Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DF00C002D for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 17:10:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D761540393 for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 17:10:49 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org D761540393 Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=protonmail.com header.i=@protonmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=protonmail3 header.b=Jkaj1dxb X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.102 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.102 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZohccEkZLjOO for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 17:10:48 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org BFD9040104 Received: from mail-40130.protonmail.ch (mail-40130.protonmail.ch [185.70.40.130]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BFD9040104 for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 17:10:47 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 17:10:37 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=protonmail3; t=1673370645; x=1673629845; bh=lPgSPW4vtPIQeVDzUCf5EmSSYoTfcbQg4wjCnZoPzFk=; h=Date:To:From:Subject:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: Feedback-ID:From:To:Cc:Date:Subject:Reply-To:Feedback-ID: Message-ID:BIMI-Selector; b=Jkaj1dxbZddHFGfaAT3s2FpeDGK3/fNNVQ9PfxjLzV3KcvUZAyHK8QkfWy+jQJ1/i B95Mot96ljv7Ua3b3XDDJmmfzGAVze10UTMN2e6V5LHlb9T96VTzjSPtK0Rj9lIwqG UrxPxjGRFxQ5D7jvXAXs2N0pR4JQMupNLv2fYbYyWWuGZQXdBRsnzXrrAp+cv4Ex+G NiXYqw2Pk8fo2mYqFN82S0ZJaZEFMpXpK9SAmfa8MaGtfqfgaxAw2ouPmH05P5FobP MdlSC2u6LuRqLYGPUiAiyFCXgjykzOBcIwD0ZLpe4fxg41G6YJ+XTM/PMmhJf0EkZ0 BcR9hzqEdyScA== To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion From: alicexbt Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Feedback-ID: 40602938:user:proton MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 09:59:50 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Why Full-RBF Makes DoS Attacks on Multiparty Protocols Significantly More Expensive X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 17:10:50 -0000 Hi Peter, > Bringing up Whirlpool here is silly. Everyone knows Samourai has made, at= best, > some rather insane technical decisions. Quite likely downright malicious = with > their xpub collection. Their opinion isn't relevant. Cite reputable sourc= es. I didn't want this thread to become a wasabi vs samourai debate instead wan= ted to focus on full-rbf and how it affects different coinjoin implementati= ons. Samourai wallet can be used with [dojo][0] that includes full node and= Whirlpool can be used in [sparrow Wallet][1] as well. There are several re= asons to not use wasabi and consider their opinion irrelevant. Wasabi has m= any privacy issues including address reuse and consolidation in a coinjoin = tx. They completely lost their reputation after deciding to work with chain= analysis firms that help governments for censorship of some UTXOs. Even _nothingmuch_ who has contributed to Wasabi's coinjoin implementation = has [no major issues][2] with whirlpool if used properly. Some [tweets][3] = in this thread even show their incompetence and major issues with wabisabi. Anyway thanks for responding to other things I mentioned in last email. [0]: https://code.samourai.io/dojo/samourai-dojo [1]: https://sparrowwallet.com/docs/mixing-whirlpool.html [2]: https://twitter.com/search?lang=3Den&q=3Dwhirlpool%20(from%3AmHaGqnOAC= yFm0h5)&src=3Dtyped_query [3]: https://twitter.com/mHaGqnOACyFm0h5/status/1538748210210013184 /dev/fd0 floppy disc guy Sent with Proton Mail secure email. ------- Original Message ------- On Tuesday, January 10th, 2023 at 3:33 PM, Peter Todd = wrote: > On Tue, Jan 10, 2023 at 09:19:39AM +0000, alicexbt wrote: >=20 > > Hi Peter, > >=20 > > > ## How Full-RBF Mitigates the Double-Spend DoS Attack > > >=20 > > > Modulo tx-pinning, full-rbf mitigates the double-spend DoS attack in = a very > > > straightforward way: the low fee transaction is replaced by the highe= r fee > > > transaction, resulting in the latter getting mined in a reasonable am= ount of > > > time and the protocol making forward progress. > >=20 > > Asking this question based on a discussion on twitter. How would you ge= t extra sats to increase the fees? >=20 >=20 > You're misunderstanding the issue. There is no need for extra sats to inc= rease > fees. Coinjoin transactions already have fees set at a level at which you= 'd > expect them to be mined in a reasonable amount of time. Full-RBF ensures = that, > modulo tx pinning, either the coinjoin gets mined, or any double-spend ha= s to > have a high enough feerate that it will be mined in a reasonable amount o= f time > as well. >=20 > > It seems this would be possible with Joinmarket, Wasabi and even joinst= r although things would get worse for Whirlpool. Whirlpool coinjoin transac= tions do not signal BIP 125 RBF so they were not replaceable earlier >=20 >=20 > Bringing up Whirlpool here is silly. Everyone knows Samourai has made, at= best, > some rather insane technical decisions. Quite likely downright malicious = with > their xpub collection. Their opinion isn't relevant. Cite reputable sourc= es. >=20 > Anyway, Wasabi would like to move to making coinjoins opt-in to RBF. Thou= gh > full-rbf may come sooner; for technical reasons opt-in RBF is ugly to imp= lement > now as activation needs to be coordinated accross all clients: >=20 > https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/issues/9041#issuecomment-1376653= 020 >=20 > > however attacker would be able to perform DoS attacks now by double spe= nding their inputs used in coinjoin. >=20 >=20 > As I explained, attackers can already do this with or without full-rbf si= mply > by picking the right time to broadcast the double spend. It's not an effe= ctive > attack anyway: with a UTXO you can already hold up a coinjoin round by si= mply > failing to complete stage #2 of the coinjoin. Actually doing a double-spe= nd > simply guarantees that you're spending money on it. It's only effective w= ith > low-fee double-spends in the absence of full-rbf. >=20 >=20 > This tweet is nuts. Eg "Gives well connected mining pools an added advant= age" > is simply false. Full-RBF does the exact opposite. >=20 > -- > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org