Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E7A279C for ; Wed, 14 Oct 2015 23:43:12 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-yk0-f171.google.com (mail-yk0-f171.google.com [209.85.160.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1B8ADF6 for ; Wed, 14 Oct 2015 23:43:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ykdt21 with SMTP id t21so2854900ykd.3 for ; Wed, 14 Oct 2015 16:43:11 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=GELc5y7Z6VBY/2oWmH6Mp93xEYwd0kVEQIkqvCMgL8w=; b=X8UyTKx/Lkm8jgfPfoKw/oh7EZ4HfC930TPfwMwaspUFxyBOjo59blyTMJV3DeSKdB usw0rPbW7tke5dgAauiNHrLkG0OZnZeJhGN57SWsO36Vt44T03rYwITjwXGYh0HgIpo9 DVOsj15O5L8Lwo0PtwzsZZqV5EF5VylC565pjVRIjRD9Y3bKh6FLFMGneUkrNQGuFeLS CGHzFtrXTKPq6YKgsVBj4W+oSSks6ZboIMPuAQK49+A3s0sB7+zXqzM/W8uc+MSP8vuR tUtCEMgjkLqZAebvnBaYaVWpCC6Ur2IX1XqJBs6Yx05liLqoXEinqqmDzDJ6yFkwdnnp +Fog== X-Received: by 10.129.129.66 with SMTP id r63mr4407512ywf.87.1444866191337; Wed, 14 Oct 2015 16:43:11 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.129.45.66 with HTTP; Wed, 14 Oct 2015 16:42:31 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <561ED92C.2090203@sky-ip.org> References: <561E2B09.3090509@sky-ip.org> <561E7283.2080507@gmail.com> <561ED92C.2090203@sky-ip.org> From: Daniel Newton Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 12:42:31 +1300 Message-ID: To: s7r@sky-ip.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=94eb2c080096154d7e0522192059 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Lightning Network's effect on miner fees X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 23:43:13 -0000 --94eb2c080096154d7e0522192059 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 You could make the same argument about changetip, coinbase, bitstamp or any other entity that operates off chain transactions. 1) There is probably no way of blocking them or enforcing fee collection from entities that operate off chain transactions 2) They all have to settle on chain eventually On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 11:37 AM, s7r via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > On 10/14/2015 6:19 PM, Paul Sztorc wrote: > > LN transactions are a substitute good for on-chain transactions. > > > > Therefore, demand for on-chain transactions will decrease as a > > result of LN, meaning that fees will be lower than they would > > otherwise be. > > > > However, the two are also perfect compliments, as LN transactions > > cannot take place at all without periodic on-chain transactions. > > > > The demand for *all* Bitcoin transactions (LN and otherwise) is > > itself a function of innumerable factors, one of which is the > > question "Which form of money [Bitcoin or not-Bitcoin] do I think > > my trading partners will be using?". By supporting a higher rate of > > (higher-quality) Bitcoin transactions, the net result is highly > > uncertain, but will probably be that LN actually increases trading > > fees. > > Probably yes. But probably no. Having less hashing power is not good, > and it's unrelated to scalability and decentralization, it's related > to security. Of course we could argue that the hashing power is not > super decentralized at this moment but it's unrelated to the topic. > > I'd rather have less decentralized big amount of hashing power as > opposite to less hashing power. > > One theory, very close to yours, is that if Bitcoin transactions > demand grows so high that we need the lightning network, there should > be plenty of on chain transactions for miners to collect fees from. > > I haven't yet seen the incentives of everyone involved in lightning > network (payment channel end points, hub operators, miners, etc.) but > would it make sense to enforce a % of the fees collected by on payment > hubs to be spent as miner fees, regardless if the transactions from > that hub go on the main chain or not? > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) > > iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWHtksAAoJEIN/pSyBJlsR9Y0H+QE/XdW7yauhrNJtp2eIBPg9 > zVUanzR2LT0zAkeF5/Xsx3PFoypALOV7R0YNL29jI3F2XkZA8v24wfNvPi0DETcC > ZOxw4G1erIEjjj51Qz4M7okjQecJxPHOJ+Nz6iNZEDFcZG2b15phCRSQKZwSHP+b > Erw6a4NPs1foieZyk260KSOB8lFs9e8bUJfXd4FfA7l60RA9582K6p05aqVtehFW > ONTe8ULv8F0ba+EzVyTodzzY6ehjD+uc31zL6mDFIbiW+InivFbfi2uDVN1BP/US > m99lLHvDEthnkTokFrbDu81kXdD0lHwIu4O0EMzCnw2E0vWi3sGKd+M0P0sv4WA= > =1qxh > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --94eb2c080096154d7e0522192059 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
You could make the same argument about changetip= , coinbase, bitstamp or any other entity that operates off chain transactio= ns.

1) There is probably no way of blocking them or enforcing = fee collection from entities that operate off chain transactions
2= ) They all have to settle on chain eventually

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 11:37 AM, s7= r via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.o= rg> wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP S= IGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 10/14/2015 6:19 PM, Paul Sztorc wrote:
> LN transactions are a substitute good for on-chain transactions.
>
> Therefore, demand for on-chain transactions will decrease as a
> result of LN, meaning that fees will be lower than they would
> otherwise be.
>
> However, the two are also perfect compliments, as LN transactions
> cannot take place at all without periodic on-chain transactions.
>
> The demand for *all* Bitcoin transactions (LN and otherwise) is
> itself a function of innumerable factors, one of which is the
> question "Which form of money [Bitcoin or not-Bitcoin] do I think=
> my trading partners will be using?". By supporting a higher rate = of
> (higher-quality) Bitcoin transactions, the net result is highly
> uncertain, but will probably be that LN actually increases trading
> fees.

Probably yes. But probably no. Having less hashing power is not good,
and it's unrelated to scalability and decentralization, it's relate= d
to security. Of course we could argue that the hashing power is not
super decentralized at this moment but it's unrelated to the topic.

I'd rather have less decentralized big amount of hashing power as
opposite to less hashing power.

One theory, very close to yours, is that if Bitcoin transactions
demand grows so high that we need the lightning network, there should
be plenty of on chain transactions for miners to collect fees from.

I haven't yet seen the incentives of everyone involved in lightning
network (payment channel end points, hub operators, miners, etc.) but
would it make sense to enforce a % of the fees collected by on payment
hubs to be spent as miner fees, regardless if the transactions from
that hub go on the main chain or not?
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