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Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:00:55 +0100
Message-ID: <CAE-z3OVQ3kwRVTKmTn8spYRmsSpnUB7=5MJBJsKAyKgKDD4KpQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Tier Nolan <tier.nolan@gmail.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1147b3ae105ffa0518e1de18
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee
Precedence: list

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On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:42 PM, Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo@gmail.com> wrote:

> If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should
> explicitly define one rather than relying on =E2=80=9Cprima facie=E2=80=
=9D assumptions.
> Otherwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence of a signed
> transaction as proof of intent to pay=E2=80=A6
>

Outputs could be marked as "locked".  If you are performing a zero
confirmation spend, then the recipient could insist that you flag the
output for them as non-reducible.

This reduces privacy since it would be obvious which output was change.  If
both are locked, then the fee can't be increased.

This would be information that miners could ignore though.

Creating the right incentives is hard though.  Blocks could be
"discouraged" if they have a double spend that is known about for a while
which reduces payment for a locked output.

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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:42 PM, Eric Lombrozo <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:elombrozo@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">elomb=
rozo@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0p=
x 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">If we =
want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should explicitly defi=
ne one rather than relying on =E2=80=9Cprima facie=E2=80=9D assumptions. Ot=
herwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence of a signed transac=
tion as proof of intent to pay=E2=80=A6<br></blockquote><br></div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote">Outputs could be marked as &quot;locked&quot;.=C2=A0 If y=
ou are performing a zero confirmation spend, then the recipient could insis=
t that you flag the output for them as non-reducible.<br><br>This reduces p=
rivacy since it would be obvious which output was change.=C2=A0 If both are=
 locked, then the fee can&#39;t be increased.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote"><br>This would be information that miners could ignore though.=C2=A0=
 <br><br>Creating the right incentives is hard though.=C2=A0 Blocks could b=
e &quot;discouraged&quot; if they have a double spend that is known about f=
or a while which reduces payment for a locked output.<br></div></div></div>

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