Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from <will.yager@gmail.com>) id 1WdPV0-0000lY-HL for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 19:39:58 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.216.179 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.216.179; envelope-from=will.yager@gmail.com; helo=mail-qc0-f179.google.com; Received: from mail-qc0-f179.google.com ([209.85.216.179]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1WdPUz-0007Qn-Pw for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 19:39:58 +0000 Received: by mail-qc0-f179.google.com with SMTP id l6so2181215qcy.38 for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 12:39:52 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.224.73.136 with SMTP id q8mr5760703qaj.54.1398368392314; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 12:39:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.140.27.135 with HTTP; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 12:39:52 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <CAG8oi1NDfoDBT_DmcBVhc0tMMhO55oDcrQBbGmqh9OfgsnG4Lg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAG8oi1NDfoDBT_DmcBVhc0tMMhO55oDcrQBbGmqh9OfgsnG4Lg@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 14:39:52 -0500 Message-ID: <CAG8oi1NRq-=+8oRx00B0XvhUatnXqNZukCGs4NatLgZMw4RK1Q@mail.gmail.com> From: William Yager <will.yager@gmail.com> To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c3dc484a029004f7cf03ab X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (will.yager[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1WdPUz-0007Qn-Pw Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Proposal: Base58 encoded HD Wallet root key with optional encryption X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net> List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development> List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net> List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe> X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 19:39:58 -0000 --001a11c3dc484a029004f7cf03ab Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Gmaxwell pointed out that we could safely front-load all the key pre-stretching. The spec has been updated to take advantage of this. The user's password is now protected by 10,000 rounds of salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, as well as the main KDF (which ranges from scrypt 2^14/8/8 to scrypt 2^18/16/16 and PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 2^16 to 2^21). Will On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 7:05 PM, William Yager <will.yager@gmail.com> wrote: > > The idea is that more powerful devices (mobile phones, laptops, etc.) can > do all the key-stretching on their own, whereas weaker devices with access > to another device with more computing power (like Trezors) do a fair amount > of key-stretching on their own, but can safely export the rest of the > key-stretching to the other device. > --001a11c3dc484a029004f7cf03ab Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <div dir=3D"ltr">Gmaxwell pointed out that we could safely front-load all t= he key pre-stretching. The spec has been updated to take advantage of this.= <div><br></div><div>The user's password is now protected by 10,000 roun= ds of salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, as well as the main KDF (which ranges from= scrypt 2^14/8/8 to scrypt 2^18/16/16 and PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 2^16 to 2^21).= </div> <div><br></div><div>Will</div><div><br><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div= class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 7:05 PM, William Yager <span= dir=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mailto:will.yager@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">= will.yager@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br> <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p= x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><br></div><div>The ide= a is that more powerful devices (mobile phones, laptops, etc.) can do all t= he key-stretching on their own, whereas weaker devices with access to anoth= er device with more computing power (like Trezors) do a fair amount of key-= stretching on their own, but can safely export the rest of the key-stretchi= ng to the other device.</div> </div></blockquote></div></div></div></div></div> --001a11c3dc484a029004f7cf03ab--