Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z67V0-0006fA-M7 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 20 Jun 2015 01:23:10 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.192.46 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.192.46; envelope-from=voisine@gmail.com; helo=mail-qg0-f46.google.com; Received: from mail-qg0-f46.google.com ([209.85.192.46]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z67Uy-0006R5-Re for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 20 Jun 2015 01:23:10 +0000 Received: by qgeu36 with SMTP id u36so41776441qge.2 for ; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:23:03 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.140.194.141 with SMTP id p135mr26314634qha.20.1434763383436; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:23:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.140.91.37 with HTTP; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:23:03 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <20150619103959.GA32315@savin.petertodd.org> <20150619154054.GA13498@savin.petertodd.org> <6716121.uS5ifrNBZv@crushinator> <5584B80A.7000403@petersson.at> Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:23:03 -0700 Message-ID: From: Aaron Voisine To: Mark Friedenbach Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a114273eece7ce30518e8e163 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (voisine[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Z67Uy-0006R5-Re Cc: Bitcoin Development Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2015 01:23:10 -0000 --001a114273eece7ce30518e8e163 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides, for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe. They don't need to be made cryptographically safe, they just have to be safer than, for instance, credit card payments that can be charged back. As long as it's reasonably good in practice, that's fine. Aaron Voisine co-founder and CEO breadwallet.com On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:09 PM, Mark Friedenbach wrote: > What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides, > for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on > single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe. > > On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Andreas Petersson > wrote: > >> I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these >> measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether. >> >> In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a >> similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much >> lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later) >> and the fraud frequency is also much lower. >> >> 0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms >> i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends. >> while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means >> excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it. >> >> RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility >> value. So it's a bad thing. >> >> for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of >> confirmations was always recommended practice. >> >> Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock: >> > Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin >> > payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the >> > irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several >> > blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a >> > co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign >> > a double-spend. >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --001a114273eece7ce30518e8e163 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>=C2=A0What retail needs= is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides, for example), whic= h enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on single-signer zeroconf= transactions that can never be made safe.

They don't need to be made cryptographi= cally safe, they just have to be safer than, for instance, credit card paym= ents that can be charged back. As long as it's reasonably good in=C2=A0= practice, that's fine.


Aaron Voisine
co-founder and CEO
breadwallet.com

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:09 PM, Mark Friede= nbach <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:
What retail needs is escrowed microchannel h= ubs (what lightning provides, for example), which enable untrusted instant = payments. Not reliance on single-signer zeroconf transactions that can neve= r be made safe.

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Andreas Pet= ersson <andreas@petersson.at> wrote:
I have some experience her= e. If you are seriously suggesting these
measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.

In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a
similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much
lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)
and the fraud frequency is also much lower.

0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms
i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.
while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means
excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.

RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility
value. So it's a bad thing.

for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of
confirmations was always recommended practice.

Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:
> Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin<= br> > payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the
> irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several
> blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a
> co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign=
> a double-spend.


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