MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <PS2P216MB0179EC99BDE0E3388F2627F89DF30@PS2P216MB0179.KORP216.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
 <F713CAAC-1997-4645-A166-57358E520594@voskuil.org>
 <CAGLBAhdTMbZPwqV9YLMyHdNzLbN2DLjiOe6cBUbkwR_x4cGRmQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <20200323125922.GA29881@canndrew.org>
In-Reply-To: <20200323125922.GA29881@canndrew.org>
From: Dave Scotese <dscotese@litmocracy.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2020 11:39:05 -0700
Message-ID: <CAGLBAhcUgTEWnraFem0YwODc61B4nwbzddHJtE0D7ZCjUNWfYg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Andrew Cann <shum@canndrew.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000eba2f405a189f355"
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block solving slowdown question/poll
Precedence: list

--000000000000eba2f405a189f355
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

I believe this isn't something we need to address.  The fact is that every
byte stored in the blockchain is already valuable to everyone who downloads
the blockchain because of what it allows them to prove - by adding more
bytes to it.  Over time, the value per byte will increase.  Perhaps there
will be holding companies with specialized scripts that cost $500 - $1000
to add to the blockchain and allow those companies to handle transactions
for thousands of customers, kind of like a community lightning channel.

Anyway, yes, your idea is fundamentally broken because a zero block reward
happens because creating even one more satoshi will push the amount of
bitcoin over 21,000,0000, breaking the meaning of "bitcoin," or, if you
like, creating a fundamental contradiction in our use of the term.

On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 5:59 AM Andrew Cann <shum@canndrew.org> wrote:

> Hi, noob question here: Is there a long-term plan for if the block reward
> drops
> too low to ensure the security of the network?
>
> IIUC miners only make profit from block rewards and transaction fees, and
> once
> the block reward drop to zero we're merely hoping that transaction fees
> will
> keep mining expensive enough to stop a state actor or someone from buying
> enough hash power to attack the network. If that's the case, should we
> start
> making plans now to change the protocol to allow an adjustable block
> reward?
>
> Here's a half-baked idea I had of how that could work: Since the block
> reward
> dilutes the value of the currency bitcoin holders have an incentive to
> keep the
> reward low. However, since the block reward is also (partly) what
> incentivizes
> mining, bitcoin holders also have an incentive to keep the reward high
> enough
> to keep the network secure. So if bitcoin holders were able to vote to
> decide
> the block reward they "should", hypothetically, reliably choose a value
> that
> balances these two concerns. You could implement this voting by adding an
> optional extra field to every txout that signals what the holder thinks the
> inflation rate should be. If the field is missing you just assume the
> default
> value based on the current protocol. Then, whenever a new block is mined,
> you
> take the median inflation rate of all the pre-existing utxos, weighted by
> the
> utxo value, to calculate the block's reward.
>
> Is this idea fundamentally broken somehow? Or are there already better
> ideas
> for how to tackle this problem (I don't follow this list very closely)? Or
> is
> this actually a non-issue to start with?
>
>  - Andrew
>
>

-- 
I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a
techie?
I own Litmocracy <http://www.litmocracy.com> and Meme Racing
<http://www.memeracing.net> (in alpha).
I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist <http://www.voluntaryist.com> which
now accepts Bitcoin.
I also code for The Dollar Vigilante <http://dollarvigilante.com/>.
"He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi
Nakamoto

--000000000000eba2f405a189f355
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I believe this isn&#39;t something we need to address.=C2=
=A0 The fact is that every byte stored in the blockchain is already valuabl=
e to everyone who downloads the blockchain because of what it allows them t=
o prove - by adding more bytes to it.=C2=A0 Over time, the value per byte w=
ill increase.=C2=A0 Perhaps there will be holding companies with specialize=
d scripts that cost $500 - $1000 to add to the blockchain and allow those c=
ompanies to handle transactions for thousands of customers, kind of like a =
community lightning channel.<div><br></div><div>Anyway, yes, your idea is f=
undamentally broken because a zero block reward happens because creating ev=
en one more satoshi will push the amount of bitcoin over 21,000,0000, break=
ing the meaning of &quot;bitcoin,&quot; or, if you like, creating a fundame=
ntal contradiction in our use of the term.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 5:5=
9 AM Andrew Cann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:shum@canndrew.org">shum@canndrew.org=
</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=
Hi, noob question here: Is there a long-term plan for if the block reward d=
rops<br>
too low to ensure the security of the network?<br>
<br>
IIUC miners only make profit from block rewards and transaction fees, and o=
nce<br>
the block reward drop to zero we&#39;re merely hoping that transaction fees=
 will<br>
keep mining expensive enough to stop a state actor or someone from buying<b=
r>
enough hash power to attack the network. If that&#39;s the case, should we =
start<br>
making plans now to change the protocol to allow an adjustable block reward=
?<br>
<br>
Here&#39;s a half-baked idea I had of how that could work: Since the block =
reward<br>
dilutes the value of the currency bitcoin holders have an incentive to keep=
 the<br>
reward low. However, since the block reward is also (partly) what incentivi=
zes<br>
mining, bitcoin holders also have an incentive to keep the reward high enou=
gh<br>
to keep the network secure. So if bitcoin holders were able to vote to deci=
de<br>
the block reward they &quot;should&quot;, hypothetically, reliably choose a=
 value that<br>
balances these two concerns. You could implement this voting by adding an<b=
r>
optional extra field to every txout that signals what the holder thinks the=
<br>
inflation rate should be. If the field is missing you just assume the defau=
lt<br>
value based on the current protocol. Then, whenever a new block is mined, y=
ou<br>
take the median inflation rate of all the pre-existing utxos, weighted by t=
he<br>
utxo value, to calculate the block&#39;s reward.<br>
<br>
Is this idea fundamentally broken somehow? Or are there already better idea=
s<br>
for how to tackle this problem (I don&#39;t follow this list very closely)?=
 Or is<br>
this actually a non-issue to start with?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0- Andrew<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">I like to provide some work at =
no charge to prove my value. Do you need a techie?=C2=A0 <br>I own <a href=
=3D"http://www.litmocracy.com" target=3D"_blank">Litmocracy</a> and <a href=
=3D"http://www.memeracing.net" target=3D"_blank">Meme Racing</a> (in alpha)=
. <br>I&#39;m the webmaster for <a href=3D"http://www.voluntaryist.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">The Voluntaryist</a> which now accepts Bitcoin.<br>I also co=
de for <a href=3D"http://dollarvigilante.com/" target=3D"_blank">The Dollar=
 Vigilante</a>.<br>&quot;He ought to find it more profitable to play by the=
 rules&quot; - Satoshi Nakamoto</div></div>

--000000000000eba2f405a189f355--