degree of security. =C2=A0 = =C2=A0i actually wrote code to do randomized blind burns where you have a poisson distribution (non-deterministic selected burn). =C2=A0 =C2=A0there= is no way to game it... it's very similar to algorand - but it uses burns instead of staking

- you can then have a secure sidechain that issues a mining reward in sidechain tokens, which can be aggrregated and redeemed for bitcoins. =C2=A0 the result of this is that any bitcoins held in the sidechain depreciate in value at a rate of X% per year. =C2=A0 this deflation rate pays for increas= ed security

- logically this functions like an alt coin, with high inflation and cheap transactions. =C2=A0 bu= t the altcoin is pegged to bitcoin's price because of the pool of unredeemed bitcoins held within the side chain.



On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com><= /span> wrote:
Hi Erik,

As you know:

1. If a sidechain is merged mined it basically grows out of the existing Bitcoin mining network. If it has a different PoW algorithm it is a new mining network.
2. The security (ie, hashrate) of any mining network would be determined by the total economic value of the block. In Bitcoin this is (subsidy+tx_fees)*price, but since a sidechain cannot issue new tokens it would only be (tx_fees)*price.

Unfortunately the two have a nasty correlation which can lead to a disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy: users will avoid a network that is too insecure; and if users avoid using a network, they will stop paying txn fees and so the quantity (tx_fees)*price falls toward zero, erasing the network's security. So it is quite problematic and I recommend just biting the bullet and going with merged mining instead.

And, the point may be moot. Bitcoin miners may decide that, given their expertise in seeking out cheap sources of power/cooling, they might as well mine both/all chains. So your suggestion may not achieve your desired result (and would, meanwhile, consume more of the economy's resources -- some of these would not contribute even to a higher hashrate).

Paul




On 6/19/2017 1:11 PM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
It would be nice to be able to enforce that a drivechain *not* have the same POW as bitcoin.

I suspect this is the only way to be sure that a drivechain doesn't destabilize the main chain and push more power to miners that already have too much power.








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