Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1We0hh-0003IH-FX for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 26 Apr 2014 11:23:33 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of petertodd.org designates 62.13.149.56 as permitted sender) client-ip=62.13.149.56; envelope-from=pete@petertodd.org; helo=outmail149056.authsmtp.com; Received: from outmail149056.authsmtp.com ([62.13.149.56]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1We0hf-0006WB-T0 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 26 Apr 2014 11:23:33 +0000 Received: from mail-c235.authsmtp.com (mail-c235.authsmtp.com [62.13.128.235]) by punt17.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id s3QBNPDt029562; Sat, 26 Apr 2014 12:23:25 +0100 (BST) Received: from savin (76-10-178-109.dsl.teksavvy.com [76.10.178.109]) (authenticated bits=128) by mail.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id s3QBNLw1033235 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Sat, 26 Apr 2014 12:23:24 +0100 (BST) Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2014 07:23:12 -0400 From: Peter Todd To: Bitcoin Development Message-ID: <20140426112312.GA17949@savin> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="k+w/mQv8wyuph6w0" Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Server-Quench: 2e7a46df-cd35-11e3-b802-002590a15da7 X-AuthReport-Spam: If SPAM / abuse - report it at: http://www.authsmtp.com/abuse X-AuthRoute: OCd2Yg0TA1ZNQRgX IjsJECJaVQIpKltL GxAVKBZePFsRUQkR aAdMdAQUGUUGAgsB AmIbWlZeUl57W2c7 bAxPbAVDY01GQQRq WVdMSlVNFUsrAn1z eGJZUxlxdAdFfTBy ZEdrWz5ZCUMrcUAp FFMHQW4DeGZhPWMC AkhYdR5UcAFPdx8U a1UrBXRDFDleOyM+ FhMyOT95MTJCIiBY BxoVIFQeWg4UHyI8 DwwdGnA3FFcZVm0o Ihgob1MHF1wWLQ08 NkFpWVMXM1cMAwlD EiMFHDVQIUIITDYq CgVBNQAA X-Authentic-SMTP: 61633532353630.1023:706 X-AuthFastPath: 0 (Was 255) X-AuthSMTP-Origin: 76.10.178.109/587 X-AuthVirus-Status: No virus detected - but ensure you scan with your own anti-virus system. X-Spam-Score: -1.5 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record X-Headers-End: 1We0hf-0006WB-T0 Cc: info@mycelium.com Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Eliminating double-spends with two-party self-escrow for high value transactions X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2014 11:23:33 -0000 --k+w/mQv8wyuph6w0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In the majority of high-value transactions the fact that funds will be sent is known prior to when they actually are. For instance, if Alice is to meet Bob in person to buy a car or sell some Bitcoins, both parties know the transaction will probably happen in the near future some time before it actually does. Existing escrow solutions already take advantage of this fact; for instance Localbitcoins provides sellers the ability to escrow their funds with Localbitcoins prior to when the funds are released to the buyer. However with nLockTime a third-party escrow agent is *not* required. Instead prior to Alice sending the funds to the escrow address, she has Bob sign a refund transaction that unlocks at some time in the future. Generally the transaction does go through, and Alice and Bob sign a second transaction sending the funds to Bob. Sometimes it doesn't, and Alice either gets Bob to sign a transaction sending the funds back to her, or in the worst-case, just waits for the timeout to elapse. Note that this technique can be used in addition to a third-party escrow agent - the third-party then only plays a role in exceptional circumstances. Implementation sketch: Mycelium Local Trader -------------------------------------------- The Mycelium Local Trader(1) is functionality built into the Mycelium Android wallet that helps users trade cash for bitcoins by finding traders in their local area. To attempt to prevent double-spends it uses "transaction confidence", a technique that attempts to determine how many nodes on the network a given transaction has propagated too. Of course this technique is fragile and vulnerable to many attacks. Local Trader already has pre-meetup buyer to seller communication built in. Within the application the buyers and sellers communicate and negotiate the amount and price of the Bitcoins prior to arranging a meeting place. We can extend this to self-escrow as follows: 1) Alice publishes her offer to sell Bitcoins for cash. 2) Bob replies to the offer with an unused pubkey, B. 3) Alice creates tx1 paying a CHECKMULTISIG scriptPubKey spendable by the co-operation of her pubkey, A, and Bob's pubkey, B. She signs tx1 but does not publish it. 4) Alice creates tx_refund which is nLockTime'd until some point in the future and returns the output of tx1 to an address she controls. Note how tx_refund depends on the signed tx1. 5) Alice sends Bob the hash of tx_refund for him to sign. As Bob does not have the actual transaction Bob can't selectivly target tx1 for a transaction mutability attack. Bob is free to sign the hash as the pubkey has never been used before. Note that the tx_refund hash Bob signs should be calculated with SIGHASH_SINGLE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY to allow Alice to, for instance, add fees. 6) Bob replies with the signature. 7) Alice checks the validity of the signature, and if satisfied, publishes tx1 to the network. 8) Alice and/or Bob travel to actually meet in person. If this takes time t the probability of a block being generated during that time is P=3D1-e^(1/10mins*t) For instance, with a travel time of 30 minutes we get 95% success, 1 hour 99.75%, and 2 hours 99.999% success. 9a) If the cash is handed over successfully Alice signs a SIGHASH_SINGLE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY signature for the tx1 output spending the funds to a scriptPubKey specified by Bob and gives that signature to him. 10a) Bob creates a transaction spending the output, adds Alice's signature to it, and finally signs it himself. He broadcasts this transaction to the network, completing the transfer. 9b) If the cash is NOT handed over successfully Alice and Bob can either co-operate to cancel the transaction immediately, sending the escrowed funds back to Alice, or Alice can wait until the timeout to use the signature she had Bob prepare in advance. While the above is relatively complex, from the user's point of view the process is quite similar to how Mycelium already works: Alice: Publish offer -> Accept offer -> Travel -> Release funds Bob: Browse ads -> Reserve funds -> Travel -> Accept The chief difference being that the funds for the transaction have been reserved, and if the transaction does not go through, will not be unlocked without the co-operation of the other party, or the expiration of the timeout. Transaction Malleability ------------------------ While the above is fairly secure if transactions aren't being mutated en-mass, better protections would be desirable. First of all adding a third-party escrow to the two-party escrow is a prudent last ditch measure to ensure that if malleability is an issue the third-party can release locked funds manually; note how SIGHASH_SINGLE is used as opposed to SIGHASH_NONE to prevent that third-party from having access to the funds. Secondly a future soft-fork such as Pieter Wuille's BIP62(2) can eliminate malleability. In particular, a soft-fork that enabled the creation of signatures that did *not* include the txin txid would be particularly valuable; in step 4 above Bob's refund signature signed over the scriptPubKey and nLockTime only would cover all possible cases whre a refund would be needed, such as accidental multiple payments and previously unknown sources of malleability. 1) http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/236k5d/mycelium_local_trader_is= _now_available/ 2) https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0062.mediawiki --=20 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 00000000000000009c143a1773a5dc24477ec151689bc78ffdd00a232bd533c8 --k+w/mQv8wyuph6w0 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) iQGrBAEBCACVBQJTW5cXXhSAAAAAABUAQGJsb2NraGFzaEBiaXRjb2luLm9yZzAw MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAyY2M2NGYzODFlYjRjMjc5ZmU3ODkyYTg0NTE3MjAzYTc2 NTkxNjk2YzZkNmExOGQvFIAAAAAAFQARcGthLWFkZHJlc3NAZ251cGcub3JncGV0 ZUBwZXRlcnRvZC5vcmcACgkQJIFAPaXwkftr0Af/eToQfrUhTk7HO2OoJYLOQSmL ms6b49DHmq1TzHnqw19b9IElCv7sVA+9usa4PT/KcGrBCuXSGZRitPB/t7926uqr AFv9eVjr+tjFPTapYC7owGxsX9V5Ckd4+sIzgAKgdg84wAdlZUeJewnv4SKOGidL Wc2t5pHxxQD0Fd9xyyz8XD7YdveC2Zx43tanSJHWXG6vNMTYUGAS7IBvCa69lJJw jGyXcuVtaR7jaXgwFxM3TXPBYVFEfw07rVlAoCkJMDkKaZEyX8EboK8/vKdK14Nj sqQiHTbQbYin0dSRlLp72Z69bRv/1M4BZBvAyRWKLAjQDhFgCqyfVC7tOlnnpw== =ib/f -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --k+w/mQv8wyuph6w0--