From: Peter R <peter_r@gmx.com>
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Message-Id: <B5E339E4-10F1-4252-9F40-F19E5609ECE7@gmx.com>
Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2015 18:59:58 -0700
To: "bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Dev"
	<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>, 
	Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.6 \(1510\))
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Your Gmaxwell exchange
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Dear Greg,

I am moving our conversation into public as I've recently learned that =
you've been forwarding our private email conversation verbatim without =
my permission [I received permission from dpinna to share the email that =
proves this fact: http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3].
> Greg wrote to Peter R:  "You know that your "proof" of this =
problematic-- outright false under the discussion we had, or at least =
likely of little pratical relevance under reasonable, pratical =
assumptions.  But you respond to dpinna agreeing with him and not =
cautioning him on relying on these
>=20
The proof is not "problematic."  Right now you're providing an example =
of what Mike Hearn refers to as "black-and-white" thinking.  Just =
because the proof makes simplifying assumptions, doesn't mean it's not =
useful in helping us to understand the dynamics of the transaction fee =
market.  Proofs about physical systems need to make simplifying =
assumptions because the physical world is messy (unlike the world of =
pure math). =20

My proof assumes very reasonably that block solutions contain =
information (i.e., Shannon Entropy) about the transactions included in a =
block.  As long as this is true, and as long as miners act rationally to =
maximize their profit, then the fee market will remain "healthy" =
according to the definitions given in my paper.  This is the case right =
now, this is the case with the Relay Network, and this would be the case =
using any implementation of IBLTs that I can imagine, so long as miners =
retain the ability to construct blocks according to their own volition.  =
The "healthy fee market" result follows from the Shannon-Hartley =
theorem; the SH-theorem describes the maximum rate at which information =
(Shannon Entropy) can be transmitted over a physical communication =
channel.  =20

You are imagining an academic scenario (to use your own words: "perhaps =
of little practical relevance") where all of the block solutions =
announcements contain no information at all about the transactions =
included in the blocks.  Although I agree that the fee market would not =
be healthy in such a scenario, it is my feeling that this also requires =
miners to relinquish their ability to construct blocks according to =
their own volition (i.e., the system would already be centralized).  I =
look forward to reading a white paper where you show:

(a) Under what assumptions/requirements such a communication scheme is =
physically possible.

(b) That such a configuration is not equivalent to a single entity[1] =
controlling >50% of the hash power.

(c) That the network moving into such a configuration is plausible.

Lastly, I'd like to conclude by saying that we are all here trying to =
learn about this new amazing thing called Bitcoin.  Please go ahead and =
write a paper that shows under what network configuration my results =
don't hold.  I'd love to read it!  This is how we make progress in =
science!!

Sincerely,=20
Peter

[1] For example, if--in order to achieve such a configuration with =
infinite coding gain--miners can no longer choose how to structure their =
blocks according to their own volition, then I would classify those =
miners as slaves rather than as peers, and the network as already =
centralized.


Link to forwarded email pastebin: http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div><div>Dear Greg,</div><div><br></div><div>I am moving our =
conversation into public as I've recently learned that you've been =
forwarding our private email conversation verbatim without my permission =
[I received permission from dpinna to share the email that proves this =
fact:&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3">http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3</a>].</=
div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><p dir=3D"ltr">Greg wrote to Peter R: =
&nbsp;<i>"You know that your "proof" of this problematic-- outright =
false under&nbsp;</i><i>the discussion we had, or at least likely of =
little pratical relevance&nbsp;</i><i>under reasonable, pratical =
assumptions.&nbsp; But you respond to dpinna&nbsp;</i><i>agreeing with =
him and not cautioning him on relying on =
these</i></p></blockquote><div>The proof is not "problematic." =
&nbsp;Right now you're providing an example of what Mike Hearn refers to =
as "black-and-white" thinking. &nbsp;Just because the proof makes =
simplifying assumptions, doesn't mean it's not useful in helping us to =
understand the dynamics of the transaction fee market. &nbsp;Proofs =
about&nbsp;<i>physical systems</i>&nbsp;need to make simplifying =
assumptions because the physical world is messy (unlike the world of =
pure math). &nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>My proof assumes very =
reasonably that block solutions contain information (i.e., Shannon =
Entropy) about the transactions included in a block. &nbsp;As long as =
this is true, and as long as miners act rationally to maximize their =
profit, then the fee market will remain "healthy" according to the =
definitions given in my paper. &nbsp;<b>This is the case right now, this =
is the case with the Relay Network, and this would be the case using any =
implementation of IBLTs that I can imagine, so long as miners retain the =
ability to construct blocks according to their own =
volition.</b>&nbsp;&nbsp;The "healthy fee market" result follows from =
the Shannon-Hartley theorem; the SH-theorem describes the maximum rate =
at which information (Shannon Entropy) can be transmitted over a =
physical communication channel. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;</div></div><div><br></div><div>You are imagining an =
academic scenario (to use your own words: "perhaps of little practical =
relevance") where all of the block solutions announcements =
contain&nbsp;<b>no information at all</b>&nbsp;about the transactions =
included in the blocks. &nbsp;Although I agree that the fee market would =
not be healthy in such a scenario, it is my feeling that this also =
requires miners to relinquish their ability to construct blocks =
according to their own volition (i.e., the system would already be =
centralized). &nbsp;I look forward to reading a white paper where you =
show:</div><div><br></div><div>(a) Under what assumptions/requirements =
such a communication scheme is physically =
possible.</div><div><br></div><div>(b) That such a configuration is not =
equivalent to a single entity[1] controlling &gt;50% of the hash =
power.</div><div><br></div><div>(c) That the network moving into such a =
configuration is plausible.</div><div><br></div><div>Lastly, I'd like to =
conclude by saying that we are all here trying to learn about this new =
amazing thing called Bitcoin. &nbsp;Please go ahead and write a paper =
that shows under what network configuration my results don't hold. =
&nbsp;I'd love to read it! &nbsp;This is how we make progress in =
science!!</div><div><br></div><div>Sincerely,&nbsp;</div><div>Peter</div><=
div><br></div><div>[1] For example, if--in order to achieve such a =
configuration with infinite coding gain--miners can no longer choose how =
to structure their blocks according to their own volition, then I would =
classify those miners as slaves rather than as peers, and the network as =
already centralized.</div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Link =
to forwarded email pastebin:&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3">http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3</a></di=
v><div><br></div></body></html>=

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